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Abstract  
 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by Chinese enterprises have played 
a crucial role in China’s expansion in the global economy. Thanks to the impressive 
internationalization of Chinese enterprises, China has become a major player in the 
world’s cross-border M&A market. Although there has been a growing body of 
research investigating the motivations for Chinese cross-border M&A, most studies 
have overlooked the China-specific mechanism of cross-border M&As undertaken 
by its state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This thesis aims to fill this important gap.  
 
Building on a political economy analysis, descriptive data exploration, and in-depth 
elite interviews with an emphasis on the institutional perspective, this thesis 
contributes to existing research by providing a new framework for conceptualizing 
the role of the informal and formal institutions in shaping the specific features of 
Chinese SOEs’ cross-border M&As. This thesis reveals a number of important 
findings. First, the political economy analysis highlights the concept of national 
rejuvenation as the key element of China’s informal institution. This informal 
objective has been formally institutionalized and can be observed through national 
policies and regulation. Second, the descriptive data analysis shows evidence of the 
directive from the state on the regional and industrial distribution of cross-border 
M&As by Chinese SOEs. Third, the in-depth interviews with China M&A experts 
confirm the top-down command where the objective of national rejuvenation is to be 
pursued by SOEs and SOE managers through cross-border M&As. 
  
The informal objective of national rejuvenation has been institutionalized, and 
through formal control mechanisms the state ensures that the objective of national 
rejuvenation is collectively shared among the state, SOEs, and SOE managers. The 
policy implications derived from this research reveal, the state implemented systems 
to regulate cross-border M&A activities that SOEs and SOE managers are expected 
to closely follow can be simplified to increase efficiency. The number of 
bureaucratic formalities can be reduced, as well as streamlining the M&A process, 
and delegating greater autonomy to SOEs and SOE managers.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
1.1 Motivation for this research: Heterogeneous pattern of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) vs. non-SOEs in China 
 
Since 1978 China has been undergoing socio-economic reforms, transitioning from a 
centrally planned economy to one driven more by market forces. In doing so, 
economic reform has been experimental. Deng Xiaoping famously characterized this 
as “crossing the river while feeling the stones one by one.” The goal was to create an 
efficient market economy akin to those seen in developed nations, while at the same 
time, encouraging majority state ownership in key industrial and service sectors 
(Perkins, 2018). This would allow China to maintain both a leading economic and 
political role, while also, creating a modern socialist market economy, with unique 
Chinese characteristics (Lin et al., 2003).  
 
As a result of economic reform, China has experienced unprecedented economic and 
social development. China is now the second largest economy in the world in terms 
of nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and, is the world largest economy in terms 
of power purchasing parity (PPP) (IMF, 2018). 1 Much of China’s economic success 
has resulted in substantial outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). For example, 
in 2016, China was the second largest source of OFDI. In addition, OFDI by China 
totalled USD $196 billion in 2016, with much of it driven by a surge of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (UNCTAD, 2017). Furthermore, 2016 saw the 
greatest amount of cross-border M&A in Chinese history; a total of 438 deals with a 
collective value of USD $99.33 billion were successfully concluded (UNCTAD, 
2017). 
 
The total number of cross-border M&A deals made by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) vs. Non-state enterprises can be seen in Figure 1.1. Based on a total of 241 
deals, 2  during the 10th – 11th five-year plan (FYP) period, 3  cross-border deals 
                                                 
1 In 2017, China’s nominal GDP was USD $12.01 trillion, and based on PPP China’s economy 
accounted for $23.16 trillion. 
2 Data collected from Zephyr M&A database constructed by the Bureau van Dijk. Financial offshore 
centers such as British Virgin Island and Cayman Islands were excluded from the dataset. 
Additionally, transactions targeting Hong Kong were excluded based on intermediary behavior.  
 2 
undertaken by SOEs were dominant, indicating that overseas M&A activity was 
mostly directed by state-led firms. This can be attributed to the state policy “Go out,” 
which encourages Chinese enterprises to undertake investments abroad (Buckley et 
al., 2007). SOEs were chosen by the state to be the first enterprises to go abroad. In 
support of this, SOEs were often granted favourable loans to facilitate the swift 
acquisition of assets closely aligned to state interests (Shambaugh, 2013). 
Consequently, most of the overseas investments undertaken during the initial “Go 
out” period was primarily led by SOEs (Naughton, 2006).  
 
Figure 1.1. A comparison of the total number of cross-border deals undertaken by Chinese 
SOEs and Non-state enterprises from 2002 – 2016  
 
Data source: Zephyr M&A database. Constructed by the author 
 
Most noteworthy from Figure 1.1, is the substantial increase in cross-border M&A 
activity by both SOEs, and non-state enterprise during the 12th FYP period. In the 
12th FYP period, a growth rate of 361.1% in SOE cross-border activity can be seen, 
as well as an 825% increase by non-state enterprises. Many of the observed increases 
can be attributed to the relaxation of formal state administrative procedures 
concerning overseas FDI. Specifically, in 2014, The National Development Reform 
Commission (NDRC) released a notice on the “Administrative Measures for the 
                                                                                                                                          
3 To best assist analysis, the evaluation will be separated into three periods that correspond to the 
relevant Five-Year Plans (FYPs). As there is only one year (2016) that corresponds to the 13 th FYP 
period, this year has been added into period 3. 
17 18
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Approval and Record Filling on Outbound Investment Projects.”4 This notice related 
to simplification of the overseas investment regulatory framework governing all 
Chinese firms. Specifically, overseas investments made in general industries (i.e. not 
involving sensitive sectors) with a value less than US $1 billion (later revised to 
USD $300 million in 2017), no longer needed formal approval or verification by the 
NDRC. Instead, deals required reporting to the NDRC, with firms required to obtain 
an acknowledgement letter from the NDRC. This streamlined the process and 
eliminated significant bureaucratic hurdles. And thus, greatly incentivizing Chinese 
enterprises to seek investment opportunities overseas.  
 
The industry distribution of the cross-border M&A deals in terms of the total number 
of deals undertaken by SOEs and non-state enterprises can be observed in Appendix 
1.1, Table 5.5  Upon analyzing the deals by industry, SOEs still dominate many key 
strategic industries, particularly in the case of natural resources, finance, and 
manufacturing. The rationale for such significant SOE presence in these industries is 
argued to stem from formal national development policies set out the government 
and directed to SOEs. Examples of formal measures that stimulated cross-border 
investment activity (particularly witnessed in period 3) included; mandates that 
encouraged the pursuit of targets aligned with the objectives of the One Belt One 
Road and Made in China 2025 initiatives. This directly resulted in a marked increase 
in both natural resource and manufacturing related acquisitions. The presence of 
SOEs by industry distribution will be further explained in Chapter 2.   
 
There is a clear distinction between the behaviour of SOEs and other firms. 
Interestingly, it can be noted, that despite amendments to formal overseas investment 
protocol with the aim of encouraging increased overseas investment by all Chinese 
firms – SOEs still dominate most of China’s strategic industries. Scholars have 
argued that Chinese SOEs are not commercial enterprises and instead are the 
extension of Beijing’s economic policies (Robins, 2013; Jones & Zou, 2017). This is 
                                                 
4 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Administrative Measure for the 
Verification and Approval and Record-Filing of Outbound Investment Projects, 
<http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/flfg/flgz/201507/W020150702406621311421.pdf>, 2014. 
5 Additional analysis by deal value could not be attained due to the limited deal value disclosure 
by non- state enterprises. A total of 28.6% of the deals undertaken by non-state enterprises 
were not made available. 
 4 
supported by Brødsgaard et al., (2017) who argue that as the controlling shareholder 
of SOEs, the Chinese government has a substantial impact on the actions of SOEs. 
Moreover, Leutert (2018) asserts that because the appointment of a chairman of an 
SOE is directed by the state, this adds a further dimension of political influence. This 
state influence spurs an authoritarian style intervention and regulation in SOEs, to a 
degree not seen in Western organizations (Pearson, 2005). Thus, it is argued that the 
behaviour observed in SOEs is not that of a conventional commercially driven 
organization, and the state-SOE relationship is specific to that of China.  
 
1.1.1 Application of the institutional theory in the China context: Gaps 
in the literature and contextualization of this research  
 
Much of the existing literature with the application of the institutional theory in the 
China context is firstly based on OFDI in a general sense (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; 
Buckley et al., 2007; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). The use of the institutional 
perspective in the existing literature is not exclusive to a specific mode of OFDI and 
thus has limited explanatory power in the pure context of cross-border M&A. 
Therefore, this research will aim to fill in the gap in the existing literature by 
introducing a China-specific institutional framework, exclusively applicable to the 
institutional theory in the context of SOEs led cross-border M&A.  
 
Secondly, there is a lack of literature that explains the cross-border M&A 
phenomenon from the exclusive perspective of Chinese SOEs. Specifically, much of 
the existing M&A literature, leverage studies based on data comprised of both state 
and, non-state enterprises (Du & Boateng, 2015; Schweizer, Walker, & Zhang, 2017; 
Zhang & Mauck, 2018). In using such a dataset (i.e., one made up of both state and 
non-state enterprises), SOEs are assumed to be conventional organizations, with 
autonomy to dictate their own M&A activity. In the context of China, SOEs are 
organizational agents of the state, directed by state mandates with a strong 
responsibility to complete government objectives. Moreover, the state fundamentally 
appoints SOE managers, thereby further influencing their behaviour and, 
highlighting that the embedded nature of the state on SOEs at three levels (national, 
organizational, and individual). This research will therefore add to the existing cross-
 5 
border M&A literature by illustrating the effect of the institution on the central 
government, SOEs, and SOE managers.  
 
Lastly, there is limited literature that is able to explain how the significance of 
China’s past historical achievements; national pride and identity, drives the 
collective desire to achieve national rejuvenation. Hope, Thomas, & Vyas (2011) 
and Chatzkel & Ng, (2013) have illustrated the significance of ‘pride’ in the M&A 
bidding process, i.e. inflated bids for the sake of ‘ego’ or to prevent a ‘loss in face.’ 
However, the findings of this thesis highlights that national pride is a tacit quality 
inherent to the Chinese identity, and pride motivates SOEs to pursue cross-border 
M&As deals that will serve the overarching goal of national rejuvenation. It is 
argued that the prevailing literature overlooks the influence of the informal 
institution. Therefore, this thesis will contribute to M&A literature by studying the 
intangible properties, fundamental to China’s informal institution, and determine 
how these factors are instrumental in shaping the formal outlook of the state, SOEs, 
and SOE leadership; subsequently influencing cross-border M&A activity.  
 
Drawing on an institutional perspective, this thesis aims to shed light on the ways in 
which the Chinese government influences the behaviour of SOEs and subsequently; 
how this can impact cross-border M&A patterns. It is pertinent to note that due to the 
unique dynamics highlighted above and moreover, the extraordinary relationship 
between state and SOE; a tailored and, a China-specific institutional perspective 
analysis will underpin this research. That is, an informal and formal institutional 
analysis, undertaken exclusively in a China-specific context.  
 
1.2 An institutional approach to this research 
 
As noted by Scott (2004), a country's institutions are comprised of set rules, social 
norms and, specific cognitive mindsets that determine socially acceptable behaviour. 
Institutions are also closely linked to the demands of centralized authorities, while at 
the same time, being connected to individual-level personal beliefs, practices and, 
norms. In-line with the aforementioned points, Meyer & Hammerschmid (2006) and 
Grzymala-Busse (2010) also underscores the close association between the 
institution and formal and informal institutions.   
 6 
 
Formal institution  
 
The formal institution is considered as the institutional framework embodying 
written, legal and, regulatory guidelines and laws (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The 
formal institution therefore determines the rules of the game and how the game is 
played. Pejovich (1999) defines the formal institution as formal rules, which 
includes constitutions, common law, and governmental regulation. The actions of the 
formal institution can govern the political, economic, and the enforcement system 
(North, 1991). Therefore, the formal institutions will ultimately determine for 
example the governing structure, the legal rights of individuals, property rights, and 
the jurisdiction – i.e., what is established by the law. Not only does the formal 
institution embody the rules and regulations but it can also incorporate the values, 
norms, and beliefs of some groups of society (Scott, 2004). However, not all 
individuals share the same values and beliefs due to differing perspectives and 
personal experiences. Therefore these individuals will be in conflict with the formal 
institution's view (laws and regulation) on what is deemed legitimate (Azari & Smith, 
2012). 
 
Informal institution  
 
The informal institution is made up of unwritten or implied norms, in addition to 
cultural and cognitive rules (Pejovich,1999). The informal environment is implicit 
and can affect the rules of the game (Pejovich, 1999). Informal institutions are 
considered unwritten norms, cultural and cognitive rules (North, 1991). Pejovich 
(1999) classifies informal rules as traditions, customs, morals, values, religious 
beliefs, and all other norms that have been passed down through each generation. It 
is these intrinsic qualities, i.e., an implicit set of values with a legacy that can be a 
powerful tool in altering the way individuals can perceive the environment and 
greater society (Scott, 2004). Supported by Chacar et al. (2017), informal rules are 
considered as socially constructed, routine-reproduced programs that identify the 
most appropriate manner to pursue social purposes. Sauerwald & Peng (2013) 
agreed that informal rules are unwritten socially shared rules that are created and 
communicated outside of what is enforced by the central state. In capturing the use 
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of the informal institution, it has meant a more distinctive framework has emerged 
which also captures the use of intangible approaches. 
 
This interaction and, subsequent harmony, between both the formal and informal 
institution, forms the basis for the principles that guide society (Azari & Smith, 
2012). It is said that the formal and informal institution is interconnected, and that 
both the formal written rules and the informal unwritten rules can actively influence 
institutional change in one another, wherein new institutional change can become 
‘institutionalized’ (Zucker, 1977). 
1.2.1 Institutionalization of informal institution into formal institution, 
Chinese style  
National rejuvenation  
 
China’s rich and well-documented history of past achievements, both cultural and 
scientific, has served to give the Chinese people a strong sense of national pride (Lin, 
2013). However, from the perspective of many Chinese, recognition of these past 
accomplishments is diminished due to China’s perceived “lost century” or “century 
of humiliation” (Lei, 2017) 6. This period was symbolically ended by the formation 
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, from which point China isolated itself by 
significantly withdrawing from international trade and relations (Kaufman, 2010). 
However, isolation had the reverse desired effect; restricted trade flows along with 
the adverse effects of China’s planned market economy, caused further regression 
and greatly stifled economic and scientific progress (Yan, 2001). During the same 
period, Western nations flourished both scientifically and economically, thus further 
exacerbating China’s regression (Lin et al., 2003).  
 
Since China reopen its doors in the 1970s, the central state has communicated the 
emotionally poignant ideology of the “rejuvenation of China” to the Chinese people; 
i.e. restoring China to its former state of glory. The concept of the rejuvenation of 
China quickly resonated with the people of China and, has since become a deep-
rooted source of motivation; driving the objective of reinstating China as a global 
                                                 
6 The lost century started during the Opium War in 1839 and lasted until the founding of the People’s 
Republic on China 1949. 
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leader (Ferdinand, 2016). Analogous to the principles of national rejuvenation, more 
recently the “Chinese Dream” also deploys an emotionally poignant narrative – i.e. 
national pride and reclaiming lost glory – to inspire collective effort to rejuvenate 
China. Callanhan (2016) and Chugani (2017) highlights how the Chinese Dream is 
integrated with the state, the Chinese people, and the Chinese individual. That is to 
say, this shared sense of national pride among the Chinese, is ingrained at three 
societal levels; national (state), organizational (SOEs) and, individual (SOE 
managers). It is put forward by this thesis, that China’s complex sense of national 
pride, resulting from a combination of their rich history of prestigious achievements 
and subsequent decline, forms the foundation of China’s informal institution. Thus it 
is this informal institutional belief that has subsequently been institutionalized into 
China’s formal institution. 
1.2.2 An institutional perspective in the context of cross-border M&A 
by Chinese SOEs 
 
China has finite resources, raw materials, agricultural goods, technology etc. 
(Gonzalez-Vicente, 2012; Qi & Zhang, 2018). Therefore, China must look outwardly 
in order acquire the resources required for the myriad of projects central to the 
Chinese dream. Resultantly, the central state has developed a series of cross-border 
M&A measures to serve the objectives of the China dream and facilitate national 
rejuvenation. This includes, firstly; the “Go out” policy, an initiative used to 
champion Chinese enterprises to external corporations and facilitate the pursuit of 
overseas investments (Karolyi & Liao, 2010). Secondly, specific administrative 
guidance, for example state issued catalogues detailing “encouraged” areas for 
targeted M&A activity (NDRC, 2018). And finally, ambitious projects such as “One 
Belt One Road” and “Made in China 2025”, both of which features prominently in 
the 13th FYP.  
 
SOEs are considered an extension of the Chinese state and thus, are often used to 
ensure the fulfilment of state directives and, were created by the Communist party 
during the founding of The People’s Republic of China in 1949 (Li & Brødsgaard, 
2013). SOEs are primarily managed by the State-owned Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), an institution under the direct supervision of 
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the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China. As of 2018 96 SOEs are under 
direct supervision (SASAC, 2018). SASAC by definition acts to protect and enhance 
state assets (Jones & Zou, 2017). Thus, SOEs are at the very heart of the political 
party and represent China’s ideologies. The maintaining of a single ruling party has 
meant that the core values of SOEs have remained tightly aligned with those of the 
government (Robins, 2013). As a result, the party is able to channel strategic, 
national-level objectives to SOEs, subsequently utilizing them as powerful 
instruments to support the fulfilment of state goals (Feng, 2016).  
 
This research will highlight how the shared belief of national rejuvenation, has been 
institutionalized into China’s formal institution (as per Figure 1.2, interaction 1). As 
a result, the desire for national rejuvenation forms much of the logic behind China’s 
political and economic decisions. Indeed, national-level policies, targets, principles, 
and guidelines all formally reflect the informal values. Resultantly, this facilitates 
that the state mandate of national rejuvenation is fulfilled.  And because of the close 
link between the values and beliefs of both the Chinese institution and society, a 
greater degree of social order is possible; thus facilitating the smooth progression of 
state-led economic reforms (Reynolds 2008; Cui & Jiang, 2012). Moreover, the 
interaction between the state, SOEs, and SOE leaders, the influence that the state has 
on the behaviour of SOEs and SOE leaders during the cross-border M&As process 
will be also studied (as per figure 1.2, interaction 2 & 3). It is argued by this research 
that, SOEs and SOE managers are acting as agents to the state. Formally the central 
government is able to ensure that SOEs carry out state plans by directing state targets 
to SOEs. In encouraging the pursuit of these strategic targets by means of cross-
border M&As, the state is able to ensure that all cross-border M&A activities are 
aligned with the state plans. Resultantly, it is indicative that the beliefs of national 
rejuvenation are also deeply embedded into the SOEs and appointed SOE personnel. 
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Figure 1.2. The interactions between the informal and formal institutions at the state, SOEs, and SOE manager level in the Chinese context. 
  
Notes:  Constructed by the author 
          corresponds to informal institutional interaction;  
          corresponds to formal institutional interaction
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1.3 Research questions and objectives 
 
This research aims to investigate the motivations of cross-border M&As by Chinese 
SOEs using an institutional perspective. In doing so, the following research questions 
and objectives have been designed to best facilitate and satisfy this thesis.  
 
• Research question 1: What are the distinctive features of the 
institutionalization process in the China specific context? 
• Research objective: To illustrate the significance of the informal belief of 
national rejuvenation which has been institutionalized in a top-down manner 
into China’s formal institution and reflected through China’s formal policies.  
 
In the context of China, the informal belief of rejuvenation is consistent throughout 
the national, organizational and, individual level. Therefore, the change in the formal 
institution is mainly directed in a top-down fashion; from the state to SOEs at an 
organizational level, and then, from the state to SOE managers at an individual level. 
This goes against the conventional view that institutional change can occur at an 
individual level in a bottom-up fashion. Therefore this research question will 
contribute to existing literature by developing a China-specific conceptual 
framework illustrating the top-down direction of institutional change between each 
level - state, organizational, individual. 
 
• Research question 2: How does the Chinese-style institutionalization process 
facilitate the unique characteristics of cross-border M&A activities by 
Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs)? 
• Research objective: To illustrate the impact of the informal belief of 
rejuvenation that is driving the formal institution at the national level, as well 
as influencing the behavior of SOEs (organizational level) and SOE managers 
(individual level), and thus creating cross-border M&A activity that is 
distinct to China. 
 
This research question will contribute to existing literature by highlighting the 
relationship between the state, SOEs, and SOE leaders through the dynamics 
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between the informal and formal institution (at the national, organizational, and 
individual levels). It is argued that the state can only achieve this because the 
informal belief of China’s national rejuvenation is consistent at all three levels. As a 
result, the state is able to command a China-specific distinct pattern of cross-border 
M&As that is aligned with the directives of the state mandate. That is, all cross-
border M&As are undertaken by SOEs are for the objective of reinstating China to 
its former excellence. 
 
1.4 Methodological issues conducting this research  
 
Qualitative literature adopting an interview approach to determining the motivations 
for cross-border M&A by Chinese SOE is very limited. This is primarily due to the 
difficulty of attaining meaningful interview data from SOEs. This is because finding 
SOE personnel willing to discuss the topic of cross-border M&A is challenging, and 
moreover, typically SOE managers will not be authorized to discuss these topics 
openly. In the event of securing an interview with an SOE manager, the close state 
ties highlighted in this research, would make the goal of obtaining reliable, high-
quality information, unlikely. Therefore, SOE personnel are cautious in disclosing 
information and are reluctant to participate in interviews. 
 
It is argued that undertaking a qualitative approach – by way of in-depth interviews – 
is critical, if gaining a deeper understanding of the Chinese institution is desired. 
This deeper understating refers to: how informal beliefs are formally institutionalized 
by the state, and how the state is able to influence the actions of SOEs to ensure that 
institutionalized beliefs are fulfilled through the use of cross-border M&As. In 
addition, tacit and intangible, yet fundamental, China-specific qualities such as 
“pride” and “national rejuvenation” cannot be easily quantified or recorded. 
Therefore, this thesis asserts that only through undertaking a qualitative approach, 
can a full and rich analysis be made on the effects of the Chinese institution on 
motivating cross-border M&As led by SOEs. 
 
This research managed to obtain 32 in-depth interviews covering 26 different 
national level SOEs. Interviews were conducted with high-level industry experts, 
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each with considerable experience working on cross-border M&A deals undertaken 
by Chinese SOEs. It should be highlighted, that firstly these interviewees are third 
party individuals that are not affiliated with the state or SOEs thus offering an 
unbiased/objective view and thus enhancing the validity of the results. Secondly, 
using an external perspective i.e. by conducting elite interviews provides an 
opportunity to obtain a unique insight into the research matter. That is, it offers a 
different perspective to what could have been obtained from SOEs directly thus 
contributing to the distinctiveness of this research. Thirdly, these interviews were the 
direct result of long-established relationships cultivated over several years and given 
on the basis of trust. Because of this, participants were comfortable to speak openly, 
facilitating the collection of rich information. Therefore, the findings of this thesis 
will make a significant, methodological contribution to the existing qualitative 
literature on cross-border M&A by Chinese SOEs. 
 
1.5 Structure of thesis  
 
Following the introduction to this thesis, the structure will be as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 is a contextual chapter that will provide a comprehensive discussion on the 
role of the state in facilitating M&A activity as well as an analysis on the dynamics 
of cross-border M&A by SOEs. This chapter will discuss the role of SOEs as an 
organizational agent of the state, along with the state related policies that encourages 
cross-border M&A activities. The chapter will then continue to be an analysis of the 
cross-border M&As conducted by SOEs between 2002 through to 2016. In doing so, 
secondary data was collected and analyzed from a formal policy perspective, while 
also, taking the viewpoint of the target region and industry into account. 
 
Chapter 3 will present conventional M&A motivations, limitations of existing 
motivations, and a critical review on existing cross-border M&A literature in the 
China context. This chapter will then proceed to present the theoretical framework 
underpinning this research i.e. an institutional perspective with the inclusion of both 
the informal and formal institutions. In presenting this framework, Chapter 3 will 
justify why the institutional theory has been utilized to support this research; in 
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addition to highlighting how this framework sheds light on the conceptual dynamics 
of the informal, and formal institution in the China context, as well as an analysis at 
the national, organizational and, individual levels.   
 
Chapter 4 will outline the methodology used to undertake this research; that is, logic 
for following a grounded theory approach is discussed, underscoring the merits of 
this mode to best explore institutional effects in the China context. Research strategy, 
data collection methods, and the research design was undertaken to ensure 
satisfactory conclusions to research questions 1 and 2 (and corresponding objectives), 
will also be comprehensively presented in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 will summarize the findings of this research by highlighting 5 key research 
areas, subsequent theoretical categories and subcategories elicited by the grounded 
theory approach. The dynamics of each theoretical category will be illustrated, and 
the determined theoretical categories will be supported by the presentation of key 
excerpts from the collected data.  
 
Chapter 6 is an in-depth discussion of the key findings of this research, further 
enhanced and supported by relevant literature. The theoretical development along 
with a China-specific, conceptual framework designed to demonstrate how informal 
and formal institutions – at the national, organizational, and individual level – direct 
cross-border M&A by Chinese SOEs, concludes this chapter. 
 
Chapter 7 will outline the main points and concluding remarks of this thesis. 
Additionally, the ways in which this research will contribute to the prevailing M&A 
literature and policies will be highlighted, along with a discussion of the possible 
limitations of this study. This chapter will close this thesis with a consideration on 
possible directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
The role of the state and SOEs in  
Chinese cross-border M&A activities:  
A contextual analysis
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2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will provide a synopsis of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as major 
organizational agents of the state, along with the identification of the formal state 
policies, which act to encourage and direct cross-border mergers and acquisition 
(M&As) by Chinese SOEs. This includes key national polices, administrative 
guidelines and key national policies – all of which aim to encourage cross-border 
M&A in state selected industries and regions (section 2.2). In order to obtain the 
complete picture and to fully understand the China-specific cross-border M&A 
phenomenon, this chapter will also analyze cross-border M&As by SOEs by 
adopting a contextual analysis approach with a focus on the role of the state. This 
has been attained through collected secondary data from Zephyr M&A database 
constructed by the Bureau van Dijk. This chapter will present the analyzed Chinese 
SOEs cross-border M&A data in order to illustrate how the formal institution, 
through policies, regulations, and guidelines has influenced the cross-border M&As 
by Chinese SOEs. In doing so, an overview of the regional and industrial 
characteristics of Chinese SOEs’ cross-border M&A activities will be provided and 
thus reflect the state’s involvement on the distribution patterns of Chinese SOEs’ 
cross-border M&A deals. This will be supplemented with a focus on the influence of 
the relevant central government policies and regulations. The constructed overall 
dataset comprises of a total of 115 deals made by Chinese SOEs from 2002 – 2016. 
In order to best assist analysis, the evaluation will be separated into three periods 
that link to the relevant Five Year Plans (FYPs) as follows: 7   
 
- Period 1: 2002 – 2005 (10th FYP) 
- Period 2: 2006 – 2010 (11th FYP) 
- Period 3: 2011– 2016 (12th FYP/ 13th FYP) 8 
 
                                                 
7 China’s Five Year Plans (FYP) are a set of detailed social and economic top policy goals that are 
used to align the economy. It is a roadmap and key indicator for the direction of national 
development. The FYP is central to laying the foundations, mapping the strategies, and setting the 
growth targets to further economic reforms (Hu, 2013). It is communicated by the highest level of 
leadership and directed at subordinates below for national implementation (Casey & Koleski, 2011). 
8 As there is only one year (2016) that corresponds to the 13th FYP period, this year has been added 
into period 3. 
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Section 2.3 will introduce the methodology adopted by this research, which is also 
used to screen data. Sections 2.4 will present the geographic distribution of cross-
border M&As conducted by Chinese SOEs, while also cataloguing these by the 
number of deals and by the value of deals. This section will begin with a regional 
analysis, and will then further the analysis by considering the data at country-level. 
Section 2.5 will outline the industry level distribution pertaining to the cross-border 
deals investigated in this study. These transactions have been grouped into the 
following categories; manufacturing, natural resources, finance, and technology.  
 
2.2 The formal institutional foundation 
2.2.1 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a major organizational agent  
SOEs dominate the domestic market in China across all key industries.  In 2006, the 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), 
highlighted seven strategic industries to be kept under tight state control. These 
industries are; defence, electricity, petroleum, telecommunication, coal, civil aviation, 
and shipping (Gang & Hope, 2013). In addition, SASAC outlined a list of five, 
further pillar industries which should also remain under careful watch by the state. 
These were singled out as, machinery, automobiles, steel, base metals and, chemicals. 
Because both the strategic and pillar industries fall under strict state regulation, this 
has led to each respective market being dominated by SOEs. These SOEs are, 
presented to the world as the great success stories of China, however, at the same 
time, remain under significant state influence. Specifically, SOEs must foremost 
follow state mandates. Indeed, as documented by Jones & Zou (2017) China follows 
an authoritarian control mechanism, allowing the state to both influence and control 
SOEs when deemed necessary. 
 
The majority control of SOEs is governed by SASAC, which in turn, is under the 
direct authority of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China. SASAC was 
formed in 2003 as a result of the consolidation of SOEs and reform, as of 2018 96 
SOEs are under direct supervision (SASAC, 2018).  SASAC manages the SOEs that 
are considered the largest and most important by the state council. These are also 
known as the national level central SOEs, i.e., the national champions. Such SOEs 
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include those that fall within the SASAC’s seven strategic and pillar industries. 
SOEs were created by the Communist party during the founding of The People’s 
Republic of China in 1949. The maintaining of the one ruling party has meant that 
the core values of the SOEs have remained consistent and tightly aligned with the 
central government. That is, SOEs were created by the state to serve a strategic 
purpose of rebuilding China after years of war and civil unrest - all while providing 
stable, long-term employment to much of the Chinese population (Li & Brødsgaard, 
2013).  
 
SASAC by definition is a shareholder and not a direct owner, planner or manager of 
SOEs. One key role that SASAC plays is acting to protect and enhance state assets 
and to promote the greater profitability of SOEs (Jones & Zou, 2017).  SASAC is 
also responsible for appointing senior SOE managers; however, the state party 
remains responsible for assigning positions to top leadership i.e., the chairman. In 
the case of the chairman, typically this will be a high ranking party official, rather 
than a business leader experienced in successfully managing large for-profit 
enterprises (Cull & Xu, 2003). As a direct result, the chairman would remain in close 
contact with the state, following party objectives as a priority, rather than pursuing 
efficiency or profit gains (Brødsgaard et al., 2017). The direct managerial 
appointments by SASAC and the state party, further underscores the intertwined 
nature of SOEs and government and, highlights how the party is able to ensure state 
plans are carried out. 
 
The importance of SOEs as an organizational agent to the state was reflected during 
the National Party Construction Work Conference of State-Owned Enterprises in 
2016. At this conference, the strengthening of the party’s role within SOEs was 
emphasized, and moreover, the importance of SOEs in carrying out party mandates 
was also highlighted.  
 
“The party leadership and building the role of the party are the root and soul for 
state-owned enterprises…. The party’s leadership in state-owned enterprises is a 
major political principle, and that principle must be insisted on... state-owned 
enterprises should also become important forces to implement decisions of the CPC 
Central Committee, the new development concept, major strategies such as the 
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"going out" strategies and the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as to enhance overall 
national power, economic and social development and people's wellbeing” 9 
 
One a more fundamental level, SOEs are at the very heart of the political party and 
are representatives of China’s ideologies. SOEs are critical for the sustained long-
term growth of China. More importantly, the sustainability of SOEs is imperative if 
the state wants to fulfill their institutional belief of rejuvenating the great China. 
 
2.2.2 Cross-border M&A related policies in China  
 
(1) China’s “Go out” policy 
 
In 1999 the state council implemented China’s “Go Out” (zouchuqu/走出去) policy. 
As a result of China’s trade surplus and the masses of foreign reserves that China 
had accumulated, China turned its efforts to promote investments abroad (Hong & 
Sun, 2006). This strategy was developed to encourage competitive Chinese 
enterprises to make overseas investments, exploit foreign resources and partnerships, 
and establish overseas operations (State Council, 2001). 
 
“Fourth, we need to implement a "going outside" strategy, encouraging enterprises 
with comparative advantages to make investments abroad, to establish processing 
operations, to exploit foreign resources with local partners, to contract for 
international engineering projects, and to increase the export of labor. We need to 
provide a supportive policy framework to create favorable conditions for enterprises 
to establish overseas operations. We also need to strengthen supervision and prevent 
the loss of state assets.” 10 
 
For many years the state believed it should have a direct influence on the large 
companies and SOEs that dominated the Chinese economy, and viewed the concept 
of approving international expansion with caution as they feared this could result in 
a loss of control (Buckley et al., 2007). However, as the importance of global 
economic integration grew stronger, the central government realized that powerful 
multinational organizations were directly linked to an increase in international 
                                                 
9
 Xinhua, Xi Stresses CCP leadership of state-owned enterprises, 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2016-10/11/c_135746608.htm>, 2016. 
10 State Council. Report on the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development; < http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18334.htm>, 2001. 
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influence (Karolyi & Liao, 2010). Therefore, having Chinese enterprises that were 
able to compete internationally were crucial for increasing China's national 
competitiveness and became a fundamental Chinese objective. 
 
In order to do this, the state council proposed more supportive foreign policies in 
order to encourage favourable conditions to motivate Chinese SOEs to go overseas.  
This included the state offering direct subsidies and tax rebates on overseas 
investments, greater emphasis on foreign investment funds, and better use of China’s 
foreign exchange reserves (Schuller & Turner, 2005). For instance, the central 
government’s China Export-Import bank provided loans to SOEs that wished to “go 
global” (UNCTAD, 2006). Moreover, the state agency; China Banking Regulatory 
Commission permitted commercial banks to grant loans to SOEs looking to pursue 
cross-border M&As (Salidjanova, 2011). Supporting overseas investment also 
required the establishment of SASAC in 2003. SASAC’s responsibilities were: 
firstly to increase supervision in order to prevent losses in state assets (Naughton, 
2006). Secondly, to support the central government’s notion for the central-level 
SOEs to become profitable “national champions” as well as internationally 
competitive players (Shambaugh, 2013).  
 
Progress towards overseas investment included identifying key permitted areas for 
foreign investment, including specifying cross-border M&As as a means of entering 
foreign market. In October 2004, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) and the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC) issued the 
following joint notice: 
 
“The special loans for overseas investments shall be mainly used for supporting the 
following key overseas investment projects: 
 
(1) Overseas resource development projects which can make up for the relative 
insufficiency of domestic resources; 
(2) Overseas productive projects and infrastructure projects which can give impetus 
to the export of domestic technologies, products, equipment, and labor services, etc.; 
(3) Overseas research and development centers which may utilize internationally 
advanced technologies, management experiences and professional talents; 
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(4) Overseas enterprise acquisition and merger projects which can improve the 
international competitiveness of enterprises, and accelerate exploration of 
international markets.” 11 
 
As a result of this notice, SOEs were noticeably directed into the specific areas of the 
state's overseas investment interests. Along with the favourable loans that were 
granted for these specific investment categories, collectively these acted as a 
significant motivation for cross-border acquisitions.  
 
 (2) Administrative guidance for overseas investments  
 
Within the FYPs that China releases every five years, the state council outlines 
priority areas for investment to assist in achieving national expansion goals (Cicenia, 
2017). Priority industry areas will vary depending on the deepening of reform and 
the direction of China’s state mandates. Thus, what is considered a strategic or key 
industry for China during one period will likely change with time. This subsequently 
means the SOE acquisition targets will also vary in accordance with the state plans. 
For example, from Table 2.1, it can be seen that industries such as petrochemicals 
and the manufacturing of automobiles were viewed as strategic to China for a 
number of years. However, as per the 12th FYP, new emerging strategic industries 
were identified such as energy conservation and environmental protection; new 
generation IT industry; biological industry; high-end equipment manufacturing; new 
energy; new materials; new energy vehicles.12 Similarly, in the 13th FYP, 6 key 
emerging industries were guided as innovations in next-generation information 
technology industries; development of the biotech industry; intelligent perception of 
spatial information; energy storage and distributed energy; advanced materials; new-
energy vehicles. 13 This is not to say that the industries in the 10th FYPs are no longer 
                                                 
11 National Development and Reform Commission and the Export-Import Bank of China. Notice of 
the National Development and Reform Commission, the Export-Import Bank of China on Giving 
Credit Support to the Key Overseas Investment Projects Encouraged by the State, 
<http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=87e36f4101983498bdf >, 2004. 
12 Ministry of Commerce. Development Plan for National-Level Economic and Technology 
Development Zones and Border Economic Cooperation Zones During the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-
2015), <http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=b5b8873f1a898ceabdfb&lib=law>, 
2012. 
13 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The 13th Five-Year Plan for economic 
and social development of The People’s Republic of China (2016 – 2020), 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf>, 2016. 
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considered strategic or important to China, more that, China is now pursuing a 
national strategy focused on innovation and technology. Thus this has subsequently 
been reflected in the promotion of new emerging industries.  As a result, the cross-
border M&As by SOEs are now primarily targeted in these newly identified 
industries (as observed in section 2.5). 
 
Table 2.1. List of China’s traditional pillar industries vs. China’s current strategic industries 
and new emerging industries  
Traditional industries  
(10th FYP) 
Strategic and emerging 
industries (12th FYP) 
Emerging industries 
(13th FYP) 
Petrochemical and chemical 
processing 
High-end manufacturing and 
equipment manufacturing  
(e.g., high-speed rail) 
 
Energy, e.g. coal mining New energy  
(solar, wind, hydropower) 
Energy storage and 
distributed energy  
Infrastructure construction Biotechnology Biotechnology  
Manufacturing of machinery 
 
Environmental protection and 
energy conservation 
Intelligent perception of 
spatial information 
Telecommunications Next generation of information 
technology 
Next generation of 
information technology 
Manufacturing of automobiles, 
airlines, shipping vessels 
Clean energy vehicles  
(e.g., electric cars) 
New energy vehicles 
(e.g., electric cars) 
Metallurgy and building materials New materials  New materials 
Source: Constructed by the author based on State Council, MOFCOM, NDRC 14 
 
In supporting the 13th FYPs to direct areas of interest of overseas M&As, as well as 
to enhance the regulation and better standardize the direction of outbound 
investments by Chinese enterprises, the state council published a “Measures guide” 
in 2017 for outbound investments (Cicenia, 2017). As per the state council’s notice, 
the Measures guide acts to promote the sustainable, healthy development of 
outbound foreign investment (State Council, 2017). The state council also points out 
that the guide also ensures that various risks are prevented as the needs of national 
economic and social development are better met.  As seen in Table 2.2, this includes 
classifying outbound investments into one of the following three categories: 
                                                 
14 State Council. Report on the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development, <http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18334.htm>, 2001; 
Ministry of Commerce. Development Plan for National-Level Economic and Technology 
Development Zones and Border Economic Cooperation Zones During the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-
2015), <http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=b5b8873f1a898ceabdfb&lib=law>, 
2012; National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The 13th Five-Year Plan for 
economic and social development of The People’s Republic of China (2016 – 2020), 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf>, 2016. 
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“Prohibited,” “Restricted,” and “Encouraged” for overseas investments by Chinese 
enterprises. 
 
Table 2.2. Prohibited, Restricted, and Encouraged categories regarding China’s overseas 
investment 
Prohibited Restricted Encouraged 
Overseas investments involving 
the export of core technologies 
and products of military 
industry that have not been 
approved by the state 
Investing in foreign countries 
and regions that have not 
established diplomatic relations 
with China, or engaged in wars, 
or bilateral, multilateral treaties 
or agreements concluded by 
China, which requires 
restrictions 
Overseas infrastructure 
investment that is conducive to 
the construction 
of the “Belt and Road” and 
connections with neighbouring 
infrastructure 
Applying overseas investment 
in technologies, processes, and 
products that are prohibited 
from exporting in China 
 
Overseas investments in: 
Real estate, Hotels, Cinemas 
Entertainment, Sports clubs etc.  
Investments that drive the 
output of superior production 
capacity, quality equipment, 
and technical standards 
 
Overseas investment in illicit 
industries such as gambling and 
pornography  
 
 
Establishing an overseas equity 
investment fund or investment 
platform 
without specific industrial 
projects 
Investment and cooperation 
with high-tech and advanced 
manufacturing enterprises and 
to encourage R&D centers 
abroad 
Foreign investments prohibited 
by international treaties 
provisions concluded or 
participated by China  
 
Carrying out overseas 
investment using backward 
production equipment that does 
not meet the technical standards 
of the country of investment 
Exploration and development of 
overseas oil gas, minerals 
resources, and other resource’s 
on the basis of careful 
assessment of the economic 
benefits 
Other overseas investments that 
are harmful or may endanger 
national interests or national 
security 
 
Overseas investments that do 
not meet the environmental 
protection, energy 
consumption, and safety 
standards of the country of 
investment 
Expanding foreign cooperation 
in agriculture, mutually 
beneficial win-win investment 
cooperation in agriculture, 
forestry, animal husbandry, and 
fishing 
Source: Constructed by the author based on State Council 15 
 
In order to supplement the state council’s regulation on overseas investment, the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) further released a 
“sensitive industries” catalogue for overseas investments in 2018 (Table 2.3). This 
catalogue was also developed in a bid to curb irrational spending which saw China’s 
foreign reserves fall below $3 trillion from $4 trillion in 2016, for the first time in six 
years (Pan, 2018). Collectively, from Table 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, these guidelines act to 
firstly tighten control over outbound M&A investments in sensitive industries and 
                                                 
15 State Council. Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Forwarding the Guiding 
Opinions of NDRC, MOFCOM, PBOC and MFA on Further Guiding and Regulating the Direction of 
Outbound Investments, <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-08/18/content_5218665.htm >, 
2017. 
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sensitive countries (i.e. those that are at war or do not have diplomatic ties with 
China) therefore supporting what the state deems to be healthy development of 
overseas investments (He, 2018). Secondly, these guidelines are set to ensure that the 
state has better control over the type of investments SOEs are making. This means, 
SOEs are limited to making investments that are only in line with the state objectives.  
This method acts as a safeguard to ensure that the acquisitions made by SOEs are of 
strategic importance and beneficial to China. 
 
Table 2.3. NDRC “sensitive” catalogue on China’s overseas investment 
Sensitive Industries Limited/Restricted 
Development, production, and maintenance of 
weapons and equipment. 
 
Development and utilization of cross-border water 
resources. 
 
News and media outlets. 
Real estate 
Hotels  
Cinema 
Entertainment industries  
Sports clubs  
Establishing an equity investment fund or 
investment platform without specific 
industrial projects overseas. 
Source: Constructed by the author based on NDRC 16 
 
(3) Key national programs: One Belt One Road and Made in China 2025 
 
One Belt One Road  
 
In 2013 Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan and Russia and announced the plans for 
creating an economic belt and corridor for linking China with central Asia, Russia, 
and eastern and central Europe (Ferdinand, 2016). Shortly after this announcement 
Prime Minister Li Keqiang announced plans for a maritime Silk Road which links 
China with south-east Asia, India, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and further 
into Europe (Ferdinand, 2016). Both these projects make up China’s One Belt One 
Road initiative - a massively ambitious development which involves over 60 
countries and over 4 billion people being connected through railways, highways, 
ports, and pipelines (Summers, 2015). China calls this a modern silk road that will to 
boost economic integration and will mark a new era of multilateral cooperation and 
globalization. Nordin & Weissmann (2018) argues that this initiative is a concrete 
                                                 
16 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Notice on issuing the text of supporting 
the format on enterprise overseas investment management: Catalogue of Overseas Investment 
Sensitive Industries (2018 Edition), 
<http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/flfg/flgz/201507/W020150702406621311421.pdf >, 2017. 
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manifestation of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream” of rejuvenation from national 
humiliation.  
 
“With the Belt and Road Initiative paving the way, we will give greater meaning to 
the notion of opening up, increase our level of openness, and coordinate efforts to 
strengthen strategic mutual trust, investment and trade cooperation, and cultural 
exchanges…we look to undertake practical and mutually-beneficial cooperation in 
multiple sectors with countries and regions involved in the Belt and Road Initiative, 
with the aim of developing a new picture of all-around opening up in which China is 
opened to the world through eastward and westward links and across land and 
sea”17 
 
The estimated cost of this project is $8 trillion with expectations on the timeframe to 
be approximately 35 years (Hillman, 2018). China has already committed USD $1 
trillion to begin developing the infrastructure links in western China (Bruce-
Lockhart, 2017). China has also established The Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) in 
2015 in order to support investments related to the Belt and Road initiative. The 
AIIB bank members include the United Kingdom, Australia, and South Korea. It is 
reported that the bank has USD $65 million in capital to support infrastructure 
projects (Dollar, 2015).   
 
In terms of the rationale for this project, scholars have argued that this project is an 
opportunity for Chinese enterprises to seek overseas alternative investment 
opportunities, projects, and markets due to China’s recent economic slowdown and 
their domestic overcapacity (Dollar, 2015). It is also believed that this project will 
further facilitate China’s “go out” strategy in securing a stronger international 
presence in new markets and thus further the internationalization of the Chinese 
economy (Ferdinand, 2016). Above all, Nordin & Weissmann (2018) understands 
the Belt and Road as a redirection of Chinese foreign policy. That is, a combining 
the "Chinese dream" with new policies and new institutions to build what Xi Jinping 
calls a "community of shared destiny." This shared destiny includes shared beliefs 
and norms, mutual respect and trust, but also a destiny where China is at the center 
(Callanhan, 2016). 
                                                 
17 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The 13th Five-Year Plan for economic 
and social development of The People’s Republic of China (2016 – 2020), 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf>, 2016. 
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The One Belt One Road initiative has featured prominently in the 13th FYP, and is 
the most far-reaching and significant ambition put forward by the state (Swaine, 
2015). The importance of this project is illustrative in the NDRC’s guide on China’s 
outbound foreign investment where investments towards the Belt and Road are 
greatly “encouraged” (see Table 2.2). This encouragement in One Belt One Road 
acquisition focused acquisitions are made despite a climate where M&A overseas 
investments are under tight regulation and scrutiny. As a result, China's leading 
SOEs are modifying their strategies to complement this initiative. Acquisitions in 
One Belt One Road related targets increases favourable approval rates on cross-
border M&As deals (Kynge, 2017). Such acquisitions made by China in 2017 that 
form part of the One Belt One Road initiative include; Singapore's Global Logistics 
Properties for $11.6 billion; Europe's leading logistics company Logicor for $12.25 
billion; and $20.1 billion spent acquiring a number of ports in various geographies. 
 
Made in China 2025  
 
In 2015, China announced its master plan to transform its country into the world’s 
most advanced and competitive manufacturing economy (Wübbeke et al., 2016).  
With the help of innovative technology China launched its industrial master plan 
“Made in China 2025.” The state council noted that the manufacturing industry had 
been the engine of China's economic growth since the liberalization of the economy. 
But in order to keep evolving along with China’s accelerated economic 
transformation, China’s manufacturing industry must also undergo an urgent 
upgrade (Malkin, 2018). As per the state council’s announcement, this includes 
implementing new technology to update China’s existing manufacturing sector. Thus 
facilitating an evolution that will see China's existing capabilities transition to new, 
strong, and world-class capabilities. 
 
“Made in China 2025" is the action plan for China's implementation of the first 
decade of the strategy of manufacturing a strong country: At present, a new round of 
scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation has formed a 
historic convergence with China's accelerated transformation of economic 
development mode...We must firmly grasp this major historical opportunity, 
implement the strategy of manufacturing a strong country…and strive to achieve a 
hundred years of the founding of New China through three decades of efforts. To 
build China into a manufacturing power that leads the development of the world's 
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manufacturing industry and lay a solid foundation for realizing the Chinese dream 
of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 18 
 
The goal is for China to become a leader in manufacturing high-quality, high-tech 
products. This requires China to become an innovator, building globally recognized 
brands, and to have modern production facilities (Hsu, 2017). Critically, in order to 
fulfill this national objective, China has adopted an outward-looking approach to 
acquire high-tech companies from overseas (Tartar et al., 2018). This is done in 
order to speed up China’s technological advancement and to leapfrog stages of core 
technological development (Malkin, 2018). The importance of Made in China 2025 
can be observed in Table 2.1 and 2.2.  From Table 2.1, high-value manufacturing 
and the generation of information technology are both listed as strategic and 
emerging industries by the state council. From Table 2.2, it is observed that cross-
border investments directed at generating high-tech and advanced manufacturing are 
greatly encouraged. As a result, SOEs have been tasked with performing overseas 
acquisitions that are aimed at acquiring cutting-edge technology that can generate 
large-scale knowledge transfer in the long run.   
 
As a result of the direct guidance and favourable support by the state, a vast volume 
of cross-border high-technological manufacturing acquisitions by SOEs was 
witnessed in primarily in Europe and North America. It is argued that the 
acquisitions undertaken are a direct subsequent of the Made in China 2025 program. 
Such deals (as per section 2.4) include: the manufacturing of electric components 
(Weichai Power’s acquisition of Germany's Linde Hydraulics for $358 million in 
2012); the manufacturing of air and spacecraft related machinery (AVIC’s 
acquisition of US Hilite International for $2.8 billion in 2014); and the 
manufacturing of special purpose equipment (Zhuzhu CSR Times’ acquisition of 
UK’s Specialist Machine Development for $178 million in 2015). 
 
 
                                                 
18 State Council.  Notice of the State Council on Issuing the “Made in China (2025),” 
<http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=826a5000ff214a60bdfb&lib=law>, 2015. 
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2.3 The dynamics of cross-border M&A by Chinese SOEs: 
Descriptive data analysis 
2.3.1 Data screening methodology 
 
All data pertaining to this chapter has been collected from the Zephyr Bureau van 
Dijk database. The M&A deals covered in this chapter, took place over a 15–year 
period beginning from 01 January 2002 up until 31 December 2016.  All deals 
involve Chinese SOEs that have completed cross-border transactions, i.e., acquired 
foreign assets. 
 
The data was screened using the following conditions as per Fuller, Netter, & 
Stegemoller (2002)’s research:  
 
1 The acquirer has to be an SOE where SASAC has the majority shareholding; 
2 The acquirer has acquired more than 50 percent of the target firm;  
3 The target can either be public, private or an SOE; 
4 The target firm cannot be from HK or any offshore financial centres; 
5 The deal value has been disclosed; 
6 The deal is either a merger or acquisition; 
7 The acquiring company needs to be publicly traded for six months before 
acquiring the target firm (if acquiring company is publicly listed); 
8 Acquiring company has at least 12 months post recorded performance. 
 
The final sample included 115 cross-border transaction deals. 
 
2.3.2 Geographical distribution by the target region 
 
Table 2.4 reports the geographic distribution of M&A activity by SOEs. The deals 
have been ordered into their corresponding FYP periods, as well as sorted by the 
total number of deals (Panel A) and the total value of the deals (Panel B).   
 
As shown in Panel A of Table 2.4, in terms of the number of cross-border M&A 
deals, it can be observed that the preferred region for Chinese SOE cross-border 
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M&A investments varies dependent on the prevailing FYP period. During the first 
period (10th FYP: 2002 – 2005), a total of 16 deals were observed. The most targeted 
regions for investments were Europe and Asia with each continent equally 
accounting for 31.3% of the total observed deals during period 1. This was followed 
by North America, accounting for 25% of the total deals. Finally, South America and 
Oceania both equally covered 6.3% of the total number of deals observed. In the 
second period (11th FYP: 2006 – 2010), a total of 20 deals were undertaken. The 
preferred region for cross-border M&A by Chinese SOEs during this time frame was 
Asia. The Asian deals accounted for 30% of the total observed deals. This was 
followed by Europe, with the number of deals summing up to 25% of the deal total, 
and then North America with 20%. Following this is South America and Oceana 
each equally accounting for 10% of the deal total. Lastly, deals undertaken in Africa 
were also noted, accounting for 5% of the total deals observed in period 2. In the last 
observed third period (12th / 13th FYP: 2011- 2016), a total of 79 deals were seen. 
The preferred region by Chinese SOEs for cross-border M&As by far was Europe. 
During period 3, the preferred region for cross-border M&As conducted by Chinese 
SOEs was Europe by a significant margin. Transactions in Europe accounted for 
more than half of the total observed deals at 59.5%. This was followed by South 
America with 13.9%; Asia with 11.4%; North America with 10.1%; Oceania with 
3.8%; and finally, Africa with 1.3% of the observed deals during period 3.   
 
In studying Panel A, notable increases in the number of investments directed at 
Europe (31.3%, 25%, and 59.5%) and South America (6.3%, 10%, 13.9%) during all 
three periods were evident. Collectively, 57 out of a total 115 deals took place in 
Europe, thus supporting the view that the region is a favoured destination for 
Chinese SOEs’ to undertake M&As. Europe is the largest producer of manufactured 
goods and services (European Commission, 2017). China views Europe as an 
incredibly desirable trading partner and also, as a fundamental region needed to 
acquire the sophisticated resources required to fulfill national development plans - 
particularly with regards to the Made in China 2025 strategy (Connor, 2018). Of the 
observed deals in Europe, deals in manufacturing were by far the most visible. A 
total of 37 deals across the three periods with a combined value of $16.77 billion can 
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be seen.19  It is argued that the vast increase in manufacturing deals corresponds to 
China’s national strategy of technology and innovation. Such noticeable high-tech 
manufacturing-related investment include; Aerospace Hi-Tech acquiring 
Luxembourg’s IEE International Electronic and Engineering (electronic instruments 
of testing, measuring, and navigation) in 2016 for $210 million; and Aviation 
Industry Corporation China (AVIC) acquiring Spain’s Aritex Cading (manufacturing 
of special purpose machinery; engineering in scientific and technical industrial 
activities) in 2016 for $113 million. 
 
In terms of the increase in transactions observed in South America, the observed 
deals are primarily focused on the natural resources industry. Collectively across the 
three periods, 57.1% of the deals seen in South America (with a total value of $4.9 
billion) were in natural resources. 20  Examples of such deals include; Yunnan 
Chihong acquiring Compania Minera Amazona in Bolivia in 2013 for $42 million; 
and China Molybdenum acquiring Anglo American’s division in Brazil for $1.7 
billion in 2016. The rise of China’s economy and the demand for securing natural 
resources has resulted in the strengthening of Sino-Latin American relations 
(Gonzalez-Vicente, 2012). The growing importance of South America as a region to 
China, was highlighted in 2014 when Xi Jinping strengthened relations with South 
America through establishing CELAC (Community of Latin America and Caribbean 
States) in 2015.  Xi Jinping also highlighted the need for collaboration between the 
two regions through the “1+3+6 Cooperation Framework”, which included 
boosting trade connections in energy and resources.  
 
“…1 means "one plan," referring to the establishment of the China-Latin American 
Countries and Caribbean States Cooperation Plan (2015-2019) with the aim of 
achieving inclusive growth and sustainable development. "3" means "three engines," 
referring to promoting the comprehensive development of China-Latin America 
practical cooperation with trade, investment, and financial cooperation. "6" means 
"six fields," referring to boosting China-Latin America industry connection with 
energy and resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, 
                                                 
19 Calculated by the author based on Zephyr M&A database – see Appendix 1.1, Panel A of Table 2 
and 3.  
20 Calculated by the author based on Zephyr M&A database – see Appendix 1.1, Panel D of Table 2 
and 3. 
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scientific and technological innovation, and information technologies as cooperation 
priorities.” 21 
 
From Panel B of Table 2.4, the total value of the deals from each period can be 
deduced. In period 1, the total amount of cross-border deals is USD $1.33 billion. Of 
this total, 55% of the total deal value came from Asia. This is followed by 23.7% 
from Europe, 11.9% from North America, 7.5% from South America, and 1.8% 
from Oceania. This indicates that, even though Asia had the same number of deals as 
Europe during the discussed period, the value of the Asian transactions was over 
twice that completed in Europe. M&As undertaken in Asia were the most high-value 
deals during both period 1 and 2. 
 
When further examining this, deals in manufacturing and natural resources can be 
seen to be in the majority. Such manufacturing deals in this period include; Beijing 
Oriental Electronic Technology Group's acquisition of South Korea's Hynix 
Semiconductor Inc. TFT LCD Business in 2003 for $380 million – which was also 
the largest deal conducted during period one. 22 Examples of Asian natural resource 
deals included; China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation’s acquisition of Russia’s 
Udmurtneft OAO in 2006 for $3.5 billion – which was also the largest deal 
concluded in period two. 23 
 
During period 2, the total value of the observed deals was USD $9.18 billion. Again, 
deals completed in Asia were of the highest value ($5.47 billion), accounting for 
59.6% of the total observed value. Despite only having two documented deals during 
period 2, transactions completed in Oceania accounted for $3.11 billion, 
corresponding to 33.9% of total deal value. This observation can be primarily 
attributed to Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. Ltd’s acquisition of Felix Resources Ltd 
(natural resources) in 2009 for $2.9 billion. Following this is Europe with 5% of the 
total observed deal value. Next is North America with 1.1%, then Africa with 0.2%, 
and finally, South America with 0.1%.  In period 3, the total value of the deals was 
                                                 
21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC). Xi Jinping Attends 
China-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit and Delivers Keynote Speech. 
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpzxcxjzgjldrdlchwdbxagtwnrlgbjxgsfwbcxzlldrh
w/t1176650.shtml>, 2014. 
22 See Appendix 1.1, Panel A of Table 4. 
23 See Appendix 1.1, Panel B of Table 4. 
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USD $87.88 billion. Of this total, Europe accounts for 36.1% of the total deal value 
(corresponding to $31.72 billion). This is followed by North America with 26.7% 
(corresponding to $23.49 billion). South America and Asia collectively accounted 
for 17.5% (corresponding to $15.39 billion and $15.37 respectively). Finally, 
transaction completed in Oceania accounted for 2.2% of the total deal value during 
period 3.  
 
From period 3, it can be seen that the value of deals observed in North America, as a 
percentage of the total value spent by Chinese SOEs on cross-border M&As 
increased significantly. During period 3 this percentage was 26.7% in comparison to 
the periods 1 and 2 (11.9% and 1.1% respectively). When examining the observed 
deals across North America during period 3, 62.5% of the North American deals can 
be noted in the manufacturing industry. 24  Such deals included, AVIC acquiring 
Hilite (manufacturing of turbine engines) for $643 million in 2014; and Hisense 
electric’s acquisition of Sharp Electronic (Mexico) for $5.5 billion in 2015. These 
transactions reflect the traditional Chinese interest of heavy industry equipment 
manufacturing whilst transitioning towards higher value adding technologies. As 
supported by the 13th FYP, these types of acquisitions are essential to foster new 
areas of economic growth.   
 
“In fostering new areas of economic growth, we will spur innovation and industrial 
application in emerging, cutting-edge fields such as additive manufacturing, 
intelligent systems, next-generation aviation equipment, comprehensive service 
systems for technologies...” 25 
 
Therefore, the acquisitions observed in North America are in-line with the targets 
stipulated by the states’ FYPs and the State Council's Measures Guide (catalogue) on 
overseas investments. Moreover, these acquisitions correspond to the "encouraged" 
category of the state council's catalogue (as per Table 2.2). 
 
                                                 
24 Calculated by the author based on Zephyr M&A database – see Appendix 1.1, Panel C of Table 2. 
25 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The 13th Five-Year Plan for economic 
and social development of The People’s Republic of China (2016 – 2020), 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf>, 2016. 
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Table 2.4. Regional distribution of Chinese SOEs’ cross-border M&A targets by number of deals and value of deals 
Panel A. Number of cross-border M&As 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Region No. of deals % Rank Region No. of deals % Rank Region No. of deals % 
1 Europe 5 31.3 1 Asia 6 30.0 1 Europe 47 59.5 
1 Asia 5 31.3 2 Europe 5 25.0 2 South America 11 13.9 
3 North America 4 25.0 3 North America 4 20.0 3 Asia 9 11.4 
4 South America 1 6.3 4 South America 2 10.0 4 North America 8 10.1 
4 Oceania 1 6.3 4 Oceania 2 10.0 5 Oceania 3 3.8 
6 Africa - 0.0 6 Africa 1 5.0 6 Africa 1 1.3 
 Total 16 100  Total 20 100  Total 79 100 
Panel B. Value of cross-border M&As (100 mil USD) 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Region Value % Rank Region Value % Rank Region Value % 
1 Asia 7.3 55.0 1 Asia 54.7 59.6 1 Europe 317.2 36.1 
2 Europe 3.2 23.7 2 Oceania 31.1 33.9 2 North America 234.9 26.7 
3 North America 1.6 11.9 3 Europe 4.6 5.0 3 South America 154.0 17.5 
4 South America 1.0 7.5 4 North America 1.0 1.1 4 Asia 153.7 17.5 
5 Oceania 0.2 1.8 5 Africa 0.2 0.2 5 Oceania 19.0 2.2 
6 Africa - 0.0 6 South America 0.1 0.1 6 Africa 0.02 0.0 
 Total 13.3 100  Total 91.8 100  Total 878.8 100 
Data source: Zephyr M&A database. Constructed by the author 
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2.3.3 Geographical distribution by target country  
 
Table 2.5 reports the geographic distribution, by target country, of cross-border 
M&A deals undertaken by Chinese SOEs. These deals have been arranged into their 
respective periods and also, sub-categorized into sections that highlight the total 
number of deals (Panel A) and the total value of deals (Panel B). Panel A in Table 
3.2, provides insight into the specific country that has been most targeted by Chinese 
SOEs for cross-border M&As. During period 1, it can be seen that, the United States 
was the most targeted country, accounting for 18.8% of the total number of deals.  
This is followed by South Korea and Germany, where they each have a total of 12.5% 
of the total number of deals during period 1. The deals completed in these three 
countries were all manufacturing related acquisitions. 
 
From period 2, the majority of the deals took place in Canada and accounted for 15% 
of the total number of deals. These transactions were primarily in manufacturing, 
with the exception of one financial deal - which was: Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China’s (ICBC) acquisition of Bank of East Asia (Canada division) in 2010 
for $75.5 million. It is argued that the strategic placement of this financial institution 
offered access to a greater network of profitable investment portfolios within the 
North American region (John, 2017). This is evident by the follow-up acquisition of 
ICBC and Bank of East Asia (USA division) in 2012 for $140 million.  
 
During period 3, both Germany and the United Kingdom accounted for 12.7% of the 
total recorded M&As by SOEs respectively. Collectively, this accounts for over a 
quarter the completed transactions during period 3. This is followed by the United 
States, France, and the Netherlands; with each country’s percentage of the total 
transactions being 7.6% of the deals completed over the course of period 3. A further 
trend that merits note from period 3 is the dominance of European targets. 4 out of 5 
listed countries reside within the EU (Germany, United Kingdom, France, and the 
Netherlands). This was most likely due to the signing of the EU-China 2020 
Strategic Agenda for Cooperation in 2013. As this trade agreement reaffirmed the 
desire for greater synergy between Sino-EU relations. Therefore, the agreement 
acted to enhance cooperation and create investment opportunities for both regions 
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over the next decade (EEAS, 2013). The strategic agenda also ensured that bi-lateral 
investment deals, (including M&A) would enhance market opportunities through 
more favourable investment rights (European Commission, 2017).  
 
Of the deals observed in Europe, as mentioned previously in section 2.3.2, the 
manufacturing industry was the most targeted industry. Of these manufacturing deals, 
Germany has received the most attention as targets by Chinese SOEs. Germany's 
manufacturing industry has a long legacy and reputation for producing high-quality 
products using technologically advanced techniques (Theil, 2012). China’s desire to 
increase its prominence in the technology industry is evidenced by their ‘Made in 
China 2025’ initiative. Synergies can be drawn comparing the latter with Germany’s 
Industry 4.0 strategy (announced in 2013), the focus of which is also being to 
develop smart factories (Erwin, Glunz, & Tsavlakidis, 2017). Specific manufacturing 
acquisitions made in Germany, included that of Wechai Power acquiring Linde 
Hydraulics (manufacturing of engines and turbines) in 2012 for $358 million; 
Zoomlion acquiring M-Tec Mathistechnik (manufacturing of special purpose 
machinery) in 2013 for $2 billion; and Anhu Zhongding acquiring Weigu GMBH 
(manufacturing of rubber products) for $102 million in 2015. 
   
From Panel B of Table 2.5, during period 1, it can be seen that South Korea 
accounted for 29.3% of the total deal value over this time. This observation can 
primarily be attributed to the deal: Beijing Oriental Electronic Technology Group’s 
acquisition of Hynix Semiconductor Inc. TFT LCD Business in 2003 for $380 
million.  This is then followed by Germany with 15% of transactions and; the United 
States with 9% of the completed deal value over period 1. Both of the latter two 
percentages are related to chemical manufacturing transactions, namely Weifang 
Yaxing Chemical’s two acquisitions made in 2005. The first acquisition was that of 
Bayer Chemicals AG (Texas) for $120 million, and the second, Germany’s Bayer 
AG Porofor Blowing Agents for $121 million.  
 
During period 2 it can be noted that Russia accounted for 38.8% of the total deal 
value. This is mainly down to China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation’s 
acquisition of Udmurtneft OAO (natural resources) in 2006 for $3.5 billion. 
Following this is Australia with 33.9%, this observation can be attributed to 
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Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. Ltd’s acquisition of Felix Resources Ltd (natural 
resources) in 2009 for $2.9 billion. In the third rank is Singapore with 17.6% which 
can be primarily be explained by Huangeng Power’s acquisition of Singapore’s 
Sinosing Power in 2008 for $1.6 billion. Lastly, transactions undertaken in the 
Netherlands and Indonesia both each accounted for 3.0% respectively. From the 
above, it is clear that natural resources and energy were fundamental acquisition 
targets for Chinese SOEs’ cross-border M&As during period 2. This highlights the 
substantial urbanization initiatives and aggressive economic growth of China during 
this period. Securing natural resources has been a consistent national agenda for 
China.  
 
“On the basis of domestic resources, the energy supply capacity building shall be 
strengthened… keep promoting the capacity of independent control over energy and 
lessen the over-reliance on foreign countries for oil.” 26 
 
Over the course of period 3, transactions completed in the United States accounted 
for 20.5% of the total deal value, followed by the United Kingdom with 15.7%. 
Transactions in the United States were again focused on the manufacturing and the 
financial industries. A notable deal in the United Kingdom was that of Hangzhou 
Hikvision Digital Technology Co. Ltd acquiring the UK's Pyronix Ltd (software 
publishing and data processing) in 2016 for $6 billion. This transaction in the 
technology industry was supportive of China’s transitional agenda focused on 
seeking new information technology. Following these acquisitions, noteworthy 
activity also occurred in Brazil and Turkey. Here, deals accounted for 13.2% and 9.7% 
of the total acquisition value respectively. Key acquisitions observed in these 
countries were in the financial industry. Such acquisitions include China’s Bank of 
Communications Co Ltd’s acquisition of Brazil’s Banco BBM SA (finance) in 2016 
for $8.37 billion; and also, ICBC’s acquisition of Turkey’s Tekstil Bankasi SA for 
$8.23 billion in 2015. Both of the latter two deals were the largest, in terms of 
transaction value, that was completed over the course of period 3. 27  
 
                                                 
26 State Council. Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the Program of Action 
for the Energy Development Strategy (2014-2020), 
<http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=5f8e90c006bb1fa8bdfb&lib=law>, 2014. 
27 See Appendix 1.1, Panel C of Table 4. 
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Table 2.5 Top 5 target countries of Chinese SOEs’ cross-border M&As by number of deals and value of deals   
Panel A. Number of cross-border M&As 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Country No. of deals % Rank Country No. of deals % Rank Country No. of deals % 
1 United States 3 18.8 1 Canada 3 15.0 1 Germany  10 12.7 
2 South Korea 2 12.5 2 Australia 2 10.0 1 United Kingdom 10 12.7 
2 Germany 2 12.5 2 Colombia 2 10.0 3 United States 6 7.6 
 - - - 2 United Kingdom 2 10.0 3 France 6 7.6 
 - - - 2 Japan  2 10.0 3 Netherlands 6 7.6 
 Others 9 56.3  Others 9 45.0  Others 41 51.8 
 Total 16 100  Total 20 100  Total 79 100 
Panel B. Value of cross-border M&As (100 mil USD) 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Country Value % Rank Country Value % Rank Country Value % 
1 South Korea 3.9 29.3 1 Russia 35.6 38.8 1 United States 179.9 20.5 
2 Germany 2.0 15.0 2 Australia 31.1 33.9 2 United Kingdom 137.9 15.7 
3 United States 1.2 9.0 3 Singapore 16.1 17.6 3 Brazil 115.7 13.2 
 - - - 4 Netherlands 2.8 3.0 4 Turkey 84.9 9.7 
 - - - 4 Indonesia 2.8 3.0 5 Germany 70.1 8.0 
 Others 6.2 46.6  Others 3.3 3.6  Others 290.2 33.0 
 Total 13.3 100  Total 91.8 100  Total 878.8 100 
Data source: Zephyr M&A database. Constructed by the author 
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2.3.4 Industry distribution of Chinese SOEs’ cross-border M&A 
 
Table 2.6 represents the industry distribution of China’s SOEs cross-border M&A 
activity from 2002 - 2016. The deals have been ordered into their respective periods.  
The total number of the transaction can be seen in Panel A, and the total value of the 
deals is seen in Panel B. 
 
From Panel A of Table 2.6, during period 1, it can be observed that 50% of the total 
number of deals during this time were within the manufacturing sector. This is 
followed by acquisitions in the natural resources industry, which accounted for 43.8% 
of transactions over this period. The financial industry was linked to 6.2% of deals 
over the course of period 1.  From period 2, it can be seen that deals related to the 
manufacturing industry correspond to 40% of the total number of observed deals. 
Followed by the natural resources industry with a total of 30%. Next is the finance 
industry with 20%, and last is the retail industry with 5%. During period 3, 
manufacturing again ranks in the first position with 51.9% of the total number of 
deals. Followed by the natural resource industry with 22.8% of the total observed 
deals. The finance industry related deals accounted for 11.4%. Next is the retail 
industry with 6.3%, which is followed by the technology industry with 3.8% of the 
total number of deals during this period. Overall from Panel A, it can be seen that 
manufacturing-related deals are consistently targeted with every period. Natural 
resources deals are gradually being less targeted. Financial deals are becoming 
increasingly more common. Retail and technology deals are also emerging. 
 
Across the three periods, the manufacturing industry had a collective total of 49.6% 
of the total number of deals.28 It is evident from the substantial amount of cross-
border M&A deals, that the manufacturing industry has been at the core of the 
Chinese economy since the economic reform (Naughton, 2006). It is evident that the 
state views this industry as being central to China's economic boom and has been 
instrumental in the rejuvenation of China.  
 
                                                 
28 Calculated by the author based on Zephyr M&A database – see Appendix 1.1, Table 1. 
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“Since the opening of industrial civilization in the middle of the eighteenth century, 
the history of the rise and fall of the world powers and the history of the struggle of 
the Chinese nation have repeatedly proved that without a strong manufacturing 
industry, there is no nation and national prosperity. Building an internationally 
competitive manufacturing industry is the only way for China to upgrade its overall 
national strength, safeguard national security, and build a world power” 29 
 
Significant deals in the manufacturing industry included transactions related to 
chemical manufacturing, such as: China’s Nantong Jiangshan Agrochemical & 
Chemicals Co Ltd acquisition of Thailand’s Ladda Group Holdings Co Ltd for $5.9 
billion in 2013. However most notably, particularly seen in period 3, is the transition 
towards high-value technology manufacturing related acquisitions. For example, the 
manufacturing of special purpose equipment (Zhuzhu CSR Times’ acquisition of 
UK’s Specialist Machine Development for $178 million in 2015); the manufacturing 
of air and spacecraft related machinery (AVIC’s acquisition of US Hilite 
International for $2.8 billion in 2014); and the manufacturing of electric components 
(Weichai Power’s acquisition of Germany's Linde Hydraulics for $358 million in 
2012). From this, it is argued that as China continues with its economic development, 
deals in high-value manufacturing are becoming increasingly important. Since the 
announcement of 13th FYP, slogans such as “科技强国 ” / “keji qiangguo” 
translating to “technology strengthens and empowers the nation” have been used to 
emphasize and encourage the growth of China’s domestic technology industry. 
Resultantly, the Chinese technology industry has been deeply integrated with their 
manufacturing sector, with the objective of generating new information technology 
in order to stimulate new manufacturing innovations and industrial changes.  
 
“At present, a new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial 
transformation has formed a historic convergence with China's accelerated 
transformation of economic development mode, and the international industrial 
division of labor is being reshaped. We must firmly grasp this major historical 
opportunity, implement the strategy of manufacturing a strong country in 
accordance and strive to achieve a hundred years of the founding of New China 
through three decades of efforts. To build China into a manufacturing power that 
leads the development of the world's manufacturing industry and lay a solid 
                                                 
29 State Council. Notice of the State Council on "Made in China 2025,” 
<http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=826a5000ff214a60bdfb&lib=law>, 2015. 
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foundation for realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation.” 30 
 
In terms of the value of the acquisitions made by Chinese SOEs, from Panel B of 
Table 2.6 period 1 consisted of deals in the manufacturing industry, accounting for 
the majority of the total with 50.3% of the value. This is followed by the natural 
resources industry with 49.4%. Finally, deals in the finance industry accounted for 
0.3% of the total deal value. During period 2, the natural resources industry totalled 
88.2% of the deal value total. This indicates that even though the number of natural 
resource deals ranked second, the deal values, in fact, were substantially higher than 
those seen in manufacturing. The largest deal during period 2 was China Petroleum 
& Chemical Corporation's acquisition of Russia's Udmurtneft OAO (extraction of 
petroleum) in 2006 for $3.5 billion. The natural resource industry is then followed 
by the finance industry with a total of 6.2% of the total value of deals. The 
manufacturing industry accounted for 4.5%, and lastly, retail industry acquisitions 
accounted for 0.04%. From period 3, it can be seen that deals related to 
manufacturing were of substantial value compared to other industries. 
Manufacturing held 48.4% of the total value in deals during period 1. This was 
followed by deals related to finance with a total of 26.1%. Natural resources deals 
were valued at 15.9% of the total deal value. Technology deals accounted for 7.1%, 
and retail deals corresponded to 2.5% of the total value of deals during period 3.  
 
As per the significant acquisitions in the natural resource industry, collectively 
across the three periods, the natural resource industry accounted for 28.2% of the 
total value of deals.31 Of note, the value of these natural resources transactions was 
substantially higher than all other industries during period 2. Key examples: include 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Co Ltd’s acquisition of Australia’s Felix Resources (coal 
mine) in 2009 for $2.9 billion; and Huaneng Power International Inc’s acquisition of 
Sinosing Power PTE Ltd (electricity) in 2008 for $1.6 billion. This period (2006 – 
2010) correlates to the peak of China’s economic boom during which the Chinese 
                                                 
30 State Council. Notice of the State Council on "Made in China 2025,” 
<http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=826a5000ff214a60bdfb&lib=law>, 2015. 
31 Calculated by the author based on Zephyr M&A database – see Appendix 1.1, Table 1. 
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economy was growing at an average annual rate of 11.3%.32 With a population of 1.4 
billion people and a rapidly growing middle class, China consumes one-quarter of 
the global supply of energy each day. China has heavily relied on imports to fuel its 
economic growth during the past decades (Butler, 2017). As a result, acquisitions in 
natural resources are a necessity to sustain the growing needs of the population. As 
per the 13th FYP, the strengthening of energy security and self-sufficiency in this 
industry, is a crucial national objective.   
 
 “We will strengthen onshore and offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation, 
take well-ordered measures to relax control over mining rights, and actively exploit 
natural gas, coal seam gas, and shale oil and gas. We will move forward with the 
transformation and upgrading of the oil refining industry, implement an action plan 
for improving the quality of refined petroleum products, and develop new clean oils 
such as biofuels.” 33 
 
Lastly, in observing Panel B of Table 2.6, periods 2 and 3, it was noted that the 
finance-related acquisitions saw significance growth (6.2% and 26.1% respectively 
in terms of the total deal value). From this, the greater internationalization of state 
banks can be seen, along with the increasingly more focused strategy of expanding 
into the global financial market through acquisitions. Evidently, two largest deals in 
terms of value in period 3 were both finance related i.e., Bank of Communications 
Co Ltd’s acquisition of Brazil’s Banco MMB SA for $8.4 billion in 2016; and 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd’s acquisition of Turkey’s Tekstil 
Bankasi SA for $8.2 billion in 2015. 34  It is further argued that by successfully 
acquiring a financial institution, it can facilitate entry into the host market as well as 
providing access to the bank’s investment portfolio (Larson, 2013). This is further 
supported by Nasiripour (2012) who pointed out that by ICBC acquiring Canada’s 
Bank of East Asia, the strategic placement of the bank paved the way for Chinese 
firms to further secure access to lucrative investments opportunities in North 
America.  
 
                                                 
32 Calculated by the author based on data from the World Bank. 
The World Bank. GDP growth annual percentage. 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN>, 2018. 
33 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The 13th Five-Year Plan for economic 
and social development of The People’s Republic of China (2016 – 2020), 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf>, 2016. 
34 See Appendix 1.1, Panel C of Table 4. 
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Table 2.6. Industry distribution of Chinese SOEs’ cross-border M&A targets by number of deals and value of deals 
Panel A. Number of cross-border M&As 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Country No. of deals % Rank Country No. of deals % Rank Country No. of deals % 
1 Manufacturing  8 50 1 Manufacturing  8 40 1 Manufacturing  41 51.9 
2 Natural resources 7 43.8 2 Natural resources 6 30 2 Natural resources 18 22.8 
3 Finance  1 6.2 3 Finance  4 20 3 Finance  9 11.4 
 Retail - - 4 Retail 1 5 4 Retail 5 6.3 
 Technology - -  Others 1 5 5 Technology 3 3.8 
 Others - -  Technology - -  Others 3 3.8 
 Total 16 100  Total 20 100  Total 79 100 
Panel B. Value of cross-border M&As (100 mil USD) 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Country Value % Rank Country Value % Rank Country Value % 
1 Manufacturing  6.7 50.3 1 Natural resources 81.0 88.2 1 Manufacturing  425.1 48.4 
2 Natural resources 6.6 49.4 2 Finance  5.7 6.2 2 Finance  229.2 26.1 
3 Finance  0.03 0.3 3 Manufacturing  4.2 4.5 3 Natural resources 139.9 15.9 
 Retail - - 4 Other 0.8 0.9 4 Technology 62.1 7.1 
 Technology - - 5 Retail 0.04 0.04 5 Retail 21.8 2.5 
 Other - -  Technology - -  Other 0.8 0.1 
 Total 13.3 100  Total 91.8 100  Total 878.8 100 
Data source: Zephyr M&A database. Constructed by the author
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter began with providing a contextual analysis to facilitate an 
understanding on the role of the state on the distribution of cross-border M&As 
conducted by Chinese SOEs. In doing so, the formal state policies, which act to 
encourage Chinese SOEs’ cross-border M&A activity, were firstly discussed. SOEs 
(considered the national champions) were chosen to be the first Chinese enterprises 
to go overseas. Essentially considered as an organizational agent of the state, SOEs 
are critical to national rejuvenation. SOEs are directed by the party, which means the 
state can, therefore, control the direction of cross-border M&As to ensure that 
national development plans are met. Since China has deepened economic reform, 
cross-border M&As has become progressively larger (in terms of volume and value). 
This could be a result of a number of state policies (“Go out”), strategies (state 
guided overseas investment categories), and programs (One Belt One Road, Made in 
China 2025) – all of which have acted to greatly facilitated the M&A activity.   
 
The “Go out” policy was developed to encourage Chinese enterprises to make 
overseas investments in order to exploit foreign resources to establish foreign 
operations, in addition to affording greater international influence. Resultantly, the 
state created various state agencies (e.g., SASAC to prevent losses of state assets) 
and a supportive framework (e.g., favourable loans for M&A activity) to motivate 
Chinese enterprises to go overseas. In order to direct and regulate cross-border M&A 
activity, the state council and NDRC have released a “catalogue guide “and a 
“sensitive” list. This allows the state to have greater control over the direction of 
cross-border M&As and to ensure all overseas investments are in line with the FYPs. 
The state council has specifically identified three clear categories for investment - 
those that are “prohibited” “restricted” and “encouraged.” SOEs and all Chinese 
enterprises have to follow these guides in order to for their overseas M&A deals to 
be approved. As a result, all organizations have to adapt their cross-border M&A 
strategies to conduct acquisitions that are in-line with the state specified fields. Key 
investments that are on the encouraged list include those related to current key 
national programs – One Belt One Road and Made in China 2025.  
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This chapter has also collected, and outlined data pertaining to cross-border M&A 
deals undertaken by Chinese SOEs during the course of a 15-year period, beginning 
in 2002 through to 2016. Data was arranged into three distinct periods; 2002-2005; 
2006-2010 and; 2011-2016. For the sake of better analysis and context, each period 
reflects a time-frame linked to one of China's FYPs. All deals were analyzed by their 
regional (continent and country level) and industrial distribution, in addition to being 
sorted according to the total number of deals and value of the transactions. From the 
resultant tables generated from the data, the following observations are made:  
 
In terms of the geographic distribution of cross-border M&As conducted by Chinese 
SOE’s over the course of period 1 (2002 – 2005: 10th FYP) and period 2 (2006 – 
2010: 11th FYP); the majority of the cross-border targets were acquired in Asia, 
Europe, and North America in terms of the total number of deals. During period 3 
(2011- 2016: 12th / 13th FYP), Europe was the preferred region for cross-border 
M&A targets, followed by South America, and Asia. Concerning overall deal value, 
completed transactions in period 1, saw those in Asia being significantly higher in 
value than those observed in either Europe or North America. Similarly, throughout 
period 2 deals in Asia were also of the highest value. Lastly, period 3 was overall 
more Europe centric in terms of acquisition targets and accounted for the majority of 
deal value. This is followed by North America, and then South America. An 
interesting trend worth highlighting in period 3, was the increased emphasis on 
South America. This is primarily because of the regions vast natural resource 
reserves and the strategic importance of the region to the Chinese government and 
SOEs. 
 
At a country level, during period 1, it can be seen that the United States is the most 
targeted country in terms of total deals. This is followed by South Korea and 
Germany. Deals completed over the course of period 1 were primarily conducted in 
the manufacturing industry. During period 2, Canada ranked as the country with the 
most number of completed M&As, with notable acquisitions in the financial sector 
offering a wider regional network and access to local investment portfolios. Period 3 
saw Germany and United Kingdom gain the most attention from Chinese SOEs for 
high-value M&A transactions. Distinctively in period 3 was the dominance of 
European targets. The focus on European targets was likely a result of the EU-China 
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2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which was signed in 2013, reaffirming the 
intent to strengthen and increase Sino-EU trade relations. 
 
Regarding distribution according to industry, manufacturing related acquisitions are 
consistently observed throughout each of the discussed periods. In terms of the value 
of these deals, apart from period 2, transactions undertaken in manufacturing were 
collectively of the highest overall value. Some significant observations can be noted 
in period 3, with particularly noteworthy deals occurring in the field of advanced 
technological manufacturing. It was argued that these transactions were motivated by 
China’s ambition to upgrade their manufacturing capabilities and fall very much in-
line with the objectives set out in China’s Made in China 2025 strategy. Further 
notable acquisitions that are consistent in all three periods include those in natural 
resources. Evident in China's FYPs, is the nation’s focus on acquiring both resource 
and energy security to sustain China's economic growth. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review and Theoretical Background: 
The formal and informal institutions  
and the dynamic interactions  
in the context of China 
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3.1 Introduction  
 
This research will use a qualitative grounded theory approach (to be discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 4) to elicit a detailed China-specific conceptual framework 
capable of explaining the cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
phenomenon observed by Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). To begin with, 
this chapter will begin with presenting the conventional motivations M&As, 
followed by why these traditional motivations are lacking in explaining China's 
cross-border M&As by SOEs. This chapter will then provide a critical review of 
existing literature on the motivations for Chinese cross-border M&A. Primarily, 
literature has addressed the role of the institution in motivating M&A using 
quantitative research methods which have highlighted the supporting role of the 
institution in cross-border M&As. However, this stream of research has the tendency 
to overlook the significance of the role of the state in cross-border M&A transactions. 
That is to say, at present, the literature is lacking in taking a specific focus on the 
significance of the interaction of China’s informal and formal institution. Secondly, 
the dynamics between the state – SOEs – SOE leaders has been overlooked, and how 
this relationship can influence the behaviour of SOEs, of which, the subsequent 
outcome is witnessed through cross-border M&A.  
 
In responding to the above, this chapter will present the institutional theory and then 
illustrate how it can be extended to the pattern and behaviour of Chinese SOEs’ 
cross-border M&A. The institution itself is comprised of the formal and informal 
institutions. The formal institution is related to how social order is maintained 
through formal rules, laws, and guidelines on how society should behave and what 
actions are deemed socially acceptable. The informal institution, on the other hand, 
is made up of implicit values that can affect the cognitive mind-set on how society is 
perceived. This includes beliefs, values, and morals. Both institutions are dynamic 
and interact with one another. The relationship between the formal and informal 
institutions will be explored at the national, organizational and individual levels. The 
institutional conceptual framework will then be applied to the China context with an 
illustration of how the informal institutional beliefs can influence the formal 
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institution of the central government. And following on from this, how the central 
government formally directs the SOEs and SOE leaders respectively. 
 
3.2 Conventional motivations for cross-border M&A  
 
Previous literature has mainly focused on the reasons for cross-border M&A at the 
organizational level. It has been argued that traditionally firms would perform an 
overseas M&A to encourage positive synergy through value creation (Seth, 1990). 
Synergies require cooperation and coordination of both firms’ assets (Farrell & 
Shapiro, 2000). From doing this, it allows superior production capabilities thus 
allowing output/cost configurations that would not have otherwise been possible 
(Farrell & Shapiro, 2000). Value creation and thus synergy is achieved by ensuring 
the best use of the combination of both firm’s productive resources in the presence 
of environmental constraints and opportunities (Chatterjee, 1986). This means close 
integration of strategic assets, and a diffusion and transfer of the know-how between 
the merging firms (Roller et al., 2006). Typically it has been argued that maximizing 
value creation can be explained through the following examples and as summaried in 
Table 3.1. 
 
3.2.1 Economies of scale and scope  
 
If firm A buys related firm B, it could be argued that the firm is paying for the 
economies of scale/scope that the combined entity will realize. An acquisition in a 
related field may involve utilization of economies of scale and scope in production 
and distribution. This in turn, can result in reduced costs and operational synergies 
(Chatterjee, 1986). Any operational synergy the acquirer can potentially generate 
from the M&A is correlated to the size of the target firm. Therefore it is argued that 
the synergy is limited to the economies of scale/scope that the target firm is capable 
of generating (Chatterjee, 1986).  
 
A firm is said to have economies of scale when the average cost of production 
decreases as output increases (Salter & Weinhold, 1978). Economies of scale are 
present when there are gained efficiencies that arise from expanding the production 
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of a specific product (Singh & Montgomery, 1987). For example, pharmaceutical 
companies will typically merge together in order to spread the enormous overhead 
costs associated with sophisticated research and development (R&D) for new drug 
development (Angelis & Kanavos, 2016). Both companies can realize economies of 
scale from the merger by avoiding duplication of costs.  This means the acquired and 
existing resources are being more fully utilized. A firm can also benefit by acquiring 
a related firm in the production stage, therefore, reducing the cost of production by 
performing multiple stages of the production directly and generating greater 
efficiency gains (Roller et al., 2006). For example, vertical acquisitions of 
production related assets such as raw materials or components can help organizations 
scale their economies in areas such as purchasing and inventory (Motis, 2007). 
Benefits from economies of scale can occur in traditional functional areas such as 
manufacturing, R&D, and selling, as well as more general areas such as 
administration and finance (Lambrecht, 2004).  
 
Economies of scope is said to be achieved by the cost of producing two goods by a 
single multi-product firm is less than the combined cost of producing these two 
goods by two-single product firms (Seth, 1990). This is made possible by acquiring 
the specialized know-how or the intangible assets which are seen as complementary 
skills. When combining these skills, it can increase the efficiency in producing a 
variety of goods which can, therefore, lower the total cost to produce each unit 
(Roller et al., 2006). Such value creation can come from businesses sharing their 
centralized functions, and a better way of organizing economic activity (Teece, 
1980). For example, scope economies can be operating in a car manufacturing 
facility which is used to assemble both cars and trucks. When capacity is increased 
through the production of two or more products, scope economies are provided 
through the utilization of indivisible shared resources (Singh & Montgomery, 1987). 
 
3.2.2 Capability upgrades 
 
Firms will typically perform an M&A to acquire new capabilities in for example 
technology, manufacturing, R&D, and general know-how. Acquisitions are a quick 
way to catch up and acquire whatever capability the firm is lacking. A firm's 
 50 
resources include all assets, capabilities, processes, attributes, knowledge, and 
information (Barney, 1991). This includes, physical resources such as a plant and 
equipment; intangible assets such as brand names and innovative capabilities; and 
financial resources which can be used to buy other types of productive resources 
(Chatterjee & Birger, 1991).  These resources allow a firm to implement strategies 
which will enable it to improve its efficiencies and effectiveness (Wang & Zajac, 
2007). Barney (1991) describes a firm's resources as rare, difficult to imitate, non-
substitutable, and imperfectly mobile. These resources, therefore, act to help build 
the firm’s competitive advantage. By acquiring strategic assets and capabilities that 
were previously lacking, the firm may choose to exploit these resources to further 
strengthen its market position (Wang, 2012). 
 
Firms will attempt to upgrade their capabilities when strategically valuable resources 
facilitate the development of new competitive advantages (Eschen & Bresser, 2005). 
Acquiring these capabilities and resources allows the firm to have further 
competitive advantages. That is, the ability to implement a value-creating strategy 
that the firm's current competitor is not adopting, nor can the competitor extract the 
same benefits if the strategy was to be adopted (Barney, 1991). M&A provides the 
opportunity to obtain entire bundles of resources and capabilities which provides the 
acquirer full control in one unified institution (Eschen & Bresser, 2005).  
 
3.2.3 Market access and local distribution networks 
 
Should an organization want to gain a foothold in a particular market, it would take a 
considerable amount of time and energy to build a fully integrated distribution 
network. Thus, undertaking an acquisition can accomplish the goal of gaining access 
to new market and distribution networks in a substantially shorter period of time. For 
example, US giant Walmart acquired recognized e-commerce player jet.com in 2016 
for $3.3 billion. Walmart is a prominent player in a brick-and-mortar space; however, 
the acquisition of jet.com allowed Walmart to bridge the gap in the digital space, 
where it has struggled for years to compete with the likes of Amazon and other e-
commerce giants (Mallette & Goddard, 2018).  
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Confident M&A buyers will aggressively look for growth opportunities in order to 
expand their presence (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). Typically more established 
players will acquire smaller targets such as those in the emerging market to benefit 
from the growing consumer base (Sun et al., 2012). Anand, Capron, & Mitchell 
(2005) found that acquirers can enhance their technical capabilities and gain access 
to institutional resources from heterogeneous foreign environments when acquiring a 
target with multinational geographic attributes. It was found that access to 
heterogeneous resource environments provided the acquirer with greater potential for 
capability enhancements because of the acquisition of complex and diverse 
capabilities (Anand, Capron, & Mitchell, 2005). Desired acquisition targets can 
include large key multinational players in the market, who are able to provide the 
acquirer with entry into various foreign markets, in addition to the myriad of 
untapped sources of value creation (Caves, 1989).  
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Table 3.1. Summary of literature on conventional cross-border M&A motivations  
 
Panel A - Economies of scale and scope 
 
    
      Method Data 
 sample 
Country of 
study 
Author(s) 
Year 
Key findings 
 
 
157 mergers between 
1969-1972 
US Chatterjee  
(1986) 
M&A create economic value through financial synergy, operational synergy and 
collusive synergy. 
 
Quantitative 
165 acquisitions 
between 1975-1980 
US Singh & Montegomery 
(1987) 
Superior economic performance in related acquisitions (vs. unrelated acquisitions) due 
to synergy expected from supplementary/complementary resources.  
 104 acquisition 
between 1962 - 1979 
US Seth  
(1990) 
Value creation and synergy found to be generated in both unrelated and related 
acquisition strategies. 
    Mixed 2 case studies in 1999, 
and 2000 
US and 
Europe 
Lambrecht 
(2004) 
Mergers motivated by economies of scale are positively correlated to product market 
demand, causing mergers to happen in rising product markets. 
 
Panel B - Capability Upgrades 
 
    
     Method Data  
sample 
Country of 
study  
Author(s) 
Year 
Key findings 
 
 
 Quantitative 
118 firms between 
1981 – 1985  
US Chatterjee &  
Birger 
(1991) 
Intangible and financial resources are the dominant factors in explaining the type of 
diversification a firm chooses, these assets provide a competitive advantage for 
entering related markets. 
 584 firms, 1991 - 2000 US  Wang & Zajac 
(2007) 
Higher levels of complimentary resources and similarities between the two firms 
result in partaking in acquisitions (vs. alliances), thus improving firm efficiencies.  
 Proposed model US Barney 
(1991) 
Synergistic value of mergers studied illustrated the link between firm resources and 
sustained competitive advantages of merged firms.  
   Qualitative  Proposed model  US Eschen & Bresser 
(2005) 
M&A used to close resource gaps if the acquired resources are of high strategic value 
and if resources possess a high distance to existing firm resources.  
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Panel C - Market access and local distribution networks 
 
    
Method Data  
sample 
Country of 
study 
Author(s) 
Year 
Key findings 
 
 
1525 M&A deals 
between 2000 – 2008 
China and 
India 
Sun et al. 
(2012) 
As a latecomer, ability for M&As by emerging market MNEs is due to comparative 
ownership advantages, thus allowing emerging firms to be more aggressive in FDI. 
Quantitative 248 M&A deals 
between 1988 – 1992 
US and 
Europe 
Anand, Capron & 
Mitchell 
(2005) 
Capabilities of firms are enhanced when a firm acquires an MNE target with 
international/geographical scope, due to attained resource diversity. 
 
 
   Qualitative 
Case study survey on 
61 M&As deals over 
30 year period 
US and 
Europe  
Larsson &  
Finkelstein 
(1999) 
Integrative model proposed on synergy realization, including the importance of 
organizational integration when combining product and marketing operations. 
 Review US Caves 
(1989) 
Support for post acquisition synergistic gains from M&A through acquiring channels 
for input, distribution systems, and customers.  
Constructed by the author 
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3.2.4 Limitations to the existing literature on cross-border M&A 
motivations  
 
The motivations outlined in the preceding text, despite having merit, do not serve to 
fully explain the phenomenon of why Chinese SOEs undertake cross-border M&As. 
When setting out to establish the motivations for cross-border M&As, the prevailing 
literature uses MNEs from developed economies, such as the US and EU. This in 
turn, questions the relevance and applicability of traditional motivations in the 
context of emerging economies. When considering this stream of research, i.e., the 
literature focused on developed economies, the assumption that firms pursue M&A 
primarily for the sake of internationalization and expansion is implied. This is 
because, such companies can be assumed to already both well-established players in 
addition to holding significant market share in their respective countries (Boter & 
Holmquist, 1996). Therefore, from the above, the rationale for internationalization 
by way of cross-border M&A stems from the firm whereby the firm has the 
capabilities, assets, and resources needed to seek overseas markets (Grant, 1991). 
However, in many cases, Chinese SOEs are not in possession of the advanced firm 
level assets such as innovative technologies or competitive advantages that are 
typically observed in Western firms that undertake cross-border M&As (Yasuhiro et 
al., 2008).  
 
It has been pointed out that firms from emerging economies that conduct cross-
border M&As often lack fundamental international experience (Peng & Wang, 2000). 
Particularly in the case of China, SOEs are encouraged by the state to perform an 
overseas M&A despite lacking crucial international experience (Erdener & Shapiro, 
2005). Nonetheless, Chinese firms have gone against what is typically observed in 
the study of cross-border M&As conducted by multinational enterprises (MNEs) in 
emerging economies. That is, often a firm from an emerging economy will not 
aggressively pursue a large, well-established target from a developed economy 
(Brouthers, 2002). This is because, in theory, companies in emerging economies will 
often choose to begin with low risk and low commitment options. For example 
licensing as an initial means to internationalization rather than high commitment 
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choices i.e., M&A (Ramamurti, 2012). In the case of China’s SOEs, they have 
acquired many well-established firms from developed economies. Such examples 
include, ChemChina’s acquisition of Switzerland’s Syngenta (agribusiness) in 2017 
for $43 billion; China National Cereals Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation’s (COFCO) 
acquisition of the Netherlands’ Nidera (grains) in 2015 for $2.25 billion; and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) acquisition of Canada’s Nexen (oil 
and gas) in 2013 for $15.1 billion.  
 
Critically, the above explanations on the rationale for cross-border M&As are based 
on conventional cross-border M&A theories, with the rationale for cross-border 
M&A being established by firm-level motivations. By focusing on the motivations at 
the firm-level, the assumption is made that, the organizations have full decision-
making power to actively pursue cross-border M&As (Moeller & Schlingemann, 
2005). In the case of Chinese SOEs, the firm is directed in a top-down fashion by the 
central government through the relevant formal institutions. That is, SOEs have to 
follow the formal policies, guidelines, and targets that are directed by the state 
(Robins, 2013). Therefore, SOEs do not have full decision-making power, and 
moreover, do not have the autonomy to execute cross-border M&As. In China, the 
motivations for cross-border M&As undertaken by SOEs are heavily influenced at a 
national level (Deng, 2009). These motivations are guided by state targets that are 
addressed in the central government’s Five-Year Plans (FYPs). These targets are 
followed closely by the SOEs, underscoring the close relationship between the state 
and SOEs (Barbieri et al., 2010). Therefore, the motivations for cross-border M&As 
undertaken by SOEs cannot be established if only the typical firm level motivations 
are assessed. Thus, in order to fully understand these motivations, the intricacies of 
the relationship between the state and SOEs need to be studied.  
 
3.3 A critical review of the literature on cross-border M&A 
motivations in the context of China 
 
Cross-border M&As undertaken by Chinese firms as a result of influences from 
Chinese institutions and the domestic political and economic climate is an emerging 
field of study. As per Table 3.2 the body of literature on cross-border M&A by 
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Chinese enterprises have been growing in recent years. Prior studies that have 
focused on Chinese cross-border M&As while taking political and economic factors 
into consideration, have taken a predominately quantitative approach. These studies 
have investigated the role of the state in completed deal transactions, and specifically, 
the state's influence in motivating SOEs to pursue cross-border M&As. Firstly, such 
studies have shown that as a result of their strong links to government, SOEs are able 
to secure finance on favourable terms; i.e., low-interest rates and flexible repayment 
conditions etc., therefore, providing a clear incentive for the SOE to pursue the 
undertaking of an M&A (Buckley et al., 2007; Du & Boateng, 2015; Gu & Reed, 
2016). Other critical state benefits such as tax rebates, access to favourable foreign 
exchange rates, and administrative support arguing that these factors also play a vital 
role in incentivizing SOEs to undertake cross-border M&As (Cui & Jiang, 2010; 
Luo & Han, 2010). It is argued that the overseas expansion strategies of Chinese 
firms are greatly incentivised by their institution, to the point that SOEs often rely on 
the ties with the state to obtain monopolistic advantages overseas (Rugman & Li, 
2007). Resultantly, state-sponsored and supported acquisitions are now becoming 
the ‘‘normal’’ mode of entry by Chinese enterprises looking to pursue overseas 
expansion (Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). However, Cui & Jiang (2012) 
highlighted the influence of state ownership and institutional pressures on FDI entry 
ownership decisions using logistic regression analysis on 588 Chinese firms. It was 
argued that high dependency on the institution could result in both a resource 
advantage as well as a political liability when choosing a foreign entry mode (Cui & 
Jiang, 2012; Anderson & Sutherland, 2015). That is, all M&A projects are subjected 
to government approval, M&A projects that create greater concerns for capital flight 
and foreign exchange demands do require more vetting by state agencies (Luo, Xue, 
& Han, 2010; Sauvant & Chen, 2014;  Jones & Zou, 2017). Specifically, the 
institutional pressures can also act to constrain the outwards M&A choices and 
favour JV modes as they are co-funded (Cui & Jiang, 2012).  
Secondly, quantitative studies have also compared the nature of cross-border M&A 
investments made by both Chinese SOEs and private enterprises. Such comparisons 
took into the account the effects of national policy incentives, for instance the ‘Go 
global’ strategy. The resulting research found that Chinese SOEs have the ability to 
conduct higher-value deals and strategically impactful deals, particularly in resource-
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scare industries – such as natural resources (Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012; 
Reddy, Xie, & Huang, 2016). Supporting this, Karolyi & Liao (2010) investigated 
the difference in government-controlled cross-border M&As and corporate-led 
acquisitions from 1990 – 2008 using a logit regression model at an aggregate 
country level and deal-specific level. Of the 5317 deals investigated, it was found 
that government-led acquisitions were more likely to pursue targets that are both 
larger in scale (e.g., M&As with 100% control) and in value (such as those in natural 
resources), than acquisitions led by non-state connected corporations. Similarly, 
quantitative studies involving internationalization strategies (Amighini et al., 2013; 
Quer, Claver & Rienda, 2011; Ramasamy et al., 2012), distinguished through the use 
of disaggregated data by country and sector, that SOEs tend follow strategies that 
assist on the strategic needs of their home country (i.e. acquiring in natural resource 
sectors), and are indifferent to the political economic conditions of the target country 
(Li & Liang, 2012; Amighini et al., 2013). 
Finally, quantitative studies using an institutional approach have investigated the 
post-acquisition performance of cross-border M&As made by Chinese SOEs (Zhou 
et al., 2015; Chen et al,. 2009; Calomiris et al., 2010). It was found that government-
led deals (where the acquirer’s parent company is identified as a government entity) 
are generally associated with poorer financial performance (Chen et al., 2009; 
Karolyi & Liao, 2010; Sun & Tong, 2003). It is argued that this is the result of 
government intervention slowing down the SOEs decision-making process, which 
can be detrimental given an increasingly competitive global environment. 
Contrastingly, Du & Boateng (2015) examined the effects of state ownership on 
value creating cross-border M&As. Using data obtained from the Chinese stock 
market, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) was examined on a sample of 340 
firms, the results concluded that cross-border M&As conducted by SOEs were able 
to increase shareholder value over the long-run, compared to, for example, non-state 
enterprises due to the preferential state treatment. Similarly supported by Zhou et al. 
(2015), results from multivariate regression and abnormal returns measures on 825 
deals, found that SOE acquisitions outperform private acquire in terms on the long-
run stock and operating performance. Moreover, Wu & Xie (2010); Zhou, Guo, Hua, 
& Doukas (2015); Boateng, Bi, Brahma (2017) used accountancy based performance 
metric - the return on assets (ROA) as a measure of post-acquisition performance for 
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cross-border M&As undertaken by publicly listed Chinese companies. It was found 
that state ownership does have a positive impact on the acquiring firm, as a result of 
the SOEs political connections and the associated benefits. Such benefits include, 
financial support, the ability to acquire target firms under strict governmental control, 
and the ability to dominate competition through state intervention. Thus, these 
studies concluded that the gains from being state affiliated outweigh the 
inefficiencies of state ownership in the long-run. 
Qualitative studies have also used the institutional and political perspectives to 
understand the principle reasons for Chinese enterprises to pursue cross-border 
M&As. This includes Cui & Jiang (2010), Peng (2012), Rui & Yip (2008), and Child 
& Rodrigues (2005) who used multiple case study designs to highlight the role of the 
Chinese government in encouraging Chinese firms to adopt a catch-up strategy and 
to build corporate strength. Rui & Yip (2008) and Zheng, Wei, Zhang, & Yang 
(2016) used a series of semi-structured interviews to illustrate that Chinese firms 
(both private and state-owned) are motivated to conduct cross-border M&As so as to 
acquire strategic assets. For example, internationally recognized brands and 
advanced technologies. In doing so, it is argued that Chinese firms are able to correct 
competitive disadvantages, such as weak brand recognition and skepticism of 
Chinese technological competence (Deng, 2009; Zheng et al., 2016). Through 
multiple case studies, Deng (2007, 2009) and Knoerich (2010) also illustrated that 
Chinese companies do acquire strategic assets to address their weaknesses - that is, 
acquisitions allow a fast route for the Chinese firms to acquire access to technology 
and international brands. Knoerich (2010)’s study on the acquisition of German 
manufacturing companies (in the machinery and equipment sector) by Chinese firms 
argued that the rationale behind German acquisitions was linked to Chinese 
companies seeking to make up for technical shortcomings thus making German 
market segments inaccessible. Subsequently, the M&A of German firms not only 
facilitated entry into the German market, but also, allowed Chinese firms to boost 
their reputations and customer base (Knoerich, 2010).  
Further qualitative studies such as Child & Rodrigues (2005) and Deng (2009) used 
multiple case studies including those of TCL, BOE, and Lenovo, to argue that 
strategic asset acquisitions are a logical outcome when the Chinese institutional 
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environment is considered. That is, the Chinese government has the authority to 
influence the clear direction of the outbound M&As. Yang et al., (2009) and Cui & 
Jiang (2012) argue that this is directly because of strong state support. Using an 
institutional based view and a multiple case study design, Cui & Jiang (2010) 
confirmed that Chinese firms comply with the rules set by the Chinese institution 
which act to both incentivized and restrict the firm’s OFDI decision. Peng (2012) 
further supported this point and stated that despite not having superior resources; 
Chinese firms were still able to undertake outwards foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
due to the incentives and support afforded by the government through state policy. In 
addition, Peng (2012) also pointed out this state support reaffirmed that acquisitions 
were the preferred mode of OFDI by Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) due 
to the urgency of fast market entry. Nolan (2001) and Deng (2010) both highlighted 
that Chinese SOEs are considered to be operating at a lower efficiency than Western 
firms, have relatively lower international competitiveness, and lack the management 
understanding to access overseas markets. Notwithstanding, SOEs still do pursue 
acquisitions overseas and are successful in securing resources in developed 
economies.  
Though these qualitative studies have been insightful in terms of providing evidence 
to support the point that the Chinese state can indeed motivate cross-border M&A. 
Nonetheless, much of the qualitative literature is based on narrow case studies, 
primarily focusing on the manufacturing and technology industries. This makes the 
task of drawing generalizations to SOEs in other industries difficult. For example, as 
per Chapter 2 of this thesis, the cross-border acquisitions in natural resources 
observed during 2006-2010 (the peak of China's economic growth) were of 
substantial value (totalling 88.2% of the total value of cross-border M&A during this 
period). It is indicative that these deals were conducted out of a necessity to drive 
Chinese economic growth, and rather gaining a more significant foothold and better 
competitiveness (i.e., as per the reasons highlighted in the preceding text).  
There is limited recent literature that takes a qualitative approach to assess the 
institutional effects on cross-border M&A exclusively by Chinese SOEs. That said, 
examples of some such studies include that of Gao, Liu, & Eleni (2015) who used 
semi-structured interviews to support their argument that the Chinese institution can 
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both support and constrain SOEs M&As strategy. It was also found that the state 
could financially support SOEs thereby mitigating the disadvantage of Chinese 
SOEs being latecomers in developed economies. However, it was also found that the 
state can hinder M&A projects undertaken by SOEs due to unavoidable bureaucratic 
process and, possible interference (Gao, Liu, & Eleni, 2015). Though the study by 
Gao et al., (2015) does have its merits, the study has a focus on the role of the host 
country’s institution during the post-internationalization process, as opposed to the 
initial motivation and the rationale of the home country’s institution for the outwards 
foreign market expansion.        
SOEs were the first enterprises explicitly chosen by the state to go abroad.  Their 
close ties to the central government mean that SOEs are responsible for carrying out 
cross-border M&As in-line with government regulations, policies, and national 
strategies. Given this close relationship, it is pertinent to address this research 
exclusively from the perspective of SOEs. However, the close relationship and 
interconnectedness of SOEs and the Chinese government make it a challenging 
process to obtain information regarding SOEs. This is further evident when 
addressing the topic of cross-border M&As, as SOEs in China are notoriously 
selective on which information they choose to disclose to ‘outsiders.' Resultantly, 
there is a lack of qualitative based literature on cross-border M&A purely from the 
perspective of an SOE; and subsequently a lack of in-depth understanding from an 
institutional perspective. 
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Table 3.2. Summary of cross-border M&A motivations in the context China (1/3) 
 
Panel A - Political economy and institutional perspective 
 
    
     Method Data  
sample 
Country of 
study 
Author(s) 
Year 
Key findings 
 49 observations 
between 1984 – 1991 
China Buckley et al. 
(2007) 
OFDI due to through China’s distinctive home institution, i.e. policy liberalization 
leading to strong natural resource seeking FDI.  
 6000 M&A deals 
between 1997 – 2014 
 
China Gu & Reed 
(2016) 
M&A motivated by financing i.e. favourable loan terms. SOEs are more likely to 
prefer cash financing than non-SOEs.  Thus M&As are highly driven by institutional 
factors. 
 132 FDI entries 
during 2000 – 2006 
China Cui & Jiang 
(2012) 
State ownership and institutional pressures can highly influence on FDI decision. E.g. 
SOEs prefer JVs and M&As as mode of entry. 
 
Quantitative 
346 firms between 
2003 – 2005, covering 
95 countries 
China  Li & Liang 
(2012) 
OFDI flows to countries with better Chinese political relations, indicating 
international politics does matter in terms of the investment distribution. SOEs follow 
strategies that assist with strategic needs of their home country. 
 1324 announced M&A 
deals between  
1982 – 2009 
China. Zhang, Zhou & Ebbers 
(2011) 
Institutions can affect the failure/success of M&A deal. At country level, deals are 
successful if the host country has good institutions. However institutional constraints 
are also faced at industry level e.g. in energy.  
 513 deals (US targets) 
between 2003 – 2011 
China  Anderson & Sutherland 
(2015) 
Emerging Chinese MNEs acquire in developed markets for strategic asset seeking 
purposes, wherein the deals are significantly driven by state influence.  
 514 M&A deals 
between 2005 – 2011 
China Liu et al. 
(2017) 
Political connections destroy M&A value (post- M&A performance) in SOEs, while it 
creates value in non-SOEs. 
 825 deals between 
1994 – 2008 
 
China  Zhou et al. 
(2015) 
SOEs outperform non-SOEs in terms of long-run stock performance and operating 
performance post M&A. The gains from state connections outweigh the inefficiencies 
associated with state connections.  
   Qualitative Case study  China Jones & Zou 
(2017) 
New framework for the role of the state in SOE international expansion strategy - i.e. 
state plays a regulatory role while SOE have considerable decision-making power. 
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Table 3.2 continued (2/3) 
 
Panel B - Quantitative China specific cross-border M&A studies 
 
     
Method Theoretical 
perspective  
Data  
sample 
Country 
of study 
Author(s) 
Year 
Key findings 
 International-
ization theory  
1350 deals across 
between 2003 – 2008 
in 59 countries  
China  Ramasamy, 
Yeung, & Laforet 
(2012) 
Difference in location of OFDI is based on ownership i.e. private firms are more 
market seekers. SOEs driven by acquiring strategic resources and want know-
how. SOEs able to conduct high-value deals. 
 Resource 
based view 
137 deals between 
1995 – 2014 
 
China Reddy, Xie, & 
Huang 
(2016) 
State influence result in Chinese SOEs completing more high value deals and 
invest in resource scarce industries in both developed and developing countries. 
 Institutional 
perspective  
5317 deals (failed 
and completed), 1990 
– 2008 
China  Karolyi & Liao 
(2010) 
State-led deals pursue larger targets with great growth opportunities, in all 
countries with any level of economic development. However state prefers 
geographically closer countries to China. 
 International-
ization theory 
368 firms in 27 EU 
countries, during 
2003 – 2011 
China Amighini  
et al. 
(2013) 
Weak evidence that M&A transfer value resources/intangible assets to Chinese. 
OFDI location not necessarily based on political influence/conditions of the host 
country.  
Quantitative Behavioral 
perspective 
165 M&A deals by 
91 companies, during 
2000 – 2006 
China  Wu & Xie 
(2010) 
The pre-acquisition performance of Chinese firms and the degree of state shares 
does have a positive impact on the post M&A performance due to state associated 
benefits. 
 Corporate 
governance 
219 deals between 
2000 - 2013 
China. Zhang & Mauck 
(2018) 
Returns from politically connected bidders vs. non-connected differ during the 
announced period. However in the long-term (post merger), politically connect 
firms have lower returns, due to the general inefficiencies associated with the 
state.  
 Corporate 
governance  
1782 firms between 
2007 - 2016 
China  Schweizer, 
Walker, & Zhang 
(2017) 
Political connected managers are more likely to complete cross-border M&A deal 
but at the cost of negative returns and lower performance. 
 Institutional 
perspective 
468 cross-border 
M&As deals between  
1998 – 2011 
China Du & Boateng 
(2015) 
Investigated the effect of state ownership on firm value creation (post-M&A), i.e. 
state owned firms generate positive abnormal returns. 
 Corporate 
governance  
340 M&A deals 
between  
2004 – 2011 
China Boateng & Bi, 
Brahama 
(2017) 
The return on asset (ROA) on non-SOE driven deals is better than SOEs.  State 
party relations found to have negative impact on post M&A performance. 
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Table 3.2 continued (3/3) 
 
Panel C - Qualitative China specific cross-border M&A studies 
 
     
Method Theoretical 
perspective 
Data  
sample 
Country of 
study 
Author(s) 
Year 
Key findings 
 Institutional 
perspective 
and RBV  
10 case studies  China  Cui & Jiang 
(2010) 
Overseas Chinese firm adjust their entry strategies to attain institutional 
legitimacy of the host country, while also complying with rules set by Chinese 
state. Thus influencing FDI ownership decision. 
To Institutional 
perspective  
Case studies  China  Peng 
(2012) 
The global strategy of Chinese MNE’s are characterized by the home country 
institutional forces; going abroad despite inferior technological/managerial 
resources; adoption of M&A as mode of entry.  
 Institutional 
perspective 
Interviews and  
3 case studies  
China. Rui & Yip 
(2008) 
Chinese firms use M&A to acquire to acquire strategic capabilities to offset their 
competitive disadvantages, while also leveraging on their unique institutional 
advantages. 
 
Qualitative 
International-
ization theory 
Case studies  China  Child & 
Rodrigues 
(2005) 
Chinese firms use M&A to internationalize with help from institution to 
overcome latecomer perspective/catch up strategies. 
 Institutional 
perspective 
Case studies  China Deng 
(2009) 
Chinese M&A driven by need to acquire strategic assets and resources as a result 
of China’s unique institutional environment.  
 Market 
seeking view  
Case study and 
interview data  
China  Knoerich 
(2010) 
Firms from fully industrialized countries agreed to be acquired by emerging 
economies due to favourable expansion opportunities which were previously 
inaccessible to them. 
 Resource 
based view 
Multiple case study 
design and interviews  
China. Zheng et al. 
(2016) 
M&A to acquire strategic assets to overcome China latecomer disadvantages and 
competitive weaknesses.  
 Institution, 
industry and 
RBV  
2 case studies  China  Yang et al. 
(2009) 
How Chinese firms internationalize are inherently shaped by the domestic 
institution as well as the international frameworks that govern FDI. 
 Institutional 
perspective 
Case studies and 
interviews  
China Gao, Liu, Eleni 
(2015) 
Home country institutions and bilateral political relations affect the post M&A 
expansion strategy of SOEs through both supporting internationalization plans 
and constraining the entry mode. 
Constructed by the author 
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3.4 Limitations of existing research on cross-border M&As by 
Chinese SOEs  
 
There are three clear limitations that exist in the prevailing literature on cross-border 
M&As by Chinese SOEs. Firstly, much of the existing literature is limited in the 
extent of illustrating the effects of the institution in the context of cross-border M&A. 
For example, Child & Rodrigues (2005);  Buckley et al., (2007); Luo, Xue, & Han 
(2010); and Cui & Jiang (2010, 2012) highlighted the influences of the government 
in stimulating Chinese OFDI in the general sense, with no exclusivity to M&A. In 
these studies, it was argued that institutional influence was able to offset any 
competitive disadvantages, for example, a lack of organizational and managerial 
skills (Buckley et al., 2007; Du & Boateng, 2015; Gu & Reed, 2016). Cross-border 
M&As are different to other OFDI modes as M&As in the China context is used as a 
competitive advantage to aggressively access and source strategic assets in a 
relatively short period of time (Deng, 2007). Evidently, China has since become a 
major player in the world’s cross-border M&A market. Starting from a base of less 
than USD 1.4 billion in 1990, the net value of cross-border M&A undertaken by 
Chinese enterprises rose to over USD $99 billion and USD $130 billion in 2016 and 
2017, respectively (UNCTAD, 2018). This has made China the largest purchaser of 
global M&A acquisition targets since 2016. Authors have also asserted that, China 
possesses many special conditions that are rarely encountered in other emerging 
economies or industrialized economies. Namely, the unrivalled state support, fiscal 
incentives, favourable bank loans, and assistance through government agencies while 
also providing protection on overseas investments; therefore, SOEs were able to 
transcend a number of perceived shortcomings (Yasuhiro et al., 2008; Peng, 2012). 
Indeed through the series of formulated policies, it has provided institutional support 
to permit Chinese enterprises to rapidly internationalize and aggressively expand 
internationally (Deng, 2009). Cui & Jiang (2012) argue that state ownership can 
strengthen the institutional influence on the SOE’s strategic OFDI choices, as the 
SOEs are highly dependent on the state’s critical resource inputs. Nevertheless, 
findings such as that of Luo, Xue, & Han (2010) and Cui & Jiang (2012) were based 
on OFDI in a general sense, with no mention of M&A as a specific mode of OFDI. 
Similarly, Child & Rodrigues (2005) and Buckley et al., (2007) discussed how the 
Chinese governmental policy implications and measures could encourage OFDI, 
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however again, the discussion was at a broad OFDI level.  In the context of China, it 
is important to distinguish M&A as a mode of OFDI. In 2015 – 2018, China became 
the second largest player globally in terms of the total number of successfully 
completed cross-border M&A deals (Koreen, 2017; UNCTAD, 2017). Thus 
highlighting the growing importance of China’s share in global cross-border M&A 
market. 
 
The second limitation identified in the existing Chinese cross-border M&A literature, 
is related to data samples not being exclusively SOEs focused. Specifically, much of 
the literature includes studies with findings based on data pertaining to listed 
Chinese companies. In this case, this is data that relates to both state and non-state 
enterprises (Zhou et al., 2012; Du & Boateng, 2015; Schweizer, Walker, & Zhang, 
2017; Zhang & Mauck, 2018). By using a mixed dataset and thus isolating the 
effects of SOEs through a dummy variable, such studies often do not fully capture 
the complete distinctive complexity of SOEs. This can be due misinterpretations of 
data, limits on quantifying tacit elements of SOEs, and thus oversimplifying the 
relationship between SOEs and the institution. Therefore, in doing so, studies are not 
completely differentiating SOEs from conventional organizations. This is 
problematic as it assumes SOEs have the autonomy to dictate the direction of their 
own M&A activity, which they do not entirely have. As a result, this dilutes the 
quality of data analysis on cross-border motivation to the organizational level only. 
Resultantly, this means studies also overlook the significance of the state on SOE 
behaviour. SOEs are quasi-agents of the state, and it is argued that the state sets the 
mandates required for all overseas investments. This is done through state plans, 
targets, and even, the specific appointment of SOE managers. This underscores both 
the influence and, the intertwined nature of the state and SOEs. This can be observed 
at three levels as follows, national, organizational, and at an individual level. Exactly 
because of the multi-level involvement that the state has in the M&A process, any 
comprehensive analysis of cross-border M&As completed by Chinese SOEs, should 
also be undertaken at each of these levels. Current qualitative literature such as that 
of Deng (2009), has studied the institutional effects at the national and 
organizational levels, highlighting the role of the government and its influence on 
corporate values and norms. However, Deng (2009)'s study did not include the 
institutional effects at an individual level. Quantitative studies of Boateng et al., 
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(2017) and Liu et al., (2017) include the impact of firm ownership and politcal 
connectedness on M&As at the national and individual levels, however the findings 
of study was relevant to M&A performance as opposed to the direct motivations of 
cross-border M&As. As the central state is also responsible for the specific 
placement of SOE managers, it therefore suggests that the state can also influence 
cross-border M&As at the individual level (Robins, 2013; Leutert, 2018). For this 
reason, it is essential to review the relevant data at an individual level – in addition 
to the national and organizational level. In approaching the research in this way, the 
underlying mechanisms and institutional effects that underpin cross-border M&As 
undertaken by Chinese SOEs, can be comprehensively understood. 
 
Finally, the third limitation found in the prevailing literature is a lack of emphasis on 
the effects that the Chinese identity and, other tacit factors – such as the focus on 
national rejuvenation and China's strong sense of national pride – have on motivating 
SOEs to pursue cross-border M&As. Existing research is yet to explore and 
determine the significance that these informal institutional effects have in motivating 
SOEs to undertake cross-border M&As. However, there have been China-focused 
studies that have identified the importance of pride in the valuation process of cross-
border M&As. This includes Hope, Thomas, & Vyas (2011) and Guo et al., (2016) 
who empirically found that firms from developing countries, including China, tended 
to bid higher on M&A deals than those from developed countries. Guo et al., (2016) 
particularly stressed the role of the state; specifically noting financial privileges, 
social and political interest, and inefficient management for these premium 
acquisitions. Studies have also concluded that politically driven deals expressing 
national sentiments typically resulted in higher premiums; thus indicating a 
significant degree of “national pride” in M&A deals (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2011; 
Asplund & Kjellesvik, 2012; Peng, 2012). Additional studies on the effects of 
Chinese culture on the M&A process include case studies by Chatzkel & Ng (2013) 
and Liu & Woywode (2013). Chatzkel & Ng (2013) expressed that the traditional 
Chinese mindset could clash with non-Chinese corporate cultures, creating obstacles 
during M&A negotiations and other key processes. Supported by Liu & Woywode 
(2013), it was found that national cultural dimensions are significant in influencing 
the intention/mindsets of individuals in the M&A process by Chinese MNEs in 
Germany. The above studies have been useful, as they have highlighted that 
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intangible qualities such as pride, are significant and merit consideration when 
assessing the M&A process. However, these studies have explored this phenomenon 
only when analyzing the negotiation/bidding process of an M&A (Hope, Thomas, & 
Vyas, 2011; Asplund & Kjellesvik, 2012; Guo et al., 2016). That is to say, the 
aforementioned studies have, for instance, underscored how pride could result in 
inflated bids or cultural clashes; they have not however, fully uncovered the 
underlying motivations behind cross-border M&As. Moreover, these studies have 
denoted pride as ‘ego' or ‘loss of face,' indicating less regard for the effect that 
China-specific significance tacit qualities can have on the cross-border M&A 
process. Some such qualities include, the historical significance of passed Chinese 
achievements and how this drives the desire to achieve national rejuvenation. It is 
therefore argued that the existing literature overlooks how intrinsic and intangible 
Chinese specific properties – i.e., China's rejuvenation and national pride – act as a 
fundamental motivator for SOEs to pursue cross-border M&As. Zhao (2005), Gries, 
et al. (2011), and Zhao & Han (2016) underscored the significance of Chinese pride 
on the Chinese culture. These scholars outlined the importance of China’s ‘lost 
century’ and, how this period continues to both haunt and motivate the Chinese. 
Despite the three above studies not being M&A focused, they still served to shed 
light on the significant roles that pride and national identity play in China. As to be 
explained in section 3.8.1, China's past historical achievements form a critical 
component of the Chinese psyche and, more broadly, link into deep-rooted cultural 
values. These informal values are significant, as they not only influence the outlook 
of the state but also shape the perspective of both SOEs, and respective key 
personnel. Therefore, it is argued that should these values not be included in the 
analysis of cross-border M&As; a fully comprehensive breakdown of the 
motivations for cross-border M&As by Chinese SOEs cannot be realized.
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3.5 The concept of the institution  
3.5.1 Origins of the institutions 
 
The concept of the institution originates from the realm of sociology. It is considered 
by Scott (1987) that the institution is a social structure by which processes including 
rules, norms, routines obtain a universal standard that is considered socially 
acceptable behaviour. Sociology has studied the origin of these processes. 
Specifically, how they diffused into behavioural guidelines, leading to eventual 
adoption, and lastly how they have evolved (Sleznick, 1996; Scott, 2004). Barley & 
Tolbert (1997) argued that institutions are created by actors through a history of 
negotiations that eventually generalizes expectations and interpretation of behaviour. 
Schutz (1962) and Berger & Luckmann (1967) determined how a shared sense of 
reality influences knowledge that guides everyday life. It was proposed that human 
activity is subjected to habitualization and if the actions are repeated frequently, it 
soon becomes a pattern. Individuals will habitualize their activity in accordance with 
the experience of a world of social institutions. Zucker (1977) further explained that 
institutions themselves are a product of social control. It was argued that social order 
originates from the fundamentals of a shared social reality that is constructed 
through social interactions.  This was supported by Scott (1987) who said social 
order exists only as a product of human activity, i.e., social order occurs when 
individuals take action, interpret that action, and share their interpretation with 
others. The interpretations, in turn, are attempts to classify the behaviour into 
categories for which individuals then repeat the actions over periods of time. Finally, 
individuals assign meaning to these actions, and thus these actions become 
"institutionalized” (Scott, 1987). 
 
Pioneers of institutional research include Meyer & Rowan (1977) who studied how 
formal institutional rules affect the behaviour of organizations. The study concluded 
that organizations are influenced by factors in the institutional environment such as 
values and myths, but above all, they stressed the importance of understanding the 
“taken for granted” rules which organizations incorporate to gain resources and 
enhance their survival prospects. The work by Parsons (1956) on the institutional 
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environment demonstrated that organizations could interact with the institution and 
thus society through universal rules, contracts and authority. From this, scholars 
began to argue that because institutions are socially constructed templates for actions 
that are maintained through ongoing actions and interactions; the patterns of actions 
that emerge are repeated and can gradually acquire the status of facts that are "taken 
for granted.” As these “taken for granted rules” are embedded into the institution, 
they will ultimately shape future interactions and negotiations (Barley & Tolbert, 
1997; Zucker, 1977). In line with the application of the institution, DiMaggio & 
Powell (1983) investigated why organizations are so similar. It was concluded that it 
is the rules of the state and society that creates pressures on organizations. A paradox 
arises in that when organizations change, they will conform to isomorphic processes 
that ultimately make organizations becoming increasingly similar, including 
behaving and using the same processes. 
 
3.5.2 Extended application to management studies  
 
A country's institutions are comprised of set rules, social norms, and cognitive 
mindsets that determine the socially acceptable patterns of behaviour (Scott, 2004). 
Institutions are constraints created by humans to create structure during economic 
and social interactions, therefore creating order and reducing uncertainty (North, 
1991). Through these characteristics, the country's institution can define the "rules of 
the game” (Muralidharan & Pathak, 2017). It is the institutional structure that 
governs the logic of a country's economic actions and the decisions used in everyday 
life (Muralidharan & Pathak, 2017). Institutions are defined by Pejovich (1999:165) 
as “the legal, administrative, and customary arrangements for repeated human 
interactions.” It was understood by Azari & Smith (2012) that institutions are a kind 
of equilibrium with the institutional structure itself formed of rules, regulations, 
culture, and traditions operating in harmony while being accepted by society. Barley 
& Tolbert (1997:6) defines institutions as “shared rules that identify categories of 
social actors and their appropriate activities.”  
 
One of the primary uses of the institutional theory is the application of legitimacy in 
organizational behaviour and human resource management. Legitimacy has been 
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defined by Suchman (1995:574) as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, and beliefs.” What is seen in some cases, is that 
high levels of legitimacy can itself be achieved within local communities even if the 
actions and behaviour are technically operating outside of what is considered legal 
(Bruton, Ireland, & Ketchen, 2012). This observation has led scholars to research 
how legitimacy under these conditions is created and maintained. In the study by 
Bruton et al., (2012) it was shown that through mimicking the standard behaviour 
that is observed in society, legitimacy could be created. For instance, private taxi 
firms use cars which are the painted the same colour as official taxis. This creates the 
illusion that they appear legitimate. Other studies by Khavul, Bruton, & Wood (2009) 
showed how small businesses in Africa could obtain legitimacy despite having no 
official licenses, employees being unregistered, and paying no taxes. In this case, it 
was shown that legitimacy was achieved due to unreliable formal institutions which 
forced entrepreneurs to rely on the use of family and social ties (Khavul et al., 2009). 
 
North (1994) stated that, as institutions are rules of the game; organizations (a group 
of individuals bounded by a common objective) are therefore actors whom can 
innovate and introduce new institutional rules when they believe that they can 
improve their competitive position. Wu et al., (2016) argues that when a firm 
expands into a foreign country with a stable institution, this helps to boost innovation 
and performance of a firm. This is because a stable political environment reduces 
uncertainty, as institutions are essentially a historical accreditation of the legitimacy 
of practices (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). The stable institution, therefore, encourages 
firms and individuals to take new innovative initiatives (Wu et al., 2016). It is argued 
that individuals who are in the position to modify the rule of the game are key to 
changing and evolving the institution over time (North, 1991). This is also supported 
by Greenwood & Suddaby (2006) who illustrated that individual entrepreneurship 
could encourage institutional change in emerging economies. Under these 
circumstances, individuals treat the informal economy as a bridge until the formal 
economy advances. In this case, the first step of institutional change is encouraged in 
the informal economy and then will transition into the formal economy (Thai & 
Turkina, 2014). 
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3.6 Types of institutions  
 
 Meyer & Rowan (1977) considered institutions as an influential factor in the 
observed actions seen by organizations. It was believed that the institution is 
comprised of the demands of centralized authorities as well as individual personal 
beliefs, practices, and norms. North (1991) supported this view, arguing that the 
institutions are formed of formal rules (constitutions, laws and property rights), and 
informal constraints (customs, traditions, and code of conduct). North (1991) further 
established an institutional typology that divides the institution into formal and 
informal dimensions. It is argued that the institution is a complex system in which 
the informal personal beliefs and the formal systems are interdependent and 
overlapping (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006; Azari & 
Smith, 2012). The study of institution states that the existing institutional 
environment is created by repeated human interactions. The repeated interactions, in 
turn, establish the formal and informal rules that are adopted by society (Azari & 
Smith, 2012). Further to this, Helmke & Levitsky (2004) defines informal 
institutions as a set of socially shared rules that are unwritten and have been created 
to be communicated and enforced outside of the official formal channels. In other 
words, the institution is made up of formal and informal practices, routines, norms 
and conventions that are embedded into the structure of society (Chacar & Vissa, 
2005; Chacar et al., 2017).  
 
3.6.1 Formal institution  
 
The formal institution is considered the institutional framework that embodies the 
written, legal and regulatory rules (North, 1991). The formal institution thus 
determines the rules of the game and how the game is played. Pejovich (1999) 
defines the formal institution as formal rules, which includes constitutions, common 
law, and governmental regulation. The actions of the formal institution can govern 
the political, economic, and the enforcement system. Therefore, the formal 
institutions will ultimately determine for example the governing structure, the legal 
rights of individuals, property rights, and the jurisdiction – i.e., what is established 
by the law. Not only does the formal institution embody the rules and regulations but 
 72 
it can also incorporate the values, norms, and beliefs of some groups of society. 
However, not all individuals share the same values and beliefs due to differing 
perspectives and personal experiences. Therefore these individuals will be in conflict 
with the formal institution's view (laws and regulation) on what is deemed legitimate 
(Azari & Smith, 2012). 
 
The formal institutions define the parameters for conducting business activities 
within the realms of society (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Webb et al., 2009). The formal 
institution can be more restrictive than what is considered socially acceptable by the 
informal institution (Pejovich, 1999). However, the boundaries of the formal and 
informal institution are dynamic and will shift with time in response to external 
environmental influences. In which case the formal institution can change, i.e., the 
boundaries and parameters of what is deemed formally acceptable can shift. This 
means the realms of what is considered legal and legitimate can vary as well. When 
the formal institutional boundaries at the national level increase; this subsequently 
creates new opportunities within parts of the informal institution to transition into the 
formal institution thus allowing informal norms to gain formal legitimacy. Changes 
in the institutional boundaries as proposed by Webb et al., (2009) include 
adjustments due to individuals successfully bringing about institutional change, 
therefore transforming the formal boundaries to be more aligned with the norms, 
values, and beliefs of the informal institution. This can be achieved by entrepreneurs 
who exploit legal and legitimate opportunities within the formal economy (Khavul et 
al., 2009). In doing so, entrepreneurs will often conform to the established formal 
institutional rules whilst simultaneously creating new informal rules for adoption by 
society. Opportunities for exploitation will arise for example, when there are changes 
in the formal institution such as shifts in policies; or when are there is a conflict 
between societal values and the direction of the formal institution. These scenarios 
can often create a grey area between what is considered legal and what is deemed 
legitimate (Lee & Hung, 2014).  
3.6.2 Informal institution  
 
The informal environment is implicit and can affect the rules of the game (Pejovich, 
1999). Barley & Tolbert (1997) highlights that cultural influences are significant to 
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formal decision making; and values, norms, rules and beliefs can also provide a 
blueprint to how the world should be. Informal institutions are considered unwritten 
norms, cultural and cognitive rules. Pejovich (1999) classifies informal rules as 
traditions, customs, morals, values, religious beliefs, and all other norms that have 
been passed down through each generation. It is these intrinsic qualities, i.e., an 
implicit set of values with a legacy that can be a powerful tool in altering the way 
individuals can perceive the environment and greater society. Supported by Chacar 
et al. (2017), informal rules are considered as socially constructed, routine-
reproduced programs that identify the most appropriate manner to pursue social 
purposes. Sauerwald & Peng (2013) agreed that informal rules are unwritten socially 
shared rules that are created and communicated outside of what is enforced by the 
central state. In capturing the use of the informal institution, it has meant a more 
distinctive framework has emerged which also captures the use of intangible 
approaches. 
 
The effects of the informal institution are increasingly becoming of great interest to a 
new generation of literature with a focus on economic stability (Pejovich, 1999; 
Williamson, 2000). Scott (1987) pointed out that the institutionalization of informal 
practices will depend in part, on how long an institution has been in place, and on 
how deeply it is accepted by members of society. The informal institution due to its 
emphasis on values on what is considered proper, appropriate behaviour; and norms 
on how things are done can be used to establish the behaviour of society and to 
encourage the public to conform and adhere to rules (Muralidharan & Pathak, 2017). 
When activities are performed outside of the formal institutional boundaries, this 
leads to the rise of an informal economy (Webb et al., 2013). From the perspective 
of the formal institution, informal activities are therefore considered illegal. 
However, if a large portion of society supports these informal activities, informal 
activities can be regarded as legitimate. Thus the realms of the informal institution 
are based on the differences between what is formally and informally perceived as 
legitimate (Webb et al., 2009). In some cases, the informal institution can gain 
momentum and attention when the formal institution is weak or absent. The beliefs 
in the informal institution are particularly prominent in emerging economies wherein 
ownership, and legal protection rights are limited. Therefore there are imperfections 
in enforcing laws and regulations set by the formal institution. Through the informal 
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institution entire networks can be formed and with enough adoption by society - 
legitimacy can be achieved. Lee & Hung (2014) pointed out that though the 
activities of the informal institution are "illegal" they can be legitimate when 
informal practices, methods, and products are accepted by social groups (Lee & 
Hung, 2014). Supported by Webb et al. (2009), it was considered that although some 
individuals are technically using illegal means for economic gain, the gaps and 
differences between both institutions allows for legitimate opportunities. 
 
3.7 Relationship between the formal & informal institution  
 
When addressing the formal and informal institution, it is the dynamic interaction 
between both institutions that form the rules that are used by society. Barley & 
Tolbert (1997) state that actions are largely organized by institutions, That is, 
institituions are created, maintained and changed through action.  North (1991) 
concluded that institutions evolve incrementally, wherein institutional change reflect 
the connection between the past, present and furture. Based on North (1991)’s 
definition, the institution is therefore the historical evolution of an economy. Azari & 
Smith (2012) proposed that the institution can operate in multiple directions.  This 
includes the institutional change in the direction from the formal institution to the 
informal institution, as well as, from the informal institution to the formal institution. 
It is said that the formal and informal institution is dynamic and that both the formal 
written rules and the informal unwritten rules can actively influence institutional 
change in one another. Azari & Smith (2012) state that if written formal rules change, 
then subsequently the unwritten informal rules must change as well. Likewise, if the 
direction was reversed and the informal rules changes then a change in the formal 
rules will be observed. This is because both the formal and informal institution is 
interconnected and it is the equilibrium between the two institutions that maintain a 
harmonious society.  
 
3.7.1 Interaction between the formal and informal institution at the 
individual level 
 
When the formal conditions are clear, i.e., have effective law enforcing properties 
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and are able to support the market, this will encourage individuals to pursue 
opportunities formally. However, in the reverse scenario, when the formal 
institutional boundaries are unclear, but the economy has vast potential, individuals 
will feel inclined and are motivated to use informal actions (Lee & Hung, 2014).  In 
the case of individuals who use informal actions, these individuals are considered as 
institutional entrepreneurs - that is, individuals whom "envision new institutions as a 
means of advancing interests they value highly yet are suppressed by existing logics” 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006: 29). Institutional entrepreneurs have an invested self-
drive and are able to earn the legitimacy of informal action by society. Institutional 
entrepreneurship is particularly evident in emerging economies, wherein the public 
may fear or have little trust in the formal economy (Thai & Turkina, 2014). 
Typically seen in these conditions are weak regulatory and governing environments; 
therefore entrepreneurs can obtain legitimacy without the need for formal regulations 
(Thai & Turkina, 2014).  
 
When the informal actions encouraged by the institutional entrepreneur have become 
widely adopted by society to the point that there is a strong desire to promote a 
transitional change, the actions will be institutionalized by the formal institution. 
Scott (1987) argues that actions of institutionalization are significant because forms 
of actions will become associated with specific social classes, for example, managers 
will give orders to subordinates whom in turn will follow because it is considered the 
norm. Berger & Luckmann (1967) explains institutionalization as when habitual 
actions become so fixed in the consciousness of the human mind that it now 
becomes considered as “this is how these things are done” in a social situation.  
 
In conducting business activities outside of the formal institution, individuals will 
face challenging conditions such as a lack of access to resources due to operating 
outside of formal legal boundaries. As a method of obtaining resources, 
entrepreneurs can form a "collective identity." This means forming bonds with 
individual groups, i.e., creating a network of bonds between the entrepreneur and 
others (Lee & Hung, 2014). By forming a network of close bonds, a sense of 
identification is formed. This is a cognitive sense of moral and emotional attachment 
that is made to the group. For example a feeling of similar and relatable attributes 
due to a similar cultural or racial background (Webb et al., 2009). As individuals 
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define themselves within a system of familiar social norms, values, and beliefs, this 
will act to further reinforce the individual's perspective (Webb et al., 2009). A 
collective identity helps to facilitate access to resources such as labour, materials, 
and financing (North, 1994).  
 
3.7.2 Interaction between the formal and informal institution at the 
organizational level 
 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) argues that the formal institution acts to constrain the 
actions and behaviour of organizations. As mentioned previously, when activities 
that are performed outside of the formal institutional boundaries are adopted by a 
group of members within society, this can lead to the rise of an informal economy 
(Webb et al., 2013). Organizations (i.e., informal organizations) arise within the 
informal economy due to external environmental changes and the creation of new 
economic opportunities (Lee & Hung, 2014). Informal organizations include firms 
who have a distrust of in the government thus perform outside of the legal 
jurisdiction (Webb et al., 2009). Such examples include, family-run enterprises, 
particularly those found in emerging markets where to register a business involves 
administrative hurdles and an onerous process (Khavul et al., 2009). As informal 
organizations are technically operating outside of the legal system, regulators, 
therefore, have the ultimate authority to shut down informal business activities. Thus, 
in driving institutional changes, informal organizations have to achieve legitimacy 
and legitimize the meaning of their informal activity (Pejovich, 1999). In other 
words, informal organizations have to create an identity that can win support, 
increase their popularity, and create market power - all the while facing formal 
constraints. 
 
When these informal organizations are mass adopted by members of society, this can 
propagate institutional change, i.e., drive formal institutional change. In the context 
of instigating formal institutional change, as the informal organization faces broader 
contextual changes it strengthens over time and acts to protect its defining 
characteristics (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). The organization’s identity increases in 
members and the organization will now become a valuable source of information 
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(Gaur, Kumar, & Singh, 2014). This then allows the informal organization to obtain 
key resources, thus further stimulating growth (Webb et al., 2009). Through 
amassing informal users, the collective momentum can change the psyche of what is 
now deemed the appropriate behaviour. The informal organizations can, therefore, 
challenge the formal rules of the game. Supported by Zucker (1977) and Meyer and 
Rowan (1977), it is argued that, as institutions are socially constructed templates for 
action. Using this perspective, organizations are able to share the same 
interpretations of behaviour, which can eventually acquire moral status and shape 
future interactions. Growth in informal organizations will increasingly attract 
attention from the formal institution. This in turn subsequently encourages the 
formal institutionalization of these informal organizations by the legal jurisdictions. 
Informal organizations are an example of how one group’s norms, values, and 
beliefs may eventually become the basis of new formal laws and regulations.  
 
3.7.3 Interaction between the formal and informal institution at the 
national level 
 
Pejovich (1999) explains that during uncertain climates such as that of a transitional 
economy; the formal institution can be compromised wherein regular and established 
patterns can be disrupted. This, in turn, creates an environment where there is a lack 
of public support and general societal distrust, thus causing the discontinuation of 
the continuity of formal written rules (Lee & Hung, 2014). During these conditions, 
individuals can navigate through environments of uncertainty while processing 
incomplete knowledge. This is achieved by relying on creative human interactions 
and exchanges, in addition to the use of the informal institution (Dau & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2014). Individuals can create new opportunistic gains through 
developments in knowledge, innovation, and access to activities during tentative 
conditions (Pejovich, 1999). Grzymala-Busse (2010) argues that scenarios wherein 
the changes in the formal institution lead to weakened enforcement of formal 
policies; create opportunities for the informal institution to exploit loopholes. For 
example, during the Chinese dual track reform era35, markets were in transition 
                                                 
35 The initial reform period involved China transitioning from a fully planned economy to one that 
gradually opened its markets. In doing so, this involved changes in the macro policy environment, 
resource allocation, and micromanagement system. To avoid fully liberalizing its markets and to 
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between the old planned system and halfway liberalized. This created a state of 
limbo wherein formal policies were undermined due to a state of uncertain transition. 
This weakened formal institutional environment subsequently led to an ad hoc 
method of resource distribution. Key state resources were distributed based on social 
networks, family circles, and local “in-groups” with the political figures in charge 
(Hitt & Xu, 2016). 
 
In other institutional scenarios, some formal institutional rules may be in 
contradiction to one another, i.e., some activities which are governed by formal 
written rules cannot be obeyed simultaneously. Therefore the informal institution 
can be used to coordinate the rules and resolve the conflicting tension (Azari & 
Smith, 2012). The reason for the conflicting formal rules is due to the rules being 
created during different times in light of very different socio-economic experiences. 
Therefore the use of the informal institution can create stability during uncertain or 
conflicting situations (Azari & Smith, 2012). It is believed that many informal 
institutional rules act as a substitute for new formal rules (Grzymala-Busse, 2010). 
Through the informal institution, new rules and behaviour can be legitimized and 
thus lead to new societal norms (Pejovich, 1999). The informal institution can, 
therefore, be used to encourage the government to re-address the formal institution 
by creating and altering formal rules. In this case, the direction of change is from the 
informal to the formal institution. 
 
3.8 Application of the formal and informal institutions and the 
direction of the interactions in the China context  
 
In this section, the institutional theory will be applied to the Chinese context. In 
doing so, the direction of the interaction between the formal and informal institutions 
and how they influence behaviour at the national, organizational, and individual 
levels will be observed. In the case of China, the national level will correspond to the 
central government; the organizational level will correspond to the central SOEs, and 
the individual level will correspond to the SOEs top-level managers.   
                                                                                                                                          
ensure stability during the transition, China used a dual track system wherein both a planned and 
market economy was used simultaneously (Lin, Cai, & Li, 1998; Lin, Cai, & Zhou, 2003; Lin, 2004). 
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From this section, it will be seen that whilst the institutional change in the 
conventional theory originates from the individual level in the informal institution, 
and is eventually institutionalized by the formal institution at the national level.  In 
the China context, however, institutional change occurs in the reverse direction. That 
is, the informal institution remains consistent, and the institutional change stems 
from the formal institution at the national level and is directed to the organizational 
and individual level, indicative of a top-down fashion.  
 
3.8.1 The informal institutional foundation in the China context 
 
3.8.1.1 Origins of Chinese pride: Ancient China  
 
China remains one of the oldest and continuous civilizations in human history. 
Unique to China, the country has managed to remain a culturally unified nation 
throughout much of its history (Eberhard, 2013). It is well documented that the 
Chinese dynasties of ancient China led pioneering imperial civilizations for several 
thousands of years (Benn, 2004). In the ancient world, China was the regional 
hegemon; it had a substantial economic and political influence throughout most of its 
history in East, Southeast and Central Asia (Lin, 2013).  
 
The Chinese dynasties were admired for their rich and broad knowledge and their 
technological advancement. The Han dynasty developed trade routes including the 
Silk Road to promote Chinese culture and economic prosperity in Central Asia 
(Callanhan, 2016). The Tang dynasty was responsible for enriching the Chinese 
culture through philosophers, artists, and intellectuals, and opening up China to 
foreign influence (Tsin, 1995). Under the Song Dynasty, China continued to prosper 
economically and culturally; and notably, gunpowder was invented and widely used 
in warfare thus furthering Chinese military advancement (Fairbank & Goldman, 
2006). The Yuan dynasty can credit itself with unifying the vast, culturally diverse, 
territories of ancient China into a single centralized system following 300 years of 
fragmented rule (Twitchett et al., 1978). The unification of China meant the 
strengthening of national integration and greater communication between different 
regions thereby allowing extensive domestic and foreign trade. By the start of the 
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15th century, China dominated nautical aviation due to the invention of the compass, 
in addition to pioneering papermaking, movable printing, the use of paper currency, 
and establishing navel military supremacy (Lin, 2013). During the Ming dynasty, 
expanded maritime trade routes were developed to connect China to the West, and 
moreover Chinese ships were commissioned to conduct numerous exploration 
voyages (Maddison, 2006). By the last Chinese Qing dynasty, there was great 
demand for Chinese goods such as tea, silk, and ceramics by the West (Fay, 1975). 
As Western empires were gradually expanding across the world, the imbalance of 
trade ultimately led to China’s first Opium war and the downfall of China’s last 
imperial dynasty (Fay, 1975).  
 
The Chinese invented and amassed a vast amount of technology throughout their 
many dynasties. To this end, it can be argued that technology and innovation are 
ingrained in the national identity of China. The advancements in science and 
technology, along with progressive thinking allowed China to project their influence 
to their neighboring countries and regions as well as Western civilization 
(Reischauer, 1974). From its well-documented historical achievements and 
continuous civilization, it is argued that China has a coherent value system that has 
instilled a strong sense of national identity. 
 
3.8.1.2 Century of humiliation 
 
Despite China’s establishing itself as a regional and global power, China’s influence 
began to decline from around 1840 onwards during the Qing Dynasty. This marked 
the start of what China calls a “century of humiliation” by colonial powers 
(Callanhan, 2016). Beginning in 1839 and lasting through until 1949, this period in 
Chinese history remains a painful memory to the country (Shang, 2013). The 
humiliation lasted for 109 years and involved two Opium Wars, a Sino-French 
Water, two Sino-Japanese Wars, colonial occupations, the signing of unfair peace 
treaties, and revolutions (Kaufman, 2010). Furthermore, during this century, China 
suffered losses in every war in which they engaged, in addition to having to concede 
major concessions and strategic trade routes to foreign powers (Peyrefitte, 1993). As 
the West began to progress technologically and flourish economically, China’s 
 81 
international influence began to decline, this turn of events ultimately China pushed 
to surrender to the West (Lin, 2013).  
 
Mao Zedong proclaimed an end to the century of humiliation in 1949 upon founding 
the People’s Republic of China (Yan, 2001). The world saw China close the doors to 
the West for several decades as a response to the humiliation suffered from foreign 
powers (Kaufman, 2010). Mao Zedong claimed the People’s Republic of China 
marked a New China and the start of rebuilding a united domestic China (Yan, 2001). 
However, the closed-door system during the Mao Zedong era impeded China’s 
growth and the isolation further fuelled China’s decline on the international stage 
(Lin et al., 2003). 
 
It is argued that the experiences of the national humiliation is an integral part of 
China’s national identity and will continue to be for modern Chinese history, it is a 
deeply embedded part of the Chinese psyche (Wang, 2014). It is further argued by 
Gries et al., (2011) that the current ideals of the Communist Party can only be 
understood when one understands the history of China. The memory of China's past 
humiliation stems deeper than a psychological issue; it is an element of the Chinese 
national identity (Wang, 2014). The century of humiliation serves as a reminder to 
China of the hardships it has to overcome. A once wealthy country admired for its 
technological prowess, and culture forward thinking became poor and lost its global 
influence (Wasserstrom, 2015). After a century of decline in Chinese strength and 
global status, along with decades of being closed off to the world; the Chinese are 
committed and resolute in returning the nation to its former natural glory (Zhao, 
2005). Thus, China believes their decline in history is something that should be 
corrected. The opening up of China has since become a necessary ingredient to the 
rise of China once again. 
 
3.8.1.3 National rejuvenation  
 
This research asserts, that China’s rich history of cultural and scientific 
achievements, encourages an innate and strong sense of national pride in the Chinese. 
This is also supported by Yan (2001) who states that Chinese politicians have often 
leveraged on the Chinese sense of national pride, with the concept ‘national 
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rejuvenation’ being a familiar narrative. Examples can be seen as far back as Sun 
Yatsen, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and, at present, Xi Jinping (Wang, 2014). 
Indeed, each leader, whether past or present, can be linked to a similar nationalistic 
agenda focused on re-establishing China’s lost global prominence (Han, 2017). The 
rejuvenation of China should be thought of as an emotionally poignant concept. That 
is to say, to the Chinese, national rejuvenation is about restoring the status quo and 
reaffirming China’s rightful place in the world; it is not about attaining new power or 
leverage over other nations (Gries et al., 2011; Li, 2017). 
 
National rejuvenation is a long-term strategy where Chinese leaders have since 
worked towards laying the foundation for a better China for future generations. 
Reform and foreign policies have been gradual and approached with caution 
(Ferdinand, 2016). Since China reopened its doors to the West, China has gone from 
being an impoverished nation to the second largest economy in the world in four 
decades (Lin, 2013). The continued growth of China is precisely what attracts others 
to China’s national development strategy. China’s growing international prominence 
has been viewed as “the rise of China” however; the Chinese people view this as the 
“rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Yan, 2001). That is to say, the Chinese believe 
their status in the world will return to their former glory – in contrast to some 
Western views of this phenomenon, i.e., China’s rise to new fortunes (Li, 2017).  
 
The ‘rejuvenation of China’ has been carefully depicted by political leaders to drive 
nationalism and strengthen domestic support for economic reforms (Wang, 2014). In 
addition, the pursuit of national rejuvenation has served to cement support for the 
Communist party, while also making the state an integral part of China’s national 
identity (Roach, 2016). When Xi Jinping took to office in 2012, he built on the 
concept of the Chinese dream, driving the ideology of the “great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation.” The Chinese dream can be understood as an updated interpretation 
of the rejuvenation of China (Callanhan, 2016). This is because the Chinese dream 
shares the same fundamental principles as the concept of rejuvenation.  The Chinese 
dream concept has since become a key ideology used by the Chinese state to offer a 
new narrative to replace the term “socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
(Ferdinand, 2016). In Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th CPC national congress in 2017, 
Xi openly called upon the Chinese nation to: 
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“…Remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission firmly in mind, hold 
high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, secure a decisive victory 
in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, strive for the great 
success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, and work tirelessly 
to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.” 36 
 
The poignant concept of the Chinese dream, creates a shared sense of purpose 
among the Chinese people at all levels i.e., the state, organizations, and the Chinese 
individual (Ferdinand, 2016). That is to say, the Chinese dream calls upon the 
Chinese people to collectively serve the nation for the greater good (Jin, 2014; Kerr, 
2015). This is also supported by Chugani (2017), who argues that collectivism and a 
shared sense of purpose is a core value among the Chinese people. The concept of 
collectivism has a long history in China and, is deeply rooted in the Chinese psyche. 
For example, the Confucian concept ren (仁); which is formed by combining the 
character ren (人 i.e. man) on the left and er (二 i.e. two) on the right -- signifying 
the relationship between people (Lin, 2014). It is thus argued that, collectivism and 
thereby the collective nature of the Chinese dream, is a concept that resonates deeply 
with the Chinese people. That is, it is a common belief shared amongst the national 
(state), organizational (SOE), and individual levels (SOE managers). 
 
3.8.2 Interaction between the formal and informal institutions at the 
national level: The central government  
 
In the current national level of China, China is a centralized broadly-planned 
economy. The decision-making power, policy development, as well as regulations 
very much remain with the core political party. In this case, society will follow the 
formal institution at the national level closely. Through this, the central government 
also ensures that it maintains order and control and that the one party ruling system 
maintains legitimacy and public support (Cui & Jiang, 2012). Thus it is imperative 
that the government minimizes any values that are in conflict with the party ideals to 
ensure that formal institutional objectives can be carried out (Zhao, 2005). In the 
                                                 
36 CPC national congress. Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC national congress; 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/201711/04/content_34115212.htm>, 
2017. 
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case of China, the formal objective is to rejuvenate China to its former glory. This 
formal objective has been institutionalized from the informal institution.  This means 
the informal institution, i.e., the values; norms; and beliefs of society have been 
institutionalized and are now aligned with that of the formal institution, i.e., the 
central government. Subsequently, society collectively shares the same unwritten 
values, cognitive thinking and personal beliefs as the central state (Reynolds, 2008).  
 
Following the Mao era, reforms led to the adoption of a more liberal approach to 
China’s political beliefs, resulting in China’s socialist ideology somewhat losing its 
influence when it began seeking market-oriented economic opportunities (Jakobsen 
& Jakobsen, 2011). Change was viewed as eroding existing institutional practices 
and challenging the legitimacy of activities which have been established over long 
periods of time (Child, Lu, & Tsai, 2007). This movement resulted in the central 
state being criticized for not being competent in protecting Chinese interests, 
ultimately resulting in many questioning the Communist party (Zhao, 2005). The U-
turn in promoting a prosperous China was going against the long-established 
socialist values leading some members of society to believe that China had lost face 
to the West. It was clear that in order for the formal institution to carry out these 
state plans, the state needed to have the support of the public. The party used 
propaganda slogans “to get rich is glorious” to promote the new national ideology of 
seizing business opportunities and pursuing entrepreneurship (Gries et al., 2011). 
The political party defended China’s new ideology by encouraging national pride 
through “building socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Montinola, Qian, & 
Weingast, 1995). This new type of nationalistic ideology was used to drive national 
support, and to make China stronger.  
 
Though China is currently showing no signs of a political transition from a 
communist regime, it has however for the past three decades, placed great emphasis 
on becoming a market-oriented economy and welcoming globalization (Gilley, 
2008). Addressed in the 10th Five Year Plan (FYP) was the historic event of China 
becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with their 
membership being a catalyst for further economic change. This marked the first 
significant step that China took towards opening up to the outside world. Progress 
towards foreign trade activity included widening permitted activities towards foreign 
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businesses, improving the investment environment, greater allocation towards 
foreign investment funds, and better use of China's foreign exchange reserves. The 
10th FYP also outlined and guided overseas investments by the state council through 
encouraging a “go out” strategy.  
 
“we need to implement a "going outside" strategy, encouraging enterprises with 
comparative advantages to make investments abroad, to establish processing 
operations, to exploit foreign resources with local partners, to contract for 
international engineering projects, and to increase the export of labor. We need to 
provide a supportive policy framework to create favorable conditions for enterprises 
to establish overseas operations. We also need to strengthen supervision and prevent 
the loss of state assets.” 37 
 
A transition towards a market-based economy required the Chinese government had 
to justify its legitimacy. The central government can adjust the formal institution to 
be in line with changes in the external environment by ensuring that the informal 
institution remains consistent. There is a uniform nationalistic trust instilled in the 
Chinese, to have faith in the Communist party. As a result, the party can, therefore, 
adjust the formal institution according to its reform plans. Tung (2016) characterized 
this as "economic nationalism." According to Zhao (2005), the Chinese people share 
a commonality in a "dream of a strong China." Because of this common ground, the 
power of nationalism is particularly effective in uniting the people and strengthening 
solidarity. Nationalism is needed for the central state to influence the informal 
institution by motivating society to work towards elevating China’s status (Tung, 
2016).  Nationalism was found by the central state as the most powerful tool in 
unifying values of the central to that of the society (Steele & Lynch, 2013). The 
national sentiment is expressed by “爱国" i.e., "loving the country” which is an 
important concept to encourage the Chinese to be loyal in serving the country (Zhao, 
2005). In China, this means supporting and giving their loyalty to the party, i.e., the 
representatives of the country and nation. By strengthening the informal institution, 
the one party-one rule system has proven successful and necessary for maintaining 
political stability whilst China undergoes its socio-economic development (Gries et 
al., 2011). 
 
                                                 
37 State Council. Report on the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development, < http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18334.htm>, 2001. 
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The transition towards a more open market-based economy has consequently 
resulted in a change in dynamics of the formal institution. This includes the addition 
of new policies and regulations that were necessary to facilitate the opening of the 
Chinese economy. Critically, the central government encouraged competitive 
Chinese enterprises to make overseas quality acquisitions, exploit foreign resources, 
forge partnerships, and establish overseas operations (Karolyi & Liao, 2010). To do 
this, the state council proposed a more supportive foreign policy based environment 
with more favourable conditions to motivate Chinese enterprise to go overseas 
(Buckley et al., 2007).  At the same time, the state council also increased supervision 
of SOE projects in order to prevent losses in state assets.   
 
“the construction of new investment projects and the merger and acquisition of 
enterprises will become important methods of foreign direct investments…. the 
overall strategic objective of China's utilization of foreign investments shall be: To 
further propel the utilization of foreign investments to be fundamentally converted 
from “being quantity oriented” to “being quality oriented.” 38 
 
The current 13th FYP places great importance on the development of innovative 
technology. China is pushing to integrate advancement in emerging technology and 
internet solutions into their national goals with the objective of benefiting socio-
economic development. Plans made by the state council such as "Made in China 
2025" have been driving this agenda. This includes rolling out technological 
initiatives that will upgrade China's existing manufacturing sector and secure the 
nation's position as a pioneer and world leader in innovative manufacturing. 
 
“Made in China 2025"…At present, a new round of scientific and technological 
revolution and industrial transformation has formed a historic convergence with 
China's accelerated transformation of economic development mode...We must firmly 
grasp this major historical opportunity, implement the strategy of manufacturing a 
strong country…and strive to achieve a hundred years of the founding of New China 
through three decades of efforts. To build China into a manufacturing power that 
leads the development of the world's manufacturing industry and lay a solid 
foundation for realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation.” 39 
 
                                                 
38  State Development & Reform Commission. The Eleventh Five-year Plan on Utilization of Foreign 
Investments, 
<http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=38075ad8cfbe4e05bdfb&lib=>, 2006. 
39 State Council.  Notice of the State Council on Issuing the “Made in China (2025),” 
<http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=826a5000ff214a60bdfb&lib=law>, 2015. 
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Moreover, government-led projects such as the One Belt One Road initiative, i.e., 
revitalizing the historic Silk Road trade route provide a fitting narrative of how the 
central government is looking to reassert China's prominence. By the Chinese 
building infrastructure and trade channels that connect China to the West, China will 
have greater ease accessing the vast volumes of resources from central Asia (Dollar, 
2015). While at the same time, boosting Chinese economic activity (Nordin & 
Weissmann, 2018). China has the full domestic support of the Chinese people 
because the One Belt One Road project resonates deeply with the Chinese people – it 
aligns with the narrative of the Chinese dream of reclaiming lost glory. 
 
3.8.3 Interaction between the formal and informal institutions at the 
organizational level: SOEs  
 
At present within the Chinese economy, the formal institution at the national level 
sets the rules and goals which SOEs must follow and actively pursue. This means 
SOEs are directed formally by the state in a top-down fashion. The formal 
institutions at the national level will also define and set the boundaries on how 
organizations should behave and what actions should be used (Pejovich, 1999). 
Given the close proximity of SOEs to the central government, it is believed that the 
informal societal values have been infused into the mindset of state-owned 
organizations. Technically, SOEs are only overseen by the state and are no longer 
formally part of the state. However, SOEs are registered as a wholly-state-owned, 
non-corporate entity, and state agencies can hold shares (Brødsgaard et al., 2017). 
Thereby making the ownership of SOEs a complex subject open to debate. As a 
result of central government control and influence, all SOEs have become 
“isomorphic." That is SOEs converged and became homogeneous as a response to 
the constraining national strategy set by the state party. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) 
proposed that such conditions could lead to homogeneity in structure, culture, and 
output. This is found particularly to be true in China, as SOEs are large in size, with 
typically a substantial and often unproductive workforce, their complacency a result 
of the “iron rice bowl” or job for life concept, firmly rooted in SOE culture 
(Naughton, 2006). 
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SOEs remain central to the economy, and therefore state ownership is still a leading 
force (Naughton, 2006). The state views SOEs as strategically important to fulfilling 
state plans, with SOEs considered as the prized organizations of China. Given the 
formal control of SOEs by the state, essentially, it can be argued SOEs are an 
extension of the central state and thus SOEs share the same informal beliefs (Robins, 
2013). As firms are shaped by the institution, this means firms will also base their 
choices on the interaction with the institutional environment (Du & Boateng, 2015). 
This is also supported by Li & Ding (2013) who argued that a firm's strategy is not 
just about ownership advantages but also involves the institutional environment that 
the firm is embedded in. As SOEs are owned by the state, they will naturally 
conform to rules and beliefs relevant to their political climate (Li & Ding, 2013).   
 
With principle ownership by the state, many have questioned the management style 
within SOEs. The corporate governance, delegation, managerial incentives, and 
supervision of SOEs remain a central process. 96 SOEs still remain directly under 
the State-owned assets supervision and administration commission’s (SASAC) 
control. This means all transactions by these 96 SOEs are related to the central party 
(SASAC, 2018).  The relationship between the state and the central SOEs is further 
illustrated in Table 3.3 and 3.4.  From this table, the number of state agencies 
involved in the cross-border M&A process can be observed. When performing a 
cross-border M&A, the SOE must get approval from SASAC and submit an 
application for approval to the National development and reform commission 
(NDRC) and the Ministry of commerce (MOFCOM). Current restrictions on 
overseas investments mean the application will be subject to extra scrutiny and 
vetting by all state agencies. Thus an additional application with supporting 
documents is now required (Baker McKenzie, 2017). A decision will be made by the 
state agencies generally between 20 – 30 working days depending on the deal value 
(however it may be longer if the target is on the restricted or sensitive list). If 
approval is granted, the SOE will need to convert their renmin bi (RMB) and obtain 
the foreign currency from the State administration of foreign exchange (SAFE) 
before they can go ahead with the overseas transaction. Thus given the rigorous 
screening on all overseas M&A deals, only those deals that are in line with the state 
plan while also being beneficial to China are approved. Secondly, SOEs are 
categorized into the following: commercial, public service, and other (Li & 
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Brødsgaard, 2013). Therefore, depending on how the SOEs are classified, this will 
influence its management and incentive system. For example, those SOEs that are 
involved in energy provision are incentivized to provide a public service to the 
people of China and develop forward-looking strategies to secure energy for the 
nation (Naughton, 2017).  
 
“The main aims of commercial SOEs will be to vitalize the state-owned sector, 
improve the efficacy of state capital, and maintain or increase the value of state-
owned assets. To achieve these aims, they should engage in lawful and autonomous 
production and business operations under the principle of the survival of the fittest. 
The main aims of public-benefit SOEs will be to ensure people’s wellbeing, serve 
society, and provide public goods and services. To achieve these aims, they should 
give greater play to market forces, introduce market mechanisms, and improve their 
assessments of cost control, product and service quality, performance, and 
capacity”40 
 
As SASAC is the ultimate manager of China’s SOEs, they formally are the decision 
makers and have the ultimate rights of control. Given the formal directive from the 
state to the SOE, essentially these SOEs have to carry out SASAC orders. Therefore, 
for as long as the SOE will remain under state control, the SOE will deem political 
objectives to be of the most importance (Naughton, 2006). 
 
China's pillar industries such as natural resources and heavy industry manufacturing 
still remain state dominant with minimal non-state enterprise access. These pillar 
industries are heavily influenced by the agenda of the central state and remain under 
close watch. There is little management diversity among these industries (Li & Ding, 
2013). The state plans and directs these industries broadly through the FYPs. 
Resultantly, the largest cross-border M&A deals conducted by Chinese SOEs in 
terms of value during 2006 – 2010 were predominately in the areas of natural 
resources. They accounted for 88.2% of the total value of the deals observed in 2006 
– 2010 (calculated based on the Zephyr M&A database). SOEs in these state 
prioritized industries are the largest firms with the most extensive distribution 
networks, the best supply of resources, and continuously have state support and 
financial backing. The fact these industries are protected from external market 
                                                 
40 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The 13th Five-Year Plan for economic 
and social development of The People’s Republic of China (2016 – 2020), 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf>, 2016. 
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entrants while also having better access to key resources illustrates their strategic 
importance, as well as, how critical SOEs are to the Chinese economy.    
 
Table 3.3. The central government agencies involved in the M&A process 
Government Agencies Abbreviation Principal Role SOE 
Approval  
required 
State Council - Blueprinting the overall long-term vision on 
FDI at the national institutional level. 
- 
 
Peoples Bank of China 
 
PBC 
Influences overseas FDI by 
increasing/decreasing the RMB, interest rates 
and deciding the policy on foreign exchange. 
 
- 
 
State administration of 
foreign exchange 
 
SAFE 
Monitoring foreign exchange inflows and 
outflows. Managing China’s foreign reserves. 
Gives SOEs a foreign currency allowance.  
 
Yes 
 
 
Ministry of Commerce 
 
 
MOFCOM 
Drafting FDI policies and regulations. 
Supervises all foreign-economic relations. 
Negotiations on foreign trade and 
investments. Represents China at WTO. 
Ensuring China’s economic trade meets 
international agreements and conducts. 
 
 
Yes 
National development 
and reform commission 
NDRC Sets China’s overall economic and industry 
policies and reform plans. Lists the industries 
and countries that China encourages 
investments in.  
 
Yes 
State-owned assets 
supervision and 
administration 
commission 
 
SASAC 
 
Manages SOEs and state-owned assets. 
 
Yes 
Sources: Constructed by the author based on Luo, Xue, & Han (2010); Sauvant & Chen, (2014) and  
Jones & Zou (2017) 
 
 
Table 3.4. Compliance procedure on cross-border M&A investments 
Government 
Agencies 
Application 
filing required 
Extra application 
filing required 
Processing time 
for approval 
(working days) 
Deal value (USD 
million) 
SASAC Yes For projects on 
"sensitive list." 
20 Any 
NDRC Yes Yes 30 
20 
More than 300 
Less than 300 
MOFCOM Yes Yes 20 
20 
More than 300 
Less than 300 
SAFE Yes Yes Subject to approval 
from SASAC, 
NDRC, MOFCOM 
 
Any 
Sources: Constructed by the author based on Sauvant & Chen (2014) and Baker McKenzie (2017) 
 
SOEs are argued to be assets of the home country which in turn makes them part of 
the home institution (Cui & Jiang, 2012). This means when SOEs conduct business 
activities, it may be the SOEs objective to serve the mandates of the central state. In 
doing so, this would indicate that the SOEs act in the interest of the home institution 
 91 
rather than challenging them (Cui & Jiang, 2012).  SOEs belong to the state thus 
M&As are viewed as investments made on behalf of the people of China. Therefore 
all investments need to have a specific purpose. Currently, all SOEs and SOE 
managers have directed their efforts to focus on two principle state projects – Made 
in China 2025 and One Belt One Road. This means all overseas M&A deals are 
focused on targeting targets that align with these state projects (Global Development 
Policy Center, 2017). In following this approach, M&As will more easily obtain 
state approval. Moreover, these deals are given further priority as they fall in line 
with the broader objective of reinstating China's former excellence. 
 
3.8.4 Interaction between the formal and informal institutions at the 
individual level: Top-level managers in SOEs 
 
The informal ideals of China are used by the central government to legitimize the 
ruling of the state party. This means that society entrusts the central state to plan and 
take the best course of action for the development of the country. The formal 
institution will dictate for individuals to conform to rules predetermined by central 
authorities. Individuals will closely follow the rules of the game set by the central 
state with little deviation (Zhao, 2005). SOE top-level leader positions are directly 
appointed by the state council, and SOE senior managers are specifically appointed 
by SASAC (Brødsgaard et al., 2017). Evidently, this illustrates that state controls can 
have an influence at the individual level directly through the formal institution in a 
top-down fashion. SOE top-level managerial appointments such as that of a 
chairman correspond to the minster level rankings within the Communist party 
(Leutert, 2018). This is an existing high-level political ranking; thus informal 
political beliefs are deeply embedded within the appointed personnel. In other words, 
these SOE managers are inherently political figures themselves. Therefore, they will 
also share the same informal beliefs as the central state party. Consequently, there 
will be no incentive for the SOE managers to deviate from state plans. Resultantly 
this ensures that the appointed political figures are the best candidate to guarantee 
the overall objective of national rejuvenation is carried out (Hout & Michael, 2014). 
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The close relationship between the central state and the SOEs results in an 
authoritarian style of management. For as long as the central state is involved in the 
ownership structure, the central state will always determine how SOEs should be 
managed. For example, the state council strategically positions all top-level SOE 
managers; resulting in SOE managers having very little autonomy (Robins, 2013). 
SOE managers must fulfill state orders regardless of whether it is in the best interest 
of their organization. Moreover, the state mandate of dictating that candidates are 
selected based on the fulfillment of political conditions mean that selected SOE 
managers can often not be the best candidates. In fact, during the initial periods of 
reform, it was not uncommon to observe SOE managers with minimal managerial 
and business experience (Hout & Michael, 2014). However, as China has grown in 
domestic and international experience, the international experience of SOEs 
managers has also grown in accordance. Currently, even though SOE managers are 
still politically appointed, SOE managers are usually capable, experienced, and 
politically astute individuals (Robins, 2013). Appointed managers by the central 
state are motivated to perform well in the SOEs due to their political career 
aspirations, and it is the state council that has the power to politically promote 
managers (Leutert, 2018).  
 
Cao et al., (2013) speculated that many SOE managers are driven by political 
promotion. Following successful management of an SOE, there is an unwritten rule 
that managers will be politically promoted. One way for the SOE leader to position 
themselves for a political promotion is to conduct a successful cross-border M&A. 
Yang, Wang, & Nie (2013) studied the factors influencing the political promotion of 
SOE executives. It shows that economic performance, i.e., growth of operating 
revenue highly affects the chance of development. M&As are indeed a quick away 
for an SOE manager to acquire profitable assets and thus increase the value of the 
SOE. However, acquired targets need to be specifically in line with the current state 
plans. For many SOE managers, the embedded informal nationalist beliefs and the 
love of the country has resulted in great pride in representing such an important 
organization. After all, the SOE managers are political figures themselves. The state 
has called for SOEs to be model citizens through their duty and responsibility to 
support and defend China (Zhao, 2005). These values will influence SOE managers 
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to act with the necessary conviction to fully convey China's strength both 
domestically and internationally. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the conventional motivations of cross-border M&A 
undertaken by typical organizations. Such motivations include economies of scale 
and scope; capability upgrades; and market access and distribution networks. It was 
discussed that these conventional motivations are not entirely sufficient in explaining 
the cross-border M&A context experienced by Chinese SOEs. This is because these 
conventional motivations are based on organizations from developed economies. 
The literature assumes that the organizations are well-established players with 
significant market share, possess significant advantages, and are competitive in the 
domestic market. Therefore, the rationale to seek new markets is because the firm 
has the relevant capabilities, assets, and resources to exploit when going overseas. In 
this case, the motivation to conduct a cross-border M&As originates from the firm 
level itself where they have full autonomy to execute and actively pursue cross-
border M&As. However, in the case of China, Chinese SOEs are not in possession 
of the overwhelming firm level assets such as innovative technologies or competitive 
advantages that are typically observed in Western firms. Moreover, despite having a 
lack of international overseas experience, SOEs are encouraged by the state (in a 
top-down fashion) to perform cross-border M&As. Thus, the rationale of conducting 
a cross-border M&A originates at the state level, and subsequently, the SOEs have a 
constrained type of autonomy. As seen in Chinese SOEs, the motivations for cross-
border M&As are greatly influenced at the national level and therefore cannot be 
fully explained by solely basing it on firm-level motivations.  For this reason, it is 
essential to determine how and why the state uses SOEs as an instrument to conduct 
cross-border M&As.  
 
To begin answering this question, this chapter has proposed the adoption of the 
institutional perspective for this research. The concept of the institution by sociology 
standards is defined as the structure by which social processes including cognitive 
mindsets, norms, routines, and actions that are amassed over time, subsequently 
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becoming a universal standard for socially acceptable behaviour. This institutional 
concept has been extended to the realm of management wherein the observed 
societal actions are a result of formal and informal institutional rules that influence 
organizational behaviour and individual processes. In this context, the institution 
itself is made up of the formal and informal institution.  It was explained that taking 
an institutional perspective is critical to undertake an in-depth analysis of the cross-
border M&A phenomena witnessed by Chinese SOEs. However, this chapter 
highlighted that the existing literature is lacking in research that sheds light on the 
dynamics between the informal and formal institution in China. Specifically, the 
literature does not adequately address the significance of China's past history, its 
pride, and the country’s sense of national identity, which is fundamental if the role of 
the formal institution is to be adequately understood. Moreover, the existing 
literature has overlooked the extent of the influence of the institution in addressing 
the unique relationship between the state, SOEs, and SOE leadership. Therefore, the 
literature does not fully explain how the state can both formally and informally 
direct the subsequent behaviour of SOEs and thus encourage cross-border M&A.   
 
It was further highlighted by this chapter that the informal institution, namely, 
China’s desire for national rejuvenation is the underlying informal driver of cross-
border M&As undertaken by Chinese SOEs. Chinese civilization has a rich cultural 
legacy, a well-documented history dating back 3000 years, and was once considered 
a regional hegemon with huge political and economic potential. Despite China’s 
prolific historical achievements, China is haunted by the “century of humiliation.” A 
period which saw the demise of China’s glory under colonial powers. Mao Zedong 
proclaimed an end to the century of humiliation in 1949 upon founding the People’s 
Republic of China and proverbially closed China’s doors to the West. However, 
China's isolation from the West impeded China's growth and further fuelled China's 
international decline. The experience of the national humiliation remains an integral 
part of China's national identity. The century of humiliation serves as a reminder of 
China's decline in strength and global status. Thus, China believes their decline in 
history is something they need to correct. Therefore, national rejuvenation has since 
become an emotionally affecting concept centered on returning China to its once 
former glory.  
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As the boundaries of the formal and informal economy are dynamic and can shift in 
response to the external environment; this means the perception of what society 
deems is formally acceptable will change allowing room for the legitimatization of 
the informal institution. This chapter argued that in the conventional institutional 
theory, institutional change originates from the individual level within the informal 
institution. That is an individual who can envision new institutional rules and is 
motivated to encourage institutional change to advance their interests. The new 
informal beliefs can be to be supported at the organizational level if the shared belief 
is a common objective. If the new institutional rule is adopted by enough members 
of society, it can be institutionalized into the formal institution and drive formal 
institutional change. Interestingly, in the Chinese context, it is indicative that 
institutional change occurs in the reverse direction. That is, change is directed from 
the formal institution at the national level to the organizational and individual level 
respectively in a possible top-down fashion - all while the informal institution 
remains constant. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will present the methodology used for this thesis and will discuss in 
detail how a methodology was designed and adopted for this study. This chapter will 
begin by introducing the primary research questions of this thesis along with their 
objectives. These points will be addressed and answered throughout the remainder of 
this thesis. The methodological framework used to underpin these questions and 
objectives will follow. Additionally, an overview of the research philosophies and 
the research approach will be provided. Specific details regarding the qualitative 
research design and justification for choosing this research method will also be 
outlined. Further, an overview of the grounded theory research strategy, in addition 
to an explanation of the data collection methods used for the interviews in this thesis 
will also be defined. Finally, the data analysis, issues surrounding validity and 
reliability, and approaches to enhance the quality of the chosen research 
methodology will be discussed. 
 
4.2 Research approach and philosophies 
4.2.1 Inductive approach 
This thesis will follow an inductive theory approach. This means the relationship 
between the theory and the investigation will take an inductive stance, with new 
theory generation being the desired outcome (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The inductive 
research of this thesis will draw upon interview data and the participants' 
understanding to grasp a firmer comprehension of the subject matter. This inductive 
research will follow a grounded theory method (further discussed in section 4.3). 
This will allow the theory to be first generated using emerging concepts that 
eventually link the fundamental categories of the theory together (Charmaz & 
Belgrave, 2007). However as Bryman & Bell (2015) point out, following an 
inductive approach does not necessarily guarantee the generation of a robust theory. 
In fact in inductive research, theory is often used and is required as a background 
during initial investigation stages (Annells, 1996). An inductive approach was 
chosen over a deductive approach because of the area of study that this thesis is 
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focused on. Specifically, in the case of this research, the relationship between the 
formal and informal institution in the China context is a stream of research that has 
yet to be fully explored. Moreover, much of the existing literature is limited in the 
application of the institutional theory to the field of cross-border M&As. Thus, this 
research will start in an exploratory fashion to allow the identification of common 
themes and concepts (based on collected data) to be identified. 
 
4.2.2 Ontological and Epistemological considerations: An interpretivist 
approach  
 
 
At the core of each research project are ontological and epistemological 
considerations. Ontology is concerned with the philosophy of reality, and the 
assumptions of the nature of social reality, what exists, and what one believes 
constitutes social reality (Blaikie, 2009). Broadly speaking there are two ontological 
streams of thought, realism, and relativism. Realism concerns the acceptance that the 
social and natural worlds have different realities, but both forms of these realities are 
probabilistically apprehensible (Annells, 1996). Therefore, realism would assert that 
reality can be objectively measured in a methodical fashion, thus limiting the biases 
of researchers (Madill et al., 2000). Relativism, on the other hand, is based on a 
rendition of a reality that cannot actually be known but instead is always interpreted. 
This is means that knowledge is linked to a time and place, and that reality is made 
up of local and specific realities (Annells, 1996). Moreover, relativists believe that 
possible interpretations of realities can coexist meaning it can be assumed that reality 
exists only as far as one's perception of it. This also means that reality is not 
independent of one's perception, and as a result of this, relativism follows a 
subjective approach (Blaikie, 2007). This research will support the relativism 
ontology to guide research. As this study is specific to the China context, it is 
believed that the institutions governed by the central state are what create the reality 
of the Chinese SOEs and SOE managers. As a nation with an authoritarian 
government, it is the experience of the formal institution that is fundamental to 
creating a reality for society and the people of China.  
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Epistemology is treated by Fuller (2007) as an understanding of how and what we 
should know, on the basis of what we assume to exist and what can be known. 
According to DeRose (2005), epistemology is the theory of knowledge. 
Epistemology assists the researcher through the research process by providing a 
general overview of what should be considered as acceptable (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
Broadly speaking there are generally two epistemological approaches; positivism 
and interpretivism. Depending on the belief of the researcher these paradigms can 
influence the adopted research method. 
 
A positivism perspective is generally associated with a quantitative and “scientific” 
approach to research in which the research involves a logically deduced hypothesis 
confirmed using evidence (Charmaz, 2006). This indicates that the researcher treats 
reality as something that can be measured, in which cause and effect principles can 
be applied to (Kuhn, 1970). One of the principal shortcomings of this approach is 
that a positivist outlook fails to capture the complexities of human behaviour and 
social interactions (Lee, 1991). 
 
Using an interpretivist approach. This research aims to attain an in-depth 
understanding of the institutions and the effects that they can have on the behaviour 
at three social levels (the state, SOEs, and SOE managers). Despite interpretivists 
believing that the nature of reality can be recorded, it is necessary, however, for a 
research strategy to define the differences between human nature and the elements of 
natural sciences. In this case, a non-scientific approach is necessary to capture the 
real “meaning” behind the actions and behaviour, rather than emphasizing 
"measurement" (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This means an interpretivist approach can 
capture insight into the lives of those with real-world experience. Charmaz & 
Belgrave (2007) stated that this would be expressed through the thoughts, feelings, 
actions, beliefs of the research participants. 
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4.3 Qualitative research design: Grounded theory  
 
In following the relativist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology, these 
philosophical approaches assume data collection through a qualitative research 
strategy. This will rely on direct experiences on the social phenomena in their 
context as opposed to statistical procedures and quantification. Qualitative methods 
are used when little is known on the research subject, and the researcher seeks to 
collect information-rich data (Snape & Spencer, 2003). Moreover, qualitative 
research rejects natural science practices and agrees that individuals interpret the 
social world in different ways thus social reality is continuously shifting (Snape & 
Spencer, 2003). Supporting this, Pandey & Patnaik (2014) defines qualitative 
research as a multi-method focus type of research that requires an interpretative 
approach to the subject matter.  
 
Grounded theory is a systematic method that is employed in qualitative research. It 
seeks to generate new theory which is made possible through its set of consistent 
data collection and analytical techniques specifically designed to develop substantial 
theory (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2007). The grounded theory technique is characterized 
by its constant data comparison phase in which codes, categories, and themes are 
developed through data analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Secondly, grounded 
theory is hallmarked by its theoretical sampling in which the researcher identifies 
data sources to collect while the emerging theory is being developed (Annells, 1996). 
The process of grounded theory means the research is developing codes, analyzing 
the data, and deciding what data to collect next and where to get the data from – all 
simultaneously as the theory is emerging (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Through this 
systematic methodological process, the researcher can inductively discover and 
generate a theoretical account of the social phenomena through the experiences of 
people operating within the field (Creswell, 1998). Moreover, the systematic process 
of data collection, analysis, and constant comparison can highlight reoccurring data 
patterns thus allowing for substantial theory to be inductively developed (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1997). 
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As per Charmaz & Belgrave (2007), the key processes for handling qualitative data 
using the grounded theory research method are: 
 
1) Data collection and analysis of data in phases (to be explained in section 4.5.2) 
2) Creation of analytical codes which are developed from the collected data  
3) Constant comparison, theoretical sampling, and greater data collection to refine 
core concepts 
4) Writing analytical memo notes to explain categories 
5) Preliminary generation of theory to explain the behaviour/processes  
6) Theoretical sampling for theory construction to check and refine the theory 
 
In the case of this study, as grounded theory provides the ability to close social 
engagement with the research participants, it therefore, allows access to a rich 
understanding of the dynamics of the Chinese institution. This in turn, encourages 
the researcher to closely observe what is happening within the data from an 
interpretist viewpoint. The close engagement with the social phenomenon allows the 
collection of rich, detailed, and full data. As Charmaz & Belgrave (2007) state, this 
includes accurate, rich data on thoughts, feelings actions, context, and structure – all 
of which are imperative to understanding the dynamics between the formal and 
informal institution.  
 
Very little research has been undertaken concerning the institutional theory in the 
China context with an emphasis on cross-border M&A by SOEs. Given the lack of 
literature on this subject; the grounded theory strategy is beneficial as it allows 
progressive development of theoretical concepts. Grounded theory places emphasis 
on creating theory through the research data as the data is being collected. Thus the 
researcher can develop theoretical categories to explain any phenomenon 
experienced directly from the data (Charmaz, 2006). Moreover, the grounded theory 
allows for qualitative data to be as rigorous and systematic as quantitative data. This 
is because the procedure allows the researcher to continuously check, redefine and 
develop ideas (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2007). Importantly, the grounded theory also 
allows the gathering of more data and further analysis, as the theory is beginning to 
emerge. In doing so, this allows the researcher to amend the initial interview 
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questions, to refine the areas that have provided insight or omit the areas that may 
not have been successful (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). 
 
However, it must be noted that, in addition to using the grounded theory approach, 
this thesis will also systematically analyse formal regulations and written policies 
released by the Chinese central government. The use of supplementary secondary 
data was deemed imperative to guarantee an objective systematic analysis to this 
research. That is, to avoid an over-reliance on findings purely based on the data 
collected from the interviews, and thus constraining the generalizability of this 
research. By supplementing this research with additional secondary data, i.e., central 
government’s statements, regulations, and policies; it provides an additional content 
dimension to the analysis thereby reducing researcher/participant’ biasness and 
subjective opinions. Thus, ensures that the findings of this research can be extended 
to other settings with a broader sample population.  
 
4.4 Data collection strategy 
4.4.1 Primary data collection: Qualitative Semi-structured interviews  
 
Qualitative interviews are considered integral to an interpretivist grounded theory 
study. As per Table 4.1, it was deemed the most appropriate data collection strategy 
to explore the dynamics between the formal and informal institution in the China 
context, in addition to being the best method for understanding the subsequent 
influence on cross-border M&As by Chinese SOEs. Using in-depth interviews 
provides an opportunity to explore preliminary ideas, test concepts, and obtain 
feedback on information (collected from the literature review) from participants 
involved in the SOE cross-border M&A process. Interviews, therefore, provide an 
opportunity to gain a complete picture of the Chinese institution, before generating a 
China-specific framework that can meet the objectives of this research. 
 
Secondly, given the complexity between the central government and SOEs 
concerning ownership and management, it is critical to gain a deep understanding of 
how the state can affect SOE behavior and subsequent outcomes. An interview 
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format allows the interviewer to probe the interviewees at length with regards to 
their knowledge on key issues relevant to the research. Specifically, open-ended 
questions allow the participant to talk freely with no fixed constraints thus permitting 
the researcher to obtain the rich detailed thoughts and attitudes of the key industry 
elites (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). By conducting interviews with individuals that 
are involved directly in this environment, it provides the opportunity to obtain 
concepts from an expert point of view that could not have been observed without 
such insight. Thus, interviews were deemed the most appropriate means to collect 
authentic, rich, and complete data.  
 
Lastly, this research involves a tacit China-specific dimension, in which the 
significance of the China-specific qualities such as their values, beliefs, and norms 
will be highlighted through the interaction of the formal and informal Chinese 
institution. Specifically, a focus on understanding how informal beliefs becomes 
institutionalized by the formal institution. As much of these characteristics are tacit 
in nature, this research would be limited in its explanatory power if a quantitative 
approach were to be used instead. This is because the intangible concepts highlighted 
in this research such as “pride” and “national rejuvenation” cannot be easily 
quantified. Therefore, it is primarily through interviews providing an in-depth insight 
into the significance of these tacit qualities can be fully captured and well defined. 
 
This research has chosen to use semi-structured interviews. The primary reason for 
selecting semi-structured interviews is because the balance of structure and 
flexibility in this technique can generate rich illuminating data when investigating 
new ideas (Robson, 1993). The researcher remained open to the fact that the 
responses from participants could be very different from those initially 
predicted/expected. During the interview, most questions were modified in their 
wording and order – depending on the direction and flow of the interview. 
Additional questions were asked based on the participant’s responses, so as to 
explore or further develop a concept. Moreover, some questions were left out, if they 
were deemed as either inappropriate or were not expected to enhance the interview.  
 
All interviews were voice-recorded to facilitate a thorough analysis of the collected 
data. Additionally, the recording of the interviews enabled the researcher to review 
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the delivery of questions and follow up responses. Field notes were also made during 
each of the interviews. These first allowed for reflection on the content and context 
of the interviews, and secondly, allowed the researcher to identify the areas that were 
well received and those that were in need of adjustment. Lastly, the notes 
highlighted any key points or sensitive issues discovered during the interviews, and 
therefore acted as a soundboard for theoretical and conceptual development. 
 
4.4.2 Schedule of prepared interview questions 
 
The topics and questions were created to guide the researcher during the interview 
process (see Appendix 2.5 Table 6). It was essential to develop a flexible guide with 
some preliminary questions to ensure that all objectives of this research are covered 
during the interviews, while at the same time providing room for exploration and 
developing participants' responses.  Most importantly, as this research deals with 
confidential and classified subject matter, questions were structured in a way that 
assured sensitivity and while also facilitating the best results. This guide was tested 
during a pilot study and was amended in-line with the feedback of the research 
participant. 
 
The first set of questions (warm-up) were designed to ease the participants into the 
interview. This was then followed by questions that highlight the consistency of the 
informal belief of national rejuvenation at the national, organizational, and 
individual levels; thus institutionalized into the formal institution (objective 1). The 
next set of questions was regarding the formal institution and the influence of the 
state on SOEs and the behaviour of SOE leaders and whether this influence can 
motivate cross-border M&As (objective 2). 
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Table 4.1. Methodological review table  
 Interviews  Questionnaires  Case studies  
Criteria Advantages Constraints Advantages Constraints Advantages Constraints 
 
Time 
 • Greater time needed to 
collect data – 
interviews vary in 
duration 
• Respondents fill and 
return questionnaire to 
researcher  
  • Longitudinal / 
ethnographic studies 
conducted over a long 
period of time. 
Sample size  • Can be small sample 
sizes 
• Larger sample size / 
participation in one 
survey distribution 
  • Small number of 
subjects  
Response rate • Low refusal rate for 
personal interview if 
confidentiality 
ensured  
  • Low response rate for 
mailed questionnaires 
with poor quality 
answers 
• In-depth detailed 
qualitative accounts of 
the real-life 
environment and 
cognitive processes 
 
Access to 
information 
• Ability to attain 
depth and rich 
information. 
Permits flexibility in 
exploring new topical 
areas during 
interview – tests the 
limits of respondents’ 
knowledge 
  • Rigid nature and 
lack of flexibility in 
questions. 
Answers restricted to 
fitted category 
 • Situational therefore 
narrow ability to extend 
and generalise findings 
from a single case 
Data analysis  • Requires onerous 
transcribing of 
interviews 
• Predetermined 
structures therefore 
short coding time 
  • Often long with masses 
of documentation - need 
to be managed and 
organized systematically 
Reliability • Allows ability for 
immediate follow up 
on participant 
responses – 
interviewer can probe 
for more depth / clear 
any 
misunderstandings 
  • Prone to errors and 
lack of consistency 
during survey 
responses.  
 • Lack of rigour and 
tendency for biased 
interpretation of data.  
Subject to uncertainty 
when small sample is 
deployed. 
Source: constructed by the author, based on: Yin (1994); Baxter & Jack (2008); Fricker & Schonlau (2002); and Foddy (1994)
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4.4.3 Access and selection of interview participants 
 
This research followed the elite interviewing process wherein elite individuals were 
used to provide new information on what people think, their attitudes, values and 
beliefs on the subject matter (Tansey, 2007). The term ‘elite’ is considered by 
Zuckerman (1972) as a group of individuals that hold significant power, and a subset 
of particularly powerful individuals with prestigious influence. McDowell (1998) 
considered ‘professional elites’ as a group that are highly skilled, professionally 
competent, and class-specific.  
 
The close relations and interconnectedness between SOEs and the Chinese 
government make it a challenging process to obtain permission to discuss any 
information regarding SOEs. This is further apparent when trying to find an SOE to 
discuss the topic of cross-border M&As. Firstly, the SOEs in China are notoriously 
selective to outsiders. There is no directory to locate relevant employees or, even, a 
generic contact email address for basic correspondence. Thus, it is an extremely 
cumbersome process to find candidates with direct insight into SOEs for an 
interview. Secondly, given the personal risks involved in disclosing sensitive 
information of a particular M&A deal (for instance for national security concerns), 
employees not familiar with the interviewer will be suspicious and reluctant to 
partake in any discussion. To put into perspective, the difficulties of obtaining 
quality interviews candidates with SOE participants, after several months of emails 
and phone calls to numerous organizations, this research managed to secure a total of 
two interviews with SOE managers. Moreover, once the interviews were undertaken, 
it was made apparent that the information provided during the interview was limited 
in scope. SOEs employees were vague and reluctant to disclose detailed information 
on how the SOE is managed or on cross-border M&As activity. Due to the lack of 
quality of the interviews from the SOE managers, their interviews were not used. 
Therefore, given the difficulty of obtaining sufficient quality data directly from 
SOEs; the researcher subsequently decided to find additional participants who could 
provide unbiased and disclose relevant information surrounding cross-border M&A 
activity undertaken by SOEs.  
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As a result, the profile for selecting elite interview candidates were based on China 
experts with industry-level knowledge on SOEs (in various sectors) that have 
conducted cross-border M&A. Such experts included China M&A consultants, 
M&A analysts, M&A advisories, and M&A brokers. It took several years of 
building trust and tenacious cultivation of relationships to obtain interviews with 
these participants. Akin to the Chinese business environment, guanxi and trust had to 
be established before any information could be disclosed. Once a relationship was 
developed between the researcher and interview participant, the participants would 
often make further introductions to other relevant interview participants and so forth. 
Due to the establishment of trust, interview participants were willing to speak openly, 
honestly and in-depth on the nature of the Chinese institution, how SOEs are 
commanded, the rationale for the cross-border M&As, and investment motivations. 
This research has chosen to use independent elite individuals that have considerable 
experience working alongside SOEs and on cross-border M&As. The principle 
advantage of conducting elite interviews is that these industry elites are able to 
provide information not recorded anywhere else (Richards, 1996). Therefore 
interviewing elites offers a unique perspective on the motivations for cross-border 
M&A by SOEs. Specifically, offering insight and a dimension that would be external 
to the SOEs. The final sample of interview participants used in this research are 
entirely independent and are not connected to the state, while also, simultaneously 
possessing in-depth experience and knowledge on SOEs’ cross-border M&As. It is 
therefore expected that the responses will have no underlining bias towards SOEs or 
subjectivism towards the central government. This will subsequently increase 
research validity and ensure that answers will be an honest and accurate reflection of 
an independent perspective on the subject matter and the most reliable source of 
information.  
 
The elite participants selected for this research are all senior China experts that were 
either involved with the SOEs directly or have previously dealt with SOEs. The 
selected interview participants are high calibre, well experienced, and respected 
individuals within their fields. Participants range from a minimum of 5 years to 20 
years China experience, with all holding senior positions within well-established 
multinational organizations. The participants are all very familiar with the Chinese 
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business environment, SOE operations, and have extensive knowledge of the cross-
border M&A process. Moreover, many have previously been hired by SOEs to 
advise, consult, and analyze a number of cross-border M&A projects. The SOEs 
covered in this research are high-profile enterprises with a strong domestic and 
international presence within their respective industries. The SOEs selected are 
managed by SASAC and are viewed as national champions by the central 
government. An overview of the profiles of the participants and involved SOEs can 
be observed in Table 4.2. As per Table 4.2, the discussed SOEs broadly cover all key 
strategic industries including; natural resources, finance, technology, and 
manufacturing. This, therefore, allows the research to attain a complete picture of the 
motivations for cross-border M&A by an SOE without the interference of industry 
biases.  
 
Nonetheless, though elite interviews have their benefits, they also do have their 
limitations. In this case, this research itself is based on SOEs and the cross-border 
M&A process. However, the interviews to be conducted are not directly involved 
with the SOEs, and thus the data collected will be based on the accounts of elite 
individuals whom are external to the SOEs. Therefore the researcher needs to be 
aware of the drawbacks of using such candidates. Limitations identified by Tansey 
(2007) include, elites misrepresenting their own position within the greater 
organization e.g. inflating or underrepresenting their role in the M&A process. In 
addition to giving accounts based on hearsay as opposed to first-hand experiences; 
and confusing different memories/experiences (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). In 
such scenarios it would greatly question the reliability of their statements and the 
data collected. Therefore the interviewer must always be aware to stringently 
vet/cross-check the information the elite interviewees are supplying before reaching 
any such conclusions with the supplied data.  
 
Participants were initially briefed through email regarding what that the research 
would involve along with an overview of the purpose of the study. Participants were 
also instructed that the interviews would be voice recorded with their consent with 
the interview being used solely for undertaking the research in this thesis (see section 
4.4.4 – 4.4.6). If participants were willing, follow up interviews were also conducted. 
The interviews were conducted between 2016 – 2018 and were either held in person 
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face-to-face, over Skype, or over the telephone. A total of 32 interviews were 
conducted with 21 different interview participants, with a total of 11 follow up 
interviews. From the interviews, 26 different national level SOEs were covered. The 
interviews length ranged from between 35 – 120 minutes.  
 
4.4.4 The Chatham House Rule 
 
In order to obtain the most open and honest information from the interview 
participants, this research followed “Chatham House Rule.” The purpose of the 
Chatham House Rule as defined by Chatham House (2018) to:  
 
“providing anonymity to speakers and to encourage openness and the sharing of 
information. It is now used throughout the world as an aid to free discussion.” 
 
Established in 1927, there is only one Chatham House Rule, which is: to use any 
information received freely; however, the identity or the affiliation of the speaker or 
any of the participants cannot be revealed (Chatham House, 2018). By assuring the 
research participants of this rule, participants can speak openly, express their honest 
views, and thus encouraging free discussion on the subject matter (Guest et al., 
2006). As a result, participants will feel more at ease knowing there will not be any 
possible negative consequence as a result of the information that they provided for 
this research. Examples of such consequences include but would not be limited to; 
dismissal, damage to reputation, and possible lawsuits (Michael et al., 2007).  
 
The use of the Chatham House rule was essential in securing interviews with the 
research participants. Most of these participants work closely in SOE related affairs, 
and some work alongside the central government agencies. The close affiliation with 
disclosing sensitive/classified information and the subsequent possible repercussions 
meant participants did not feel comfortable providing an interview unless complete 
anonymity was guaranteed.  
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Table 4.2. Profile of interview participants in this research 
Participant Role Involved SOEs* SOE industry Gender Years in 
industry 
Location 
A1 M&A consultant CCCC Natural resources Male 8 Singapore 
G1 M&A advisory ChemChina Natural resources Male 8 Beijing 
H1 M&A consultant ChemChina Natural resources, Technology Male 18 Hong Kong 
H2 M&A consultant COSCO, COFCO, AVIC Natural resources, Manufacturing Male 9 Hong Kong 
J1 M&A advisory Anonymous Technology Male 5 Hong Kong 
J2 M&A consultant State Grid of China Natural resources, Technology Male 5 Geneva 
J3 M&A analyst Anonymous Natural resources Female 9 London 
J4 M&A brokerage Anonymous Manufacturing Male 20 Shanghai 
K1 M&A brokerage COFCO, China Baosteel Group Natural resources, Manufacturing Male 9 Shanghai 
K2 M&A consultant China Telecom Technology Male 8 Beijing 
L1 M&A consultant Anonymous Natural resources, Technology Male 10 Shanghai 
M1 M&A consultant COSCO, COFCO, SINOCHART, Hesteel, Baogang Natural resources, Manufacturing  Male 10 Shanghai 
M2 M&A advisory Anonymous Finance Male 5 Santiago 
M3 M&A analyst ICBC Finance Female 6 Beijing 
M4 M&A advisory Anonymous Finance  Female 5 New York 
N1 M&A consultant Anonymous Natural resources Female 5 Beijing 
P1 M&A consultant China Baosteel Group Manufacturing Male 12 Santiago 
R1 M&A advisory CCCC Natural resources Male 10 Singapore 
T1 M&A consultant Anonymous Natural resources Female 15 Geneva 
T2 M&A analyst Anonymous Natural resources Male 5 London 
V1 M&A advisory State Grid of China, General Water of China Natural resources Male 9 London 
X1* M&A manager in SOE Not used Finance  Female 8 Beijing 
R2* M&A manager in SOE Not used Natural Resources Male 10 Shanghai 
Constructed by the author. Notes: 1. Listed SOEs are based on those participants who have granted consent for disclosure only. II. Interviews from Participants X1 and R2 
were not used due to the lack of quality in obtained data
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4.4.5 Interview consent 
In seeking interview participants to partake in this research, potential candidates 
were emailed an interview invitation which included a detailed synopsis on the 
purpose of the research project (see Appendix 2.1). Participants that were interested 
in being interviewed were then sent additional information via email, and a suitable 
interview time was scheduled (see Appendix 2.2). At the time of the interview, the 
researcher re-summarized the purpose of the research encouraging open dialogue 
and allowing for questions to be raised by the participant to be answered by the 
researcher. Prior to the interview commencing, the researcher reminded the 
participants that the interview would be audio-recorded and asked whether the 
participants were still comfortable with this. The audio recording was not turned on 
until participants gave their consent. If participants were happy for the interview to 
be recorded, the researcher also mentioned that they could request the audio 
recording to be stopped at any point during the interview. 
 
Face-to-face interviews were recorded using a dictaphone that was placed in between 
the researcher and the participant. Over the telephone interviews were recorded 
using a mobile recording application. Before the recording, participants were 
reminded that the interview would follow the Chatham House Rules (section 4.4.4) 
and were asked if they consent to the research using any quotations given during the 
interview. Any such quotations would be anonymous. All participants who agreed to 
partake in the research were asked to read and sign the consent form (see appendix 
2.3). All participants were emailed a signed copy of the consent form for their 
personal records. All consent forms were kept in a locked filing cabinet. All 
recordings of the interviews were kept in a password locked folder on the 
researcher's password locked computer. 
 
4.4.6 Transcription 
Transcription of interviews is necessary to present the interview data in a format that 
facilitates analysis. The researcher completed the transcription of the interviews. 
This decision was made to ensure the consistency in the quality and content of the 
transcripts. Moreover, as a result of the researcher carrying out the transcription 
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process, it allowed the researcher to be re-familiarized with all interview content, 
which proved hugely beneficial during the data analysis process.  
 
The transcription employed Mergenthaler & Stinson (1992: 129-130) seven 
principles of standardization. These set of standardization rules involve: 
 
1.  Preserve the morphologic naturalness of transcription. Keep word forms, the 
form of commentaries, and the use of punctuation as close as possible to 
speech presentation and consistent with what is typically acceptable in written 
text. 
 
2. Preserve the naturalness of the transcript structure. Keep text clearly 
structured by speech markers (i.e., like printed versions of plays or movie 
scripts). 
 
3. The transcript should be an exact reproduction. Generate a verbatim account. 
Do not prematurely reduce text. 
 
4. The transcription rules should be universal. Make transcripts suitable for both 
human/researcher and computer use. 
 
5. The transcription rules should be complete. Transcribers should require only 
these rules to prepare transcripts. Everyday language competence rather than 
specific knowledge (e.g., linguistic theories) should be required. 
 
6. The transcription rules should be independent. Transcription standards should 
be independent of transcribers as well as understandable and applicable by 
researchers or third parties. 
 
7. The transcription rules should be intellectually elegant. Keep rules limited in 
number, simple, and easy to learn 
 
By following these rules, it firstly allowed all transcripts to be in the same format 
which assisted in the analytical process. Moreover, the rules of standardization also 
permitted the use of participants’ slang, pauses, emotions to be conveyed in the 
transcripts (see Appendix 2.4 for sample transcript). Resultantly, this allowed a true 
reflection of representation in the participants’ views and thus minimized any 
possible misrepresentation (McLeilan et al., 2003). Post-transcription, each finished 
transcript was checked against the relevant original recording to guarantee the 
quality and accuracy of the transcripts. 
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4.5 Data Analysis 
4.5.1 Computer-assisted analysis 
  
In order to manage the large volume of data (including the transcripts, comparisons 
of interviews, excerpts, and systematic data analysis) computer software specifically 
designed for qualitative research was used. Interviews were firstly transcribed using 
Microsoft Word, and the primary data was then uploaded onto the online qualitative 
research platform Dedoose (https://www.dedoose.com). Dedoose was used to assist 
with the analytical process by allowing the researcher to store, organize, and explore 
the raw data jointly through in-built functions. From here, the researcher was then 
able to analyze the contents of the data to find categories and key themes using the 
analytical tools. Subsequently, allowing for the generation of a theory in a systematic 
methodological fashion. 
 
4.5.2 Coding process for grounded theory data analysis 
 
Following the grounded theory strategy, coding the data is the first crucial stage of 
the analytical process. The term coding in grounded theory is the process of defining 
the data. In grounded theory, the relationship between the data and theory is a 
conceptual code (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). The coding stage in grounded theory is 
critical as it provides the fundamental link between the data collection process, and 
the initial stages of explaining theoretical categories that may be developed 
(Charmaz & Belgrave, 2007). Traditionally in grounded theory, there are two 
distinct stages of coding. Firstly the substantive coding phase, which involves open 
and selective coding once a core category emerges (Holton, 2010). Secondly, a 
theoretical coding stage in which the core categories are theoretically integrated and 
a theory is formulated (Holton, 2007). Both stages involve the data being compared 
continuously, while also being theoretically sampled to saturate core concepts, 
collect new data, and assist in refining the categories (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2007)
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4.5.2.1 Open coding  
 
Line-by-line open coding is used by the researcher to begin the preliminary coding 
process. To minimize the possibility of missing an important coding category, 
researchers need to ask themselves "what is this data a study of?" "what is happening 
in the data?" "what is the main concern?” (Glaser & Holton, 2004). Each line of the 
data is examined to tentatively identify a code, actions, or concepts that are occurring 
(Holton, 2010). The data is segmented to allocate units of meaning. This allows the 
analysis and theory to be built from the ground up and allows the researcher to break 
the data into categories to begin to see the different processes (Charmaz & Belgrave, 
2007). Upon completing the line-by-line coding stage, the researcher would have 
produced a rich body of codes without leaving anything out, as well as refraining 
from imputing any personal motives into the theory being built (Glaser & Holton, 
2004). From Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3, an example of the line-by-line open coding 
process can be observed. In the first example from Table 4.3 initial codes such as 
“past failures,” “more careful,” “continuing with M&A,” “continue with caution,” 
and “more experienced” were the preliminary codes generated from the data 
extracted from participant L1. 
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Figure 4.1. An example of the line-by-line coding process using Dedoose 
 
Note: Author’s own work for this research 
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Table 4.3. An example of exploration from data to code generation 
Participant Data Extracts Initial codes Selective codes Category 
 "Yes, I think the failures, I think they will be very careful 
but I still think they will go on and continue to do this but 
they will be more cautious, and now they are more 
experienced." 
“past failures” 
“more careful” 
“continuing with M&A” 
“continue with caution” 
“more experienced”  
“learning from past 
experiences” 
“continuing M&A more 
cautiously” 
Selective M&A based 
on state plans 
 
L1 "maybe before China focused on oil and natural 
resources, but now China will focus on high technology 
especially on AI, if those Chinese companies buy these 
high technology companies, they will be able to use these 
technology in the China market, and they profit from 
that. China is shifting from natural resources, before 
China needed more iron ore and coal, but now we don't 
need as much and now as a country we are changing." 
“past experiences” 
“past natural resources driven” 
“current focus on technology”  
“want to acquire high tech” 
"profit in China market" 
“shift away from natural 
resources” 
“don’t need as much natural 
resources” 
“evolving country” 
“greater experience in 
M&A” 
“transitioning from natural 
resources to technology” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H1 
"There was a time a couple of years back China felt like 
they didn't care so much, as long as they go out there and 
buy resources, but what happened, particularly in Africa, 
they lost a lot of money because the deals were not so 
strategic because sometimes they were just scattershot." 
“past experiences” 
“lack in care” 
“just want to buy resources” 
“loss of money” 
“not strategic deals” 
“random M&A” 
“previously inexperienced 
in M&A” 
“learning from past” 
“greater thought in current 
deals” 
 
Selective M&A based 
on state plans 
 “the government was not happy about the approach of 
how deals were done so nowadays it is much more 
targeted. In some ways now when Trump blocks deals, 
there's actually some justice to that because in China 
deals are much more now vetted. If they are going after 
an American company, there is a strategic reason for 
this"  
“negative reputation” 
“more targeted M&A” 
“justice in deal blocking” 
”better vetting in deals” 
“strategic reason behind 
deals” 
 
“more targeted M&A with 
a strategic purpose” 
 
Constructed by the author, based on the author's own work for this research 
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4.5.2.2 Constant comparison and theoretical sampling 
 
Charmaz (2006) explains that the constant comparison process is an iterative 
operation wherein data is compared with other data - the data is compared with the 
code - the code is compared with other codes - the codes are then compared to the 
category - the category is compared to other categories - and then the category is 
compared with the concept. The constant comparison process is required to move 
from open coding to selective coding because it is through constant comparison that 
the researcher can establish which concepts are emerging (Holton, 2010). The 
comparison allows common codes to be refined and formed into categories that 
represent more substantial portions of data (Charmaz, 2006). Regular reviewing of 
the transcripts also encourages new interpretations of narratives, new codes, and a 
deeper understanding of the participants' beliefs, particularly attitudes towards the 
role of the Chinese institution in relation to cross-border M&As. 
 
As per Figure 4.2, through the process of constant comparison, a core category will 
begin to emerge of which it’s primary function is to become integrated as part of the 
underlying theory (Holton, 2010). In appearing to explain the phenomenon, the core 
category will then become the root for further data collection and new coding efforts 
(Charmaz & Belgrave, 2007). The comparison process occurs in every stage of the 
methodology to ensure that the theory generated remains grounded in the data 
(Charmaz, 2006).  In parallel to the constant comparison is the process of theoretical 
sampling. This involves facilitation on what data needs to be collected and where to 
collect this data to continue developing the emerging theory. As the collection of 
data is confined to the parameters of the emerging theory, the researcher can only 
discover what to collect next based on the initial coded data (Strauss & Corbin, 
1997). This means the researcher needs to identify gaps in the data and emerging 
theory to draw guidance on where and how to collect additional data. In this research, 
upon initial coding of the existing data, theoretical sampling was used to identify 
areas where additional data sources were needed to be collected to facilitate the 
emerging theory.  
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Figure 4.2. An example of the comparison of excerpts within the same emerging coded category using Dedoose. Upon comparison, some of these excerpts 
have been recorded. 
 
Note: Author’s own work for this research 
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4.5.2.3 Selective coding  
 
Upon identification of core codes, any subsequent data collection and coding is 
refined to what is relevant to the emerging theory (Holton, 2010). The core codes are 
then used to sift through large volumes of data. This is known as selective coding 
(Charmaz & Belgrave, 2007). During this process, all developed themes, categories 
and codes are re-examined to identify any similarities and to avoid any overlapping 
or repetition. By refining the coding, only the core codes are used to categorize the 
rest of the data (Holton, 2010). Therefore, any future data is categorized more 
accurately.   
 
As per Figure 4.3, the purpose of selective coding is to build categories that can 
clarify the data as the data is being examined. The categories created must also allow 
any gaps within the data to be identified (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2007). Selective 
coding also means that the selected codes are now used as categories and are now 
part of the developing theory. By choosing specific categories to be used, this 
indicates that the chosen codes have major significance is explaining processes 
within the data (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2007). The selective data collection process 
continues until the researcher believes that the core category is sufficiently integrated 
into the emerging theory.  
 
In this research, in conducting selective coding, all transcripts were revisited and 
compared against early codes. These early codes, in turn, were also compared 
against newly collected data to check for analytical integrity and the ability to 
deduce meaning. It also involved the clarification of any new codes against the logic 
of the emerging theory and thereby established new boundaries. Also, as the theory 
developed, categories were refined and combined, while at the same time, ensuring 
that all significant concepts were represented by the categories. 
 
From Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, examples of the selective coding process can be 
observed. In the first example from Table 4.3, from the except given by participant 
L1, it can be seen that selective codes such as “learning from past experiences,” and 
“continuing M&A more cautiously” were refined from the initial open codes of “past 
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failures,” “more careful,” “continuing with M&A,” “continue with caution,” and 
“more experienced.” As a result, new interviews and data were collected, coded, and 
explored based on these selective codes.  
 
Figure 4.3. Development of core codes/categories   
 
Source: Constructed by the author, based on Charmaz & Belgrave (2007) and Holton (2010) 
 
4.5.2.4 Theoretical coding 
 
Theoretical coding is used to determine relationships among the individual 
categories/concepts to achieve an integrated conceptual framework (Charmaz, 2006). 
Theoretical coding conceptualizes how the codes can be incorporated into the theory. 
Thus this requires intensive comparison of data to validate the reliability of the codes 
that represent the accounts of the participants (Glaser & Holton, 2004). In theoretical 
coding, the researcher aims to develop a higher level of understanding through 
refining and merging concepts into theoretical categories that can explain the 
research phenomenon (Charmaz, 2006). By the end of the theoretical coding process, 
the researcher would have developed a theoretical model that can be applied to the 
subject matter. Table 4.4 is an illustrative example of how this research developed 
theoretical codes based on the data raw obtained from the research participants. In 
this example, the coding is continuously refined during the open coding and 
selective coding stages - until the theoretical code "influence of state agencies" is 
reached. 
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Table 4.4. An example of the grounded theory coding process 
            Data extract Open coding Selective coding Theoretical coding 
1 “I think that the SASAC will now have a larger say in 
the decision-making process of SOEs. While I expect the 
day-to-day M&A process to still be run independently by 
the SOE team, the final stage approval will be required 
by the government.” 
SASAC control, lack of decision making 
by SOE;  
M&A final approval by state 
SOE lack of autonomy; 
Greater involvement of 
state;  
M&A harder process 
Influence of state 
agencies  
2 “Now you need so many different approvals NDRC, 
SAFE, SAS approval just to get to the table to say I want 
to transact on something. Whereas in 2012 so many 
purchases made, like hotels and these weren't necessarily 
good investments, but they came from SOE money” 
Various state agencies;  
onerous processes; 
past experiences;  
M&A easier before 
 
  
3 “When Xi Jinping came in, he went into the media 
industry, and that's when people started getting arrested, 
then he went into the rail industry, then he went into oil 
and gas and this industry has a long-standing relationship 
with the security industry. He cleaned these industries 
out. Then he went into the financial sector and 
reorganized BoC and ICBC and did this to put his own 
guys in. He went SOE by SOE, this had a huge effect on 
outbound investment. The autonomy totally dropped.” 
New leader;  
industry crackdown;  
restructuring;  
Allies;  
outbound M&A harder; 
reduced autonomy  
  
 Constructed by the author, based on the author's own work for this research  
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4.5.3 Theoretical Saturation 
 
When the research no longer needs to collect data, this is when theoretical saturation 
is reached (Guest et al., 2006). Constant comparison between the data, the properties, 
and dimension of each category/concept is carried until no new properties or 
dimensions emerge – at this point saturation is met, and the category has now 
become theoretically saturated (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Theoretical saturation is 
understood as a feature of grounded theory that signifies completion.  
 
In this study, theoretical sampling was used to collect specific data relevant to the 
newly emerged concepts. Constant comparison analysis was carried out to determine 
the integrity and dimensions of the collected data. Theoretical sampling and the 
collection of data were conducted until the analysis ceased to find any further new 
insights and thus no new codes were generated. Theoretical coding was used to 
define categories while core categories were compared, contrasted, and revised until 
they were able to explain the generated theory sufficiently.  For example, as per 
Table 4.5, the theoretical category “influence of state agencies” was elicited from the 
coding stages. All initial data was revisited to determine any further properties that 
might have emerged in this given category. And, interview participants were asked 
for a follow-up interview to explore the dynamics of any new categories in more 
depth. It was agreed by all participants that the state agencies are instrumental in the 
cross-border M&A process undertaken by SOEs. Thus, in this specific case, no new 
interviews were required. Table 4.5 illustrates the theoretical categories and 
subcategories generated by this research, and Figure 4.4 is a summary of the 
grounded theory process.  
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Figure 4.4. The grounded theory process 
 
Source: Constructed by the author based on Strauss & Corbin (1994); Charmaz (2006) and Holton (2010) 
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Table 4.5 (1/2). Outline of core categories, definitions, and examples of questions asked 
Interaction Category Definition Examples of questions asked 
Informal institution  Rejuvenation of China Identifying the influence of the historical 
values and sentiments of national pride on 
formally encouraging M&A to revive China to 
its former glory 
“Where does the pride in China stem from?” 
“How significant is the century of humiliation to the 
Chinese?”  
“Is China trying to revive its nation?” 
 Greater international 
influence 
Determining whether China is seeking a more 
significant international presence i.e., an 
indication of national revival 
“Have SOEs extended their global footprint?” 
“Is having global influence important to China?” 
“Can mianzi motivate cross-border M&A?” 
 Resource security and Self-
sufficiency 
Issues concerning the importance of why 
specific resources are acquired. Determining 
the extent of China's desires to be less 
dependent on the West for key resources, e.g., 
technology, minerals, grains 
further an indication of national revival 
“Why are these deals so important to China?” 
"Do you think China is trying to more self-sufficient and 
relying less on imports?" 
“Is independence important to China?” 
“How has the recent trade war with the US affected China?” 
Institutionalization of 
informal institution into 
formal institution 
Government-led M&A Establishing the degree, the state has on 
influencing the behavior of SOEs to 
encourage cross-border M&A 
“The idea of cross-border M&A, where does it come from?" 
“How connected is the state to SOEs?” 
 Influence of state agencies Determining the impact of the state on cross-
border M&A. Issues concerning M&A due to 
roles of state agencies.  
“To what degree are state agencies involved in the M&A 
process?” 
“To what extent has the capital control restrictions affected 
overseas M&A?” 
 Selective M&A agenda 
based on state plans 
Issues regarding how M&A is influenced by 
national state plans. E.g., more specific and 
targeted with a purpose. 
“Has SOEs become more experienced in overseas M&A?’ 
“Are M&As more selective?” 
 Constructed by the author, based on the author's own work for this research 
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Table 4.5 continued (2/2). Outline of core categories, definitions, and examples of questions asked 
Interaction Category Definition Examples of questions asked 
Between the national level 
and organizational level 
 
SOE obligation to fulfill 
state plans; SOE level of 
autonomy 
Establishing how closely must SOEs follow 
the state plans and the degree of autonomy 
that SOEs have in cross-border M&A. 
“How much freedom do SOEs have in the M&A process?” 
“Who selects the M&A target?” 
 Profit vs. social  
driven deals 
Determining how social and profit 
responsibilities are weighted in SOEs given 
their state ownership. 
“Do SOEs have a responsibility to the people of China?” 
“To what degree are deals by SOEs driven by profit?” 
“What is objective behind the deals that SOEs have made?” 
 SOE paradox: Undeniable 
influence yet challenging to 
engage  
Identifying the consensus on how SOEs are 
perceived within their respective industries as 
a result of state influence. 
“What was your experience on working with SOEs?” 
“Are SOEs respected in your field?” 
“What is the reputation of SOEs?” 
Between the national level 
and 
 individual level 
 
Strategic placement of 
managers 
Indicating how top-level SOEs positions are 
made and the degree they are under political 
influence when it comes to M&As. 
“How are SOE leaders chosen?” 
“Why is it important for the state to place SOE managers?” 
“Do SOE managers have to follow the directives of the state?” 
 Cross-border M&A for 
career leverage 
Highlighting the relationship between 
conducting an M&A and rewards given to 
SOE leaders concerning their political careers. 
“Post successful M&A, what will happen to the SOE 
manager?” 
“Will SOE managers act in best interest of SOE?” 
Constructed by the author, based on the author's own work for this research 
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4.6 Issues surrounding qualitative research 
 
One of the biggest criticisms surrounding qualitative research is the lack of scientific 
rigor. For this reason, there are considerable discussions on the principles of validity 
and reliability using a qualitative interpretivist approach. Since qualitative research 
is regarded as a mode of seeking more profound understanding, while also allowing 
a focus on a particular phenomenon rather than testing and refuting theories; 
qualitative research studies are often scrutinized about the quality and robustness of 
the results (Pandey & Patnaik, 2014). However, it is argued that validity and 
reliability are applicable to qualitative research when taking in account the differing 
features and goals of the research (Seale, 1999). The measures taken to achieve the 
reliability and validity of this research will be outlined below.  
 
4.6.1 Internal validity  
 
This research used triangulation to improve construct and internal validity. Internal 
validity refers to the degree to which the researcher can conclude that the observed 
relationship is causal (Golafshani, 2003). That is, concluding with confidence that 
the detected cause of the observed phenomenon is in fact true.  The concept of 
triangulation indicates that a single source can never fully explain a phenomenon. 
Therefore it needs two or more sources of data for the conclusion to be more credible 
(Pandey & Patnaik, 2014). Research validity can be strengthened by following a 
triangulation approach in crosschecking sources of information from multiple origins 
(Thurmond, 2001). Proposed ways to improve internal validity in qualitative 
research includes data triangulation (Burke, 1997). This means using multiple data 
sources in a single research study, for example, using multiple interviews thus 
providing multiple data sources. Moreover over data triangulation involves 
collecting data at different points in time, different locations, in addition to different 
candidates. 
 
In the case of data triangulation, this research adopted a strategy a ensure that 
interviews were conducted with a varied range of M&A experts including; M&A 
consultants, M&A brokers, M&A analysts, and M&A advisors - all of which are 
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based in various international geographies. This firstly allowed the researcher to 
check the acquired information from different data sources to determine general 
agreement. Moreover, the benefit of using a wide range of data sources is that each 
data source can provide additional information from a different perspective therefore 
resulting in a more complete understanding of the phenomenon. Lastly, in 
interviewing candidates at different periods of time in addition to different 
geographies, the gathering of rich information from multiple different sources 
facilitates a far superior understanding of the subject matter than if only one data 
source was used, thus vastly improving the internal validity of the results.  
Concerning construct validity, semi-structured interview questions were 
purposefully thought out to guide the researcher into obtaining the best possible 
responses. The questions were also prepared to ensure that all key topics were 
covered during the interviews. These questions were developed from studying a 
range of sources and were crosschecked. This includes journals, company reports, 
newspaper and magazine articles. By developing these questions from a variety of 
sources, it allowed the researcher to crosscheck the validity of these questions from 
various angles thereby giving strength and integrity to these questions before use.  
From the perspective of the grounded theory process, triangulation was also applied 
to this research consistently throughout the data collection process. Specifically, 
triangulation was applied through the use of theoretical sampling and constant 
comparison. New participants were asked questioned based on emerging categories 
and concepts that emerged from previous interviews. Information from transcripts 
was routinely compared to previous interviews, codes, categories, and concepts. 
Moreover, through the participants’ introduction to new interview candidates, this 
provided the opportunity to validate different responses from participants within the 
same industry, differing seniority levels, and with varying years of work experience. 
This allowed the analysis of data that came from participants with different 
perspectives and levels of business authority. Finally, the constant comparison 
process of grounded theory meant adopting triangulation to compare the collected 
data against secondary external sources of data. The collected primary data were 
examined for similarities as well as contradictions to the secondary data, thus 
enabling an overall interpretation of the data to be developed before a final 
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conceptual framework is concluded. 
 
4.6.2 Reflexivity 
 
One potential threat to validity in research is researcher bias. That is, in qualitative 
research, researchers frequently find what they want to find, because qualitative 
research tends to be more open ended and less structured than quantitative research 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). This in turn allows the researcher to undertake selective 
recording of the information, and interpretation of the data based on the personal 
views and perspective of the researcher. 
 
In order to avoid researcher bias and ensure research rigor, reflexivity is a strategic 
process typically employed. This involves self-awareness and self-reflection by the 
researcher on any potential biases and predispositions. Through reflexivity, 
researcher can become more self-aware to monitor and attempt to control their biases 
(Burke, 1997). This involves an active of process of scrutiny, reflection, and 
interrogation of the data, as well as the researcher him/herself.  Manson (1996:6) 
stated a reflexive researcher should: 
 
“constantly take stock of their actions and their role in the research process and 
subject these to the same critical scrutiny as the rest of their data.”  
 
Reflexive strategies used by this research include consciously taking steps back from 
the subject of this research and critically questioning the attained interpretations. 
Such self-reflection and questions asked to oneself included: “what do I know?” 
while at the same time questioning, “how do I know what I know?” – all while 
recognizing the potential limitations that this research may have been produced. 
These questions were asked throughout the planning of the research, data collection, 
and data analysis phases. Undertaking a reflexive process, permitted the attainment 
of research confidence with regards to how the knowledge was constructed 
throughout the research process. It also facilitated research rigor and allowed 
accountability for factors that could influence the planning, conduction/undertaking, 
and ultimately the conclusion of this research. 
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Critical reflexive research is an essential process, in order to reflect on the 
knowledge produced by the research, in addition to questioning how knowledge has 
been generated (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). Thus, is it important that the researcher 
is reflexive and aware of the potential influences on the obtained knowledge. That is, 
it is important to take a step back and take a critical look on the researcher’s role in 
the research process (Burke, 1997). Ultimately, self-reflection and answering the key 
aforementioned questions is essential to improving the quality, validity, and rigor of 
the research (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004).  
 
4.6.3 Reliability 
 
Reliability is considered the extent to which the results are consistent, and an 
accurate representation of the population under study (Morse et al., 2002). If the 
study can be reproduced again with the same results using the same methodology 
then it can be said that the research is reliable (Morse et al., 2002). Reliability of 
qualitative studies can be a challenging process. An interpretivist research project is 
often based on the collection of data from interviews wherein the research 
participants are giving accounts of real-life experiences, and it is down to the 
researcher to interpret these personal experiences. The biggest challenge faced in 
qualitative research, is overcoming the elements of information misinterpretation and 
researcher biases (Golafshani, 2003). To ensure the reliability of the results of this 
research, several techniques for enhancing the reliability of qualitative research were 
followed.  
In the first instance, the research involved a well thought out and well documented 
methodological research process. The research questions and corresponding 
objectives have been made clear from the beginning. The methodology is explicit 
and well formulated. The data has been gathered transparently through consented 
participants that are well regarded in the Chinese M&A field. Lastly, the data 
analysis has followed the well-established grounded theory procedure, and has been 
thoroughly explored using sophisticated analytical tool ‘Dedoose.' The systematic 
process adopted ensures that any errors in the methodology are minimized. This 
subsequently allows the data to be accurately collected and analyzed, thus giving the 
highest possibility of robust and reliable results (Pandey & Patnaik, 2014). 
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It is believed that given the same conditions and a similar situation, the same data 
and findings of this research can be obtained by a different researcher. However, it 
must be noted, that in the case of qualitative research and social sciences in general, 
it is significantly difficult to recreate such similar research conditions (Golafshani, 
2003). Specifically, to this study, the interview participants acquired for this research 
are the direct result of years of tenacious relationship cultivation and trust building. 
Thus, it would be unlikely that these participants would speak as openly or, feel the 
same degree of comfort, required to disclose the detailed information that underpins 
this research. Therefore, given that the theory generated in this research is 
fundamentally based on trust (which allowed such rich and full-bodied information 
to be provided by the participants); it cannot be guaranteed that another researcher 
would obtain the same outcome.  
The second measure employed to enhance reliability is to ensure that the acquired 
results are as unbiased as possible. This required the researcher to adopt a neutral 
stance when analyzing the collected data. It is critical that the responses given by the 
participants directly shape the findings of the research, and are not influenced by 
researcher biases, or other interests (Pandey & Patnaik, 2014). Concerning this 
research avoiding any possible biases in the findings, it is believed that the use of 
interview participants are independent and not connected to the central government 
ensured the given responses had no underlying biases. Moreover, the trust 
established between the researcher and participants further assured the provided 
accounts were honest and accurate in reflecting their experiences, thus further 
safeguarding the reliability of this research.   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the research methodology that was used to attain the 
research questions and corresponding objectives of this research (as per section 4.1). 
Limited research has been conducted concerning the institutional theory in the China 
context and subsequent cross-border M&A by SOEs. This research, therefore, 
adopted an inductive grounded theory approach following an interpretivist 
epistemology. Primary data was collected using semi-structured interviews. A total 
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of 32 interviews were conducted with 21 elite China M&A industry experts 
(consultants, analysts, advisers, and brokers) each with direct experience working on 
SOE cross-border M&A deals. A total of 26 national level SOEs from the key 
industries (natural resources, manufacturing, technology, and finance) were covered. 
The industry experts all had between 5 – 20 years of experience in the Chinese 
business environment. The experts have also had exposure to the cross-border M&A 
process undertaken by SOEs. As these industry experts are independent of the SOEs 
and state, the research was therefore, able to collect data from impartial individuals. 
Resultantly, the responses had no underlining biases towards the SOEs or the central 
government. This subsequently increased research validity and ensured the answers 
were an honest and accurate reflection of the subject matter. Given the closed nature 
of SOEs and the volume of classified information on cross-border M&A deals, the 
interviews were conducted following the "Chatham House Rule." This meant 
participants were able to speak freely and openly with their anonymity guaranteed. 
Interviews were recorded with the consent and transcribed to begin the data analysis 
phase. 
 
Data obtained from the interviews were analyzed using online qualitative research 
platform ‘Dedoose.' The collected data was coded in stages following the grounded 
theory analytical process. Open coding was completed to tentatively identify codes 
that were able to explain concepts occurring in the data (for example: “past failures,” 
“more careful,” and “more experienced”). Through a constant comparison process 
(an iterative process of comparing data to codes – codes to categories, etc.), the 
dimensions of the data were made clear and early categories (such as “selective 
M&A”) from the codes were made. Potential core categories emerged, which then 
became the root to further new data collection and new coding efforts (i.e., 
theoretical sampling).  From here, selective coding was used to refine any newly 
collected data, based on the previously identified core codes (for example: “learning 
from past experiences,” and “continuing M&A more cautiously”). All transcripts, 
codes, and categories were re-examined to check for integrity in meaning. Only the 
most analytical codes were used to categorize any new data and thus strengthening 
the emerging theory. The last phase of coding in the grounded theory process is 
theoretical coding. This was done to determine the relationship between the core 
categories (for example the theoretical category "selective M&A based on state 
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mandate" was generated from selective codes "continuing M&A more cautiously” 
and “more targeted M&A with a strategic purpose”). Categories were integrated into 
the theory thus developing a theoretical model able to explain the China-specific 
institutional M&A context (see Table 4.5). Theoretical saturation in this research 
was reached when any newly collected data was no longer able to produce any new 
concepts and when existing categories were not able to provide any new properties.   
 
Concerning issues surrounding qualitative research, these include issues regarding 
validity and reliability. Construct and internal validity was guaranteed in this 
research by adopting various methods triangulation. This meant all questions asked 
and all responses given by the interview participants were cross-checked from 
multiple sources, including external secondary data sources. Moreover, interview 
transcripts, codes, categories, and concepts were compared continuously and 
checked for integrity and rigor throughout the analysis process, thus increasing 
internal validity. Reliability was encouraged in this process by conducting a well 
thought-out and documented research process. The grounded theory process itself, is 
a well-established systematic procedure that ensures errors were minimized. It is 
believed that the level of trust established by the researcher and elite interview 
participants ensured a collection of rich and full-bodied data. Moreover, by adopting 
a grounded theory approach, data was continually redefined and revised - as the data 
was being collected. This process allowed for opportunities of critical self-reflection 
as well as the avoidance of any possible biases in data interpretation. As a result, this 
process therefore permitted enhanced validity and reliability of this research.  
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Chapter 5 
Findings 
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5.1 Introduction  
 
Upon using the grounded theory approach to code and analyze the obtained 
interviews, 5 key research areas were identified. This includes the influence of 
national rejuvenation; the direction of institutionalization; the formal 
institutionalization of the informal belief at the national level; the interaction 
between national level and organizational level; and the interaction between national 
level and individual level. From identifying the above research areas, the theoretical 
categories and categories were developed (Figure 5.1). Upon eliciting theoretical 
categories and subcategories, these have been used to develop, and have been 
integrated into the China-specific conceptual theoretical framework outlined in this 
chapter. This framework has been designed to explain the institutional dynamics 
between the formal and informal institutions in China at the national, organizational, 
and individual levels. Three clear distinctive interactions between the formal and 
informal institution can be observed in motivating cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) undertaken by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). That is, 
firstly, the interaction of institutionalizing the informal belief of national 
rejuvenation into the formal institution at the national level. Next, the formal 
command (the beliefs of national rejuvenation) in a top-down directive from the state 
to the SOEs. And lastly, the formal directive from the state to the SOE leadership. 
These dynamic interactions are also presented in Figure 5.1 and will be introduced in 
this chapter, with further detailed discussion of these interactions in Chapter 6: 
Discussion.  
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Figure 5.1. Research areas, theoretical categories and corresponding key subcategories: 
The key institutional interactions between the State, SOE, and SOE manager in facilitating cross-border M&As 
 
Note: Constructed by the author based on the grounded approach adopted by this research.  
RA corresponds to research area; TC corresponds to theoretical category; SC corresponds to subcategory.   
--> corresponds to informal institutional interaction; → corresponds to formal institutional interaction. 
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5.2 Key findings on research question 1 
 
“What are the distinctive features of the institutionalization process in the China 
specific context?” 
5.2.1 Research area 1: Collective belief of national rejuvenation at all 
levels of society  
 
5.2.1.1 Theoretical category 1: The rejuvenation of China  
 
In exploring the effects of the informal institutional beliefs on the outcome of the 
formal institution, a number of key observations were made. Firstly, it was expressed 
that the lasting effects of certain Chinese historical events continued to influence 
Chinese psyche. For instance, participants expressed how past excellence, had an 
ongoing impact on Chinese pride. It was found that there is a common shared belief 
among the Chinese at all levels of society; a dream of rejuvenating the formerly 
great China. 
 
“...their rich history, well-documented achievements in science, technology, 
exploration…It's a clear well-documented history so the pride comes from that, who 
they were and who they think they should be in the world… they have always been 
pioneers in the world… they have defined civilization, medicine, science and 
technology, aviation. And today China is collectively working hard to continue that 
legacy and reclaim what was lost."  
(Participant M1, Shanghai, M&A consultant)  
 
Participants agreed on the lasting adverse effects of the century of humiliation, in 
particular, its impact on China's sense of pride.  To the Chinese, this period in history 
remains deeply rooted in their outlook and continues to influence their often 
sceptical view of the West. It is connected to the concept of what the Chinese see as 
a loss of face to the West.  
 
"It is definitely is a painful point for them, it hurts the pride of the Chinese definitely. 
It hurts them to know that they were taken advantage of, the loss century of this and 
that… but I think the very concept of the century of humiliation is so Chinese, it's so 
ingrained in their concept of face. The world sees it as OK you slipped a bit in 
global trade… someone got the better of you but to the Chinese… it's so ingrained 
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into their face and pride that for them its humiliation but maybe the rest of the world 
doesn't see it that way." 
         (Participant J2, Geneva, M&A consultant) 
 
 
Linking this point to the objective of rejuvenating China, it was found that China's 
rich history created a sense of shared confidence among the Chinese. Specifically, 
that the rejuvenation of China was expected, and moreover, would be a return to the 
normal state of affairs – i.e., China once again being a global pioneer of science and 
technology in addition to being a political leader. In doing so, participants also 
believed that M&A would continue to play a critical role in restoring China’s past 
glory. Participants demonstrated a shared belief that China is unable to accomplish 
this without pursuing international partnerships and more importantly, cross-border 
acquisitions. This is because China has insufficient domestic reserves of 
fundamental resources, such as food and energy. As a result, not pursuing cross-
border M&A’s would significantly inhibit the greater objective linked to 
rejuvenation, self-sufficiency and the China dream. 
 
"So their desires to rejuvenate China and all their objectives to reclaim past glory its 
intertwined with M&A because you can boil it down to a simple fact. Despite their 
brilliance and ambition and ability, they don't have sufficient resources domestically 
to achieve it on their own so they have to look outwards." 
   (Participant H1, Hong Kong, M&A consultant)  
 
 
Concerning the purpose of the One Belt One Road initiative, participants believed 
that this project is foremost a strategic tool to provide China with increased resource 
security. It was further asserted that this initiative, is also used as a vehicle for 
extending nationalist sentiment and consolidating the public support of the state 
party. This resonates deeply with the Chinese because of the historic significance of 
revitalizing the old silk road and also; because of the central role that One Belt One 
Road initiative plays in the rejuvenation of China. 
 
"You can say its driven by pure necessity, and it's a smart play to keep their economy 
rolling, it keeps resources coming, it builds massive international allies in trade and 
also the narrative directly links to the story to rejuvenate China and reclaim lost 
glory. It's built on the concept of the former silk road, so the narrative makes sense 
and can be sold at a much deeper level, and it's a strong and convincing narrative." 
    (Participant M1, Shanghai, M&A consultant) 
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5.2.2 Research area 2: The direction of the institutionalization process 
 
5.2.2.1 Theoretical category 2: Institutionalization Chinese style: Top-down 
directive  
 
In pursuing national rejuvenation, it was found that this is a consistent belief at all 
levels of society. As a result of this consistency, a unified environment with a shared 
societal vision is created. Therefore, the informal institution is able to generate 
sufficient collective momentum to challenge the rules of the formal institution, and, 
subsequently, allowing the informal belief to be institutionalized at the national level. 
The consistency of the informal belief permits the state to direct mandates related to 
the national rejuvenation of China to subordinates accordingly in a top-down fashion. 
This formally ensures that national objectives are fulfilled. 
 
“Normally in China as a country if we have a plan, then this plan will be divided 
into some small plans and for sure the SOE company will need to complete that 
small plan that is given by the state. So this is the normal practice in China. Then it 
is just like…every SOE company will complete their plans, then as a country and as 
a whole we make that plan.”   
                             (Participant L1, Shanghai, M&A consultant) 
 
“SOEs are primarily influenced by the government, they can’t make any decisions 
on their own. Absolutely without a doubt anything outside of the state plans cannot 
happen. At the SOE level for sure key board members and key finances are totally 
subject to the approval of party officials. If a party member is in there then that is 
something strategically placed, and their mandate and their objective is to guarantee 
to carry out state orders."  
                     (Participant M1, Shanghai, M&A consultant) 
 
The top-down direction of commands, in the case of institutional change occurring at 
the national level, goes against the conventional direction of institutional interactions 
as discussed in Chapter 3. What is traditionally seen in the conventional context is, 
institutional change occurring from the bottom-up at the individual level, 
contradicting what has been observed in this research. However, this also illustrates 
that the findings of this research have unique, China-specific institutional 
characteristics. In illustrating the institutionalization of the informal belief of 
national rejuvenation into the formal institution, and thus highlighting the top-down 
direction of command; two key elements Greater international influence and 
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Greater resources security for China are used to support this point. These will be 
discussed below. 
 
 (1) Subcategory 2.1 Greater international influence  
 
A prominent sub-theme – China seeking greater international influence – was 
identified during the interviews. It is argued that it was a key element supporting the 
pursuit of national rejuvenation wherein SOEs are seeking to acquire greater 
international influence. Participants highlighted that key government programs, 
namely the One Belt One Road initiative is illustrative that China is trying to extend 
their global influence. It is therefore argued that the belief of national rejuvenation 
has been formally institutionalized. Participants demonstrated a belief that through 
the use of SOEs, China is able to formally extend their global reach. As SOEs are 
large organizations, with existing infrastructure networks and robust reputations; 
through undertaking M&As, SOEs and China can thus gain more influence over 
markets and international trade.  
 
“...yes, of course, that's the major point of these SOEs, and why the state is making 
them do these M&As, they want to dominate world trade. They want to extend their 
global reach, there is of course benefits to China back home but after these M&As, 
they will move towards a say in trade access to more markets, and also they also 
have more access to Western technology which China does not have. It's what every 
Chairman's number one goal is, to make China the best, but the difference with 
China is, they are not shy to make it public that that is what it wants. Some countries 
like the US they are very worried if another country like borders on being better 
than them. China is quite outspoken in the fact that they want to be the best, they 
don't see it as a sign of tyranny they see it as quite a good thing. It's a positive thing.”  
                     (Participant N1, Beijing, M&A consultant) 
 
“the M&As coming out of China currently are deals all related to the Belt and Road 
project, but this is not for mianzi. This is a direct policy from the state for all 
Chinese SOEs, if you want to do an M&A it has to in line with this strategy. You can 
clearly see the shift in geopolitics with this initiative so of course, China is 
increasing their global footprint with the Belt and Road. But you know, in the eyes of 
China they want to restore what they believe is their rightful position in the world, 
it's not a mianzi thing. "  
                      (Participant M1, Shanghai, M&A consultant) 
 
 
In connecting to the point of greater international influence; there has been a clear 
distinction made between 1) conducting cross-border M&A so as to secure greater 
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international influence and 2) conducting M&A for the sake of face or “mianzi.”  It 
was established that the reason for pursuing a cross-border M&A deal goes far 
beyond that of the superficial value that mianzi provides. This is because, in the 
prevailing Chinese climate, M&A deals need to add significant benefits to China and 
its future generations or they will not be approved. This allows the facilitation of the 
rejuvenation of China wherein the global international influence is created from an 
economically strong and powerful China, where all cross-border M&A deals are 
well considered with a strategic purpose (as opposed to acquiring vanity trophy 
assets with no added value).  
 
"I have also experienced other Chinese companies who have openly stated to the 
media….well they have publically made comments that they want to be a fortune 500 
company and so the assets that they have been targeting have been big headline-
grabbing attention purchases… but now fast forward to 2018, they are doing a lot of 
disposals rather than asset purchases because they have been targeted by the 
government and the government have been telling the leading four banks to stop the 
credit facilities to them and have let them know what they think or what is perceived 
as recklessness in the way that they are splurging.”  
                           (Participant J1, Hong Kong, M&A advisory) 
 
(2) Subcategory 2.2 Greater resources security for China  
 
In line with the rejuvenation of China, it is argued that being self-sustaining, i.e., not 
relying on trade partners for fundamental resources is also key element in for 
national rejuvenation. Guided by the central government, the state has publicly 
encouraged Chinese firms to develop key resources and thus facilitate China to 
become an economically strong nation. Participants argued that formally China is 
desperately seeking greater security for the people, which also involve the need to be 
self-sufficient and thus less reliant on imports. Notable themes included the need to 
secure critical food and energy resources such as grains and fuel because of the 
increasing demand from China's growing middle class. A reoccurring theme 
provided by the participants was how SOEs are directed by the state to focus on the 
sustainability of the growing population and their need to assure a stable supply of 
safe food.  
 
"I really think it's about self-sufficiency and for security because you know they 
don’t really have that much arable land, they are planting on, and in the past, the 
area has decreased because of industrialization and urbanization. And it's not like 
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people are dying to become a farmer. It's quite the opposite right now with 
urbanization. I think the market is increasing faster than the supply – with grains 
anyway. On the grain side, they are definitely not self-sufficient, going forward they 
have a growing middle class and obviously the wealthy middle class is consuming 
more meat. They are mainly importing like grains, what is useful for the meat 
production and animal feed.”  
              (Participant J3, London, M&A analyst) 
  
 
“Chinese SOEs would now assess an investment according to what it brings to their 
own strategic development in China as opposed to investing in overseas cash cows. 
The ChemChina-Syngenta deal, one of the rationales for investment is clearly the 
access to Syngenta's knowledge base in the agribusiness field and in doing so, help 
China's own food security."   
                 (Participant V1, London, M&A advisory) 
 
 
It was found that the theme of resource security is a shared belief among society, and 
is greatly encouraged by the state. Participants argued that particularly in the case of 
SOEs, M&A deals are conducted with the objective of securing the fundamental 
resources needed to serve China’s domestic agenda, as opposed to cultivating 
international relations or assisting the needs of other nations. 
 
“I think even for natural resource companies if they go overseas to buy for example 
a mine, I think the whole reason is still to focus on the Chinese market, this is 
something China needs. They just want to have to more control over natural 
resources, and finally they bring those resources back to China. I don’t think they 
will try to develop business overseas. Especially for SOEs in China, they are not 
typical companies. They normally don’t have overseas employees. They will have 
employees but not a key foreign employee in the organization, in an SOE most of the 
senior management they are all Chinese, and they don’t speak English.”  
                                            (Participant L1, Shanghai, M&A consultant) 
   
 
It is argued that China is seeking self-sufficiency through international trade. That is 
because of the increasingly interconnected nature of global trade and commerce, 
China is taking an outward-looking approach and using cross-border M&A to realize 
the rejuvenation strategy.  Evident in its formal aggressive catch-up strategies such 
as Made in China 2025, it is accurate to assume that, China would like to become 
less reliant on other nations. However, the Chinese are also aware that they cannot 
accomplish without engaging with the West.   
 
"I think the overarching theme the government is going after its independence, 
whether it is in resources, commodities independence. The case like ZTE is the 
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absolute nightmare for the Chinese that the US government can come and basically 
turn off the switch and make a Chinese company die. The fact that another country 
has leverage on China that they cannot mitigate, whether its technology or resources 
or whatever… I think that is the overarching theme that they are trying to fix, and so 
in that sense, technology independence, resource independence is a massive massive 
theme for the Chinese government."  
             (Participant H1, Hong Kong, M&A consultant) 
 
 
"The way the world is becoming you can't just keep yourself to a small circle. In a 
very important area like food and technology, every country would like to keep it 
under control by themselves rather than rely on others." 
                                          (Participant K1, Shanghai, M&A brokerage) 
 
 
"...I don’t think they want to close themselves off. They definitely want to access the 
Western and global markets. They do want to be self-sufficient but at the same time 
be connected to the West. I think China knows by now being cut off is not a good 
idea. They need access to Western technology and Western expertise.”  
                                   (Participant N1, Beijing, M&A consultant) 
 
5.2.2.2 Summary of research area 1 and 2: The influence of the informal 
institution and the direction of the institutionalization process in the China 
context  
 
From Figure 5.2, it can be seen that the informal belief of national rejuvenation and 
the returning the nations’ former brilliance is a significant factor in China’s informal 
institution. This is a belief that is shared at all levels of society, thus highlighting the 
significance of the informal institution in driving formal institutional change. As the 
informal belief of national rejuvenation is collectively shared at all levels of society, 
that the state is able to institutionalize informal beliefs into formal institutions. 
Resultantly, the state is able to direct national rejuvenation through the formal 
institution.  
 
It was further established that both subcategories are directed from the central state 
for the SOEs to pursue in a top-down fashion. Thus, going against the conventional 
institutional perspective that institutional change originates from the bottom up. This 
illustrates that the conventional institutional view – of a bottom-up approach to 
institutional change – cannot be applied to the China context. The sub-themes of 
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greater international influence and greater resource security can be linked to state 
mandates driven by the objective of national rejuvenation. 
 
Figure 5.2. The influence of the informal institution and the direction of the 
institutionalization process in the China context 
 
 
Constructed by the author 
 
  
5.3 Key findings on research question 2 
 
“How does the Chinese-style institutionalization process facilitate the unique 
characteristics of cross-border M&A activities by Chinese state owned enterprises 
(SOEs)?” 
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5.3.1 Research area 3: The formal institutionalization of the informal 
belief at the national level 
 
5.3.1.1 Theoretical category 3: Government led M&A 
 
 
From the conducted interviews, it was unanimous that the central government is 
highly involved in M&A overseas transactions. It is argued that the state can ensure 
the commitment of fulfilling the informal institutional belief (of national 
rejuvenation) by the formal institution a number of ways. Firstly, at the national 
level, fundamentally, the final decision on all cross-border M&As by SOEs is 
controlled by the central government. Secondly, in order to get approval on cross-
border M&As, the M&A deal has to be in line with state plans. Thirdly, it can be 
expected that the state mandate acts to guide the actions of SOEs. 
 
State policy this will drive M&A for sure, for example the new SASAC guidelines on 
overseas investments, it is clear that this will be used to only target companies which 
are strategically important to Beijing. The days of investments in all sorts of sectors 
by state-owned companies could be over. 
                       (Participant V1, London, M&A advisory) 
 
“...that is how an SOE came to work, so it is depending on what the mandate is from 
the top and depending on how that mandate is interpreted by an organization, and 
depending on an organization’s own culture of focus on profit maximization vs. 
focus on clear strategic state mission." 
                               (Participant J4, Shanghai, M&A brokerage) 
 
The participants argued that the central government has overruling power and can 
exert its influence on M&A transactions through its formal policies and initiatives as 
per the agenda (clearly documented in five-year plans). In the case of the origins of 
cross-border M&As, participants stated that based on the directives of the state plans, 
the state council assigns targets to the relevant SOE, which they are then obligated to 
fulfill.  
 
(1) Subcategory 3.1 Selective M&A agenda based on the state mandate 
 
 
The interviews illustrated that the state plans are powerful tools to guide as to what 
type of M&A might occur. Key noticeable themes throughout the interviews were 
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how M&As have transitioned from the previously natural resource focused 
acquisitions towards technology acquisitions. It can be argued that these types of 
M&A deals are conducted to strengthen China’s national security. Moreover, notable 
mentioned projects throughout the interviews often included acquisitions related to 
the One Belt One Road project and the Made in China 2025 initiative. These projects 
demonstrate China’s growing international confidence and China’s growing 
prominence in specifically targeted sectors.  
 
“...last few years has been a shift away from certainly resource base acquisitions, 
there's also been a shift away from revenue based acquisition, and there's been much 
more of a shift towards policy directive that is in higher technology issue that is in 
line with the national governmental directives. So things in line with China 
manufacturing 2025. If you're in the coal mining business and you interpret your 
mandate as I should go and buy higher wind turbine technology or I should buy AI 
technology…there may not be any link at all with your core business so strictly 
speaking its not your near-term profit value maximizing problems that your solving, 
you're responding to just a different particular administrative mandate." 
                                        (Participant J4, Shanghai, M&A brokerage) 
 
Participants observed that SOEs must adapt their corporate mission to incorporate 
the current state directives (regardless of whether it will be detrimental to their 
profits). Given the ownership structure of SOEs, SOEs consider the fulfilment of the 
assigned state targets as necessary. Therefore, they must follow the state mandate – 
which is currently to work towards achieving the Made in China 2025 goal.  
 
“...in China we only have one political party, and this person decides everything. So 
when the country have these kinds of policy, so China 2025 and that means some big 
SOE company in China they will have a plan and targets which they need to achieve 
before the deadline. So in China, every time when the central government…when 
they say some plan like we need to do something, it’s normally a policy, you need to 
make that, you cannot fail it. So it will be some political pressure for every boss and 
every SOE, you need to develop something before that time. I think of course this 
will be one reason why they go out and try to acquire and buy some high technology 
company which will support China 2025 this program.”  
                             (Participant L1, Shanghai, M&A consultant) 
 
 
It was agreed by all participants that there has been a definite shift in the cross-
border M&As targets that China pursues. Cross-border M&As made by Chinese 
SOEs have now become increasingly selective. Many participants have expressed 
that if an SOE is pursuing an overseas target, it will be to serve a very specific 
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objective. Given how deals are scrutinized far more than before, it is correct to 
assume that SOEs are looking to acquire strategic targets, and in many cases, China 
has become more selective than before. It was found that moving forward; all M&A 
deals have to make sense for China as a whole, with clear benefits that serve the 
national interest.   
 
“There is definitely a distinction between the private and SOEs in terms of their 
target selection. Especially from the SOEs purchases, you know they are definitely 
targeting certain foreign targets, that there is something that they intrinsically want 
and need to improve in their own domestic market or either their capability is 
lacking in that regard and they need something.”  
                          (Participant J3, London, M&A analyst) 
 
 
“...they were savvier and they were focused on something more particular that they 
were trying to acquire. It wasn't so much they wanted to enter an industry, it was 
more specific to a product or service they were trying to dominate in, so I felt like 
they were savvier with the criteria, they were more selective and they became more 
aggressive when it came to negotiations but I think it’s from, as they acquired more, 
they became more experienced and learned from that, and had seen what became 
successful, and during the valuation they saw what mattered.” 
       (Participant M4, New York, M&A advisory) 
 
 
(2) Subcategory 3.2 The influence of state agencies 
 
 
From the interviews, it was also evident how state agencies have a substantial 
influence over cross-border M&A deals. It was speculated that the purpose of these 
state agencies is to ensure that only the cross-border M&A deals that are in line with 
national development plans (as laid out by the Five-Year Plans - FYPs) are carried 
out. It was also pointed out, that the central government maintains control over 
cross-border M&A's by ensuring that all Chinese enterprises must secure approval 
for any cross-border investments. For instance, as the State-owned assets supervision 
and administration commission (SASAC) is in charge of all state assets, SOEs 
looking to conduct a cross-border M&A deal will need to obtain SASAC approval. 
Moreover, participants also highlighted the significance of the state agencies 
National development and reform commission (NDRC) and Ministry of commerce 
(MOFCOM), both of which are involved in approving cross-border M&As. 
 
"...it's more of a macro way of looking at a thing. At the moment if you make your 
case to the state council, you will have the state backing, and you will have bank 
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financing - if you can let us see your plans. If you get the approval of the M&A plan 
then you will have state backing." 
                 (Participant G1, Beijing, M&A advisory) 
 
 
“...so in China you have the NDRC who approves the overseas investment, with a 
certain amount you go to the state level... Some projects go through the application 
process which means the government will see the benefits that come out of the 
project. At least the government needs to see that the projects have some economic 
benefits, especially after many failures in terms of overseas international 
acquisitions. So I think especially right now Xi Jinping is more careful about China's 
international reputation."   
        (Participant T1, Geneva, M&A consultant) 
 
 
The importance of the state agency State administration of foreign exchange (SAFE) 
was also voiced by the participants. Following the significant capital flight from 
China as a result of overseas transactions, the state council has since urged state 
banks and SAFE to be more vigilant in their lending. Critically, given that the 
Chinese renminbi (RMB) is not freely convertible, the central government can, 
therefore, regulate cross-border M&A through imposing greater capital restrictions 
through the SAFE agency. 
 
“This year (2017) outbound investment has been quiet due to capital flow 
restrictions. The SAFE has been tasked to vet cross-border transfers. I believe the 
restrictions will apply to deals of a certain threshold amount, but regardless of 
amount, this has certainly been a game changer for M&A." 
             (Participant V1, London, M&A advisory) 
 
Participants believe the administrative M&A process has become increasingly 
difficult as a direct result of the 2016 surge in cross-border M&A deals. SOEs now 
have to submit various additional forms of applications to state agencies to obtain 
M&A approval. 
 
“If you want approval there are multiple organizations you need to get approved by 
- and that's SASAC, MOFCOM, SAFE. And above SAFE is PBOC and the state 
council, and so again there are many organizations that have to approve the process. 
It’s become very cumbersome over the past few years.”   
                       (Participant H2, Hong Kong, M&A consultant) 
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5.3.1.2 Summary of research area 3: The institutionalization of the informal 
institution into the formal institution at the national level 
 
Figure 5.3. Institutionalization of the informal institutional beliefs into the formal institution 
at the national level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constructed by the author 
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From Figure 5.3, it can be observed that upon institutionalization of the informal 
belief of national rejuvenation, the belief becomes a formal rule. That is, the state 
being able to ensure the proactive pursuit of national rejuvenation by closely 
regulating all cross-border M&As deals. This involves the following formal 
measures; firstly, encouraging increasingly selective deals that are well aligned with 
state plans and; secondly, insisting on the use of specific state agencies to vet cross-
border M&A deals. Therefore, only the cross-border M&A deals that conform to 
national development plans are approved.  As a result of the greater selectivity and 
influence outlined in the preceding paragraph, it can be ascertained that cross-border 
M&As are directed in a top-down fashion by the state.  
 
5.3.2 Research area 4: Interaction between the national level and the 
organizational level in the formal institution 
 
5.3.2.1 Theoretical category 4: The obligation to fulfill state plans with 
autonomy 
 
Given the relationship that SOEs have with the state, participants argued that SOEs 
are compelled to carry out mandates as directed from above. Participants also 
brought attention to the point that as SASAC directly manages SOEs; the subsequent 
behaviour of these organizations is subject to significant state influence.  
 
" …the existence of SOEs from the very beginning they have their purpose, they are 
the pioneers of developing this country, so at the very beginning the communist party 
laid down their strengths, in doing so they promoted the entire economy by their firm 
grips on the entire country through SOEs. Because they are quasi-government, they 
have to do things not entirely economic and they have to carry out the plans laid out 
for the country by the state…”  
                    (Participant G1, Beijing, M&A advisory) 
 
A further key theme that emerged during interviews, was that SOEs do have a degree 
of autonomy. However, this autonomy is extended to SOEs, provided that their 
endeavours fall within the boundaries and parameters of state plans. That is, once the 
state assigns a directive to an SOE, it is then left up to them to decide how they will 
fulfill state targets. Participants underscored that this autonomy stems from the fact 
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that both the state and SASAC, lack the resources and knowledge to manage the 
SOEs themselves directly.  
 
 “They obviously have the bandwidth to do stuff or not do things, but its partially 
because the administrate or supervisory agency does not have the capacity to run a 
business. So if anybody has to run a business, the manager at the SOE has to run the 
business. And the people outside of the business doesn’t have the knowledge base 
nor do they have the economic incentive to create value over the long term.”  
                       (Participant J4, Shanghai, M&A brokerage) 
 
As already highlighted, SOEs do have a consequential degree of autonomy in 
relation to running day-to-day business matters. The overarching theme was one that 
pointed towards SASAC setting the overall direction for the SOE, with the granting 
of autonomy being dependent on whether the enterprise works within the parameters 
set out by SASAC. Moreover, it was also noted that it is vital for the SOE to inform 
SASAC of their business plans through an annual report. Within this annual report, 
the SOE should detail any cross-border M&A plans. By making SASAC aware of 
their cross-border M&A plans, the SOE will have the autonomy to pursue any 
overseas target they see fit – provided it aligns with the requirements outlined by 
China's FYPs. 
 
"There is an overarching requirement to also comply with the bottom line of their 
supervisors and shareholders which is SASAC. So if SASAC says you must have this 
deal done by a certain time, it cannot involve X Y Z in the commercial threshold, its 
OK fine as long as you don't exceed those bottom line requirements, you can 
demonstrate whatever entrepreneurial spirit you can and within the boundaries of 
what you are allowed. So yes the manager does have a certain amount of decision 
making power, but it's what's within what SASAC allows."  
                 (Participant J1, Hong Kong, M&A advisory) 
 
 
"How the SOE operates in overseas M&A is that, they will have a report at the 
beginning of the year that lays out every aspect of their operations to the 
shareholder, i.e., the SASAC, and within it they will detail if they have any plans, 
they will say it, and that's usually the way SOEs operate because if you say that and 
that has been approved then when you are actually pursuing them in the middle of 
the year, you don't need any subsequent approval or registration with SASAC 
because they acknowledge your plans.”  
                 (Participant G1, Beijing, M&A advisory) 
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(1) Subcategory 4.1 Social vs. Profit-driven deals  
 
As a subsequent outcome of the state having direct involvement in organizational 
affairs, interview participants stated that this further complicates the behaviour of 
SOEs. In following the state directive, the objective of each SOE deal will depend 
significantly on the targets set out in the FYPs. Thus, the cross-border acquisitions 
made are greatly affected by what the state plans are, and how SOEs interpret state 
mandates. For example, plans could focus on working towards a more socially 
harmonious China, resulting in all cross-border deals having some social objectives. 
While other FYPs may be driven by increasing national GDP and, therefore 
encourage SOEs to pursue profitable cross-border targets. In the case of the latter, 
SOEs would be assigned aggressive performance targets by the state. To this end and, 
in most cases, meeting these targets would require the pursuit of lucrative cross-
border M&A opportunities by SOEs. 
 
“… they (the state) would say I would like to see the SOE revenue grow 50% or I 
like to see the revenue double. Or they would say I would like to see 10 or 20% of 
your revenue come from international sources. So its really hard for a company to 
grow a business that fast so you’ve got to buy and acquire something…” 
                       (Participant J4, Shanghai, M&A brokerage) 
 
 
It was further reiterated by all participants that the state council puts great pressure 
on SOEs to be competitive. But, at the same time, SOEs are also held responsible for 
sustaining social livelihood. Illustrated in the context of cross-border M&As, SOEs 
are encouraged by the state to acquire natural resources to fuel China’s growing 
economy. But in parallel to this, the market prices of these commodities are kept 
artificially low. This serves to subsidize other industries dependent on stable raw 
material prices and, thus preventing SOEs from maximizing profitability.  
 
"Of course for the government they want them to make a profit, if they can't make a 
profit it's a financial burden for the government and for all the people in China. But 
we can see the problem for the national SOEs, they also need to take responsibility 
like social responsibility and other things. I can give you an example of coal price, 
they are a state-owned company and buy many mines overseas, if they sell coal at 
the spot market price, then they will get a much higher price, but they are an SOE 
and the government does not let them to sell the coal at the market price because … 
if the coal price too high, then the factories will have too high price to produce steel 
or cement so they need to control the coal price, because this is the fundamental 
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price for many products so they need to control many factors and then they will 
decide the price.  This is only one example, but you can apply this to all the SOEs 
companies in China." 
                         (Participant L1, Shanghai, M&A consultant) 
 
(2) Subcategory 4.2 The SOE paradox: Undeniable influence yet a challenge to 
engage 
 
Also brought to the discussion was the conflicting view on the global reputation of 
SOEs and how they perceived as business partners. Participants pointed out that, 
accountability to the central government combined with a lack of transparency with 
regards to the cross-border M&A process has resulted in conflicting opinions on the 
reputation of SOEs. Participants all stated that the necessary approval by the state on 
all SOEs business matters has subsequently resulted in considerable uncertainty 
during cross-border deals. In some cases, approval from the state took up to 18 
months for some M&A deals, thus creating significant complications and frustration 
for the SOEs’ overseas counterparty. As a result of the top-down bureaucratic 
guarantee which is implemented by the state, SOEs have subsequently gained a 
reputation for being difficult to engage and challenging to work with.   
 
“…just a lot of red tape and bureaucracy, challenging in the sense of there was little 
transparency definitely. In general, it felt like we just knew that we had to handle 
affairs with a bit more caution and making sure that we were careful in every step of 
the M&A process."  
    (Participant M1, Shanghai, M&A consultant)  
 
 
“...it was delays more than anything, like oh it would take 18 months to get to this 
process, or this far through negotiations and what have you. But I do think it 
presented a lot more difficulties and challenges as well as when we came to 
negotiations in terms of the state’s interest." 
       (Participant M4, New York, M&A advisory) 
 
 
"So some Chinese companies they can begin the process of an M&A, but in the 
middle of the process they disappear, they don't answer any calls or don't send a 
non-binding offer, so people are a little skeptical of the acquisition by Chinese 
companies. They don't have the greatest reputation because I have been in the 
process of an M&A where we were selling to the Chinese, and in the process of the 
M&A from one day to another they stopped answering phone calls, and they stopped 
answering messages." 
               (Participant M2, Santiago, M&A advisory) 
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At the same time, despite their reputation of being challenging to work with, SOEs 
are also widely respected. This is due to their size, political influence, and their 
unrivalled access to capital. This results in the ability to conduct substantial amounts 
of cross-border M&As. Therefore, it was argued that without the assistance of the 
state, SOEs would not have been able to obtain the global recognition they enjoy 
today. Subsequently, despite knowing the bureaucratic challenges associated with 
SOEs during the M&A process, targets still specifically seek to be acquired by SOEs 
- due to the vast pool of resources an SOE can attain as a result of the state 
association. 
 
"…For sure like for us at the "global world leaders event “it’s incredibly important 
to have the SOEs there. Everyone wants the Chinese to be part of the conversation, 
they are taken incredibly seriously because they are massive and they are growing. 
They are just huge companies especially in the energy sector. CNOOC, CNCP, 
Sinopec, all these companies are huge conglomerates and they acquire a lot and 
spend a lot of money. For the other oil companies like ExxonMobil, it’s the SOEs are 
who they want to meet.” 
              (Participant J2, Geneva, M&A analyst) 
 
“SOEs they usually have a reputation of having a lot of liquidity so when they have 
the potential capacity of buying a very large enterprise. So literally in South 
America there are lots of companies that say please find me a Chinese buyer 
because I know they full of liquidity and they pay high prices even higher than the 
market price… that is what people think of Chinese SOEs.” 
                                (Participant M2, Santiago, M&A advisory) 
 
That said, it was also argued that while conducting cross-border M&As received the 
attention of global peers, SOEs would need to do more in order to be acknowledged 
as a competent multinational organization. For example, driving synergistic 
integration while also exploiting the competitive strengths of a given acquisition.  
 
“...not just by the pure fact that they done an international M&A, it's about whether 
they can integrate that acquisition and whether they can draw competitive strengths 
out of that acquisition. Its really depends whether they do well with that acquisition 
or not.  If they do well, it will strengthen their competitive position in that market. I 
don't think they will get creditability just because they have done an international 
acquisition. I think we are beyond that, there was a time, wherein it was considered 
prestige if a company made an international acquisition, I think they are beyond this 
now."  
             (Participant H2, Hong Kong, M&A consultant) 
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5.3.2.2 Summary of research area 4: Interaction between the national level and 
the organizational level in the formal institution 
 
Figure 5.4. Interaction between the national level and organizational level within the formal 
institution 
 
Constructed by the author 
 
From Figure 5.4, at the national level, the state can direct and guide cross-border 
M&As undertaken by SOEs. This is done through aligning deals with the state plans 
and ensuring approval from the appropriate government agencies is required. At the 
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organizational level, SOEs as an extension of the state are obligated to execute 
government mandates; thus acting as an organizational agent of the state.  
 
As a direct outcome of close state ties, it was found that the objective (social or 
profit-driven purpose) of any cross-border M&As undertaken by an SOE would be 
influenced by mandates set out in state plans. Moreover, it was established that 
SOEs are simultaneously undertaking the role of being a commercial profit entity 
whilst also being a public social entity. Furthermore, the top-down relationship 
between the state and SOEs also has resulted in a conflicting reputation of SOEs. 
The need for the bureaucratic guarantee has earned SOEs the reputation of being 
challenging to engage and difficult to work with. In saying this, on the other hand, 
SOEs are in fact hugely respected as a result of the political power behind the 
organizations.  
 
5.3.3 Research area 5: Interaction between the national level and the 
individual level in the formal institution: 
 
5.3.3.1 Theoretical category 5: Strategically appointed managers by state 
 
Participants were unanimous in the view that top-level SOE managers are 
strategically placed into their positions by either SASAC or the state council. This is 
done to ensure that managers work in-line with and further state objectives, thus 
indicating at the individual level, managers are also directed in a top-down fashion. 
Regarding selection criteria, participants stated that high-level managers would 
either be political figures or industry experts with strong political ties. These SOE 
managers will generally be subject to substantial political control and influence. To 
this end, it was agreed that intermingling between SOE managers and political 
figures was both expected and common. 
 
"So usually the decision makers, i.e., board level will consist of who has been in the 
SOE for a very long time and people who are from whatever sources. So the head of 
SASAC was the previous head of CNPC. So you will have political intermingle 
selection, and then sometimes you will have few political players like provincial 
heads who's been defeated in his political career and has been put into an SOE as a 
deputy executive chairman or something. It's difficult to say but usually a mix of 
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these so people being appointed by the top and you've had people who have been 
there for their lifetime."  
                 (Participant G1, Beijing, M&A advisory) 
 
 
“...the central SOEs, if you look at SASAC's website, they have the centrally owned 
SOEs, all the CEOs and chairmen have to be selected by the government."  
        (Participant T1, Geneva, M&A consultant) 
 
Despite the appointment of SOE managers being a politically led process, it should 
not detract away from the fact that these managers are high calibre, competent 
individuals. The participants supported this view, and were in agreement that these 
managers will generally be experienced, well-respected professionals in their fields. 
In addition, SOE managers will combine their professional capabilities with political 
astuteness to further their careers.  Critically, SOE managers will be considered by 
the state council as the best individuals to lead an SOE.  
 
"Yes, they definitely are politically connected, but they are highly qualified, maybe 
their English is not up to the mark, but they will come with their translators. Usually, 
the SOE managers are from the top universities in China. They are very capable. 
Maybe the CEO is nominated by the state party. But at the working level, like 
regional heads and country heads, they are professional.” 
                  (Participant R1, Singapore, M&A advisory) 
 
 
(1) Subcategory 5.1 Cross-border M&A for career leverage  
 
Due to the close ties between SOEs and the party, it was discussed by the 
participants that the behaviour of SOE leaders is also restricted and highly 
influenced by the state.  Many participants also asserted that SOE chairmen are 
regarded as high-ranking officials within the party. Thus, they have substantial 
political influence but are also under great political influence. Critically it was 
asserted that SOE managers are politically incentivized. For example, it is widely 
understood that an SOE chairman will seek to be appointed with the longer-term 
ambition of advancing their political career within the party 
 
 Political promotions based on whether administrated targets assigned to the SOE are 
met. Thus indicating that SOE managers are incentivized to act as agents to the state. 
Party recognition and other political incentives will be used as a core motivation to 
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encourage exceptional performance from SOE managers. Interestingly, when asked 
whether an SOE manager would get politically rewarded as a result of leading a 
successful M&A; participants agreed that this would indeed act as strong leverage 
for the SOE manager to obtain a political promotion. Thus, it could be argued that it 
is in the personal interest of the SOE manager to pursue M&As. 
 
“My feeling is SOEs internal organization structure is very complicated and also its 
very difficult to get promoted and you have to navigate the hierarchy and all this 
stuff… so I would say if you can pull off a successful deal that would be their 
motivation for a promotion. Well at the end of the day it's a personal gain but for 
them its also a political gain as well because if you see the personnel movement 
among the SOEs and between the government, like some of the chairmen of one SOE 
just moved to the be vice president or vice governor of a province. It's 
interchangeable when it comes to that level so if you are successful during your 
period of the SOE and if you make the company profit double or triple through M&A 
yes it's a good personal gain in terms of business wise and political wise and also a 
promotion up to the political ladder." 
              (Participant T1, Geneva, M&A consultant) 
 
"If the M&A doing well and you are meeting your administrative targets, you can be 
very quickly promoted. The higher you go, the less you get compensated based on 
the pure economic performance of your SOEs, and the more you get compensated 
based on fulfilling the state goals or targets. Like if you're the COFCO boss, you can 
move to Sinopec (a bigger SOE), and from there you can be promoted to a governor 
or minister. Its definitely happening, all these guys all belong to the Chinese party.”  
               (Participant J4, Hong Kong, M&A consultant) 
 
It was also discussed that a political promotion is not just a motivator for the SOE 
chairman; it is also in the best interest of all SOE managers involved with the M&A 
deal, as each should also receive appropriate political recognition for their efforts. 
However, the political benefits of successfully facilitating an M&A are not strictly 
reserved for SOE managers; there is also scope for other involved individuals to 
secure benefits. For example, those employed by banks and the administrative 
agencies responsible for deal approvals and so on - thus everybody in the chain of 
command are incentivized to pursue cross-border M&As.  
 
“For example was the COFCO boss motivated to buy Noble because he knew he 
would get a political promotion? Yes of course, but you know you everybody can 
also earn a lot of money as well, but everybody wants to do a big project, not only 
the boss of COFCO but everyone involved can be promoted as well. Like the 
government officials who were involved in approving this deal as well and also those 
who give the orders from inside the government and everyone who can prove that 
this was a successful deal. It's a great honor for everybody involved.”  
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     (Participant K1, Shanghai, M&A brokerage) 
 
5.3.3.2 Summary of research area 5: Interaction between the national level and 
the individual level in the formal institution: 
 
Figure 5.5. Interaction between the national level and individual level within the formal 
institution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constructed by the author 
 
 159 
Figure 5.5 illustrates that the state further encourages cross-border M&As to comply 
with party objectives at the individual level. In this case, top-level managers are 
placed explicitly into the SOEs by the central state. This is carried out to ensure that 
all cross-border M&As undertaken by SOEs are relevant to the national plan of 
rejuvenation. Thus, it can be seen that at the individual level, top-level SOE 
managers and leaders, are also agents to the state party and are under considerable 
top-down political influence. 
 
In being appointed into an SOE leadership position, an SOE manager does not have 
full autonomy; their behavior is in fact constrained by the state. Moreover, top SOE 
management are politically incentivized. Therefore, their actions are driven by a 
desire to meet state targets, and thus, they will conduct cross-border M&As as a 
means to obtain party recognition and further their political career.   
 
5.4 Concise summary of key findings  
 
The constructed table below (Table 5.1) has presented the comprehensive findings of 
the conducted interviews with the 21 interview participants. Questions surrounding 
core categories and subcategories were created and addressed to the interview 
participants. The participants’ responses assisted in the facilitation and the creation 
of new theory surrounding the dynamics between the formal and informal institution 
in motivating cross-border M&A by Chinese SOEs. The findings from these tables 
have been compared to existing literature and state policies for validity and 
reliability. They will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. This research follows the 
following guidelines for constructing Tables 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. Summary of key findings based on responses from interviewees 
 
Panel A.  National level (Informal institution)       
Research  
Area 
Theoretical 
categories 
Subcategories Agree Neutral Disagree Total score 
RA1.  
Collective societal 
belief of national 
rejuvenation 
TC1.  
Rejuvenation of 
China 
- M1(3), H1(3), V1(2), J2(3), A1(2), 
M2(1), H2(2), J3(2), K1(3), N(13), 
L1(1), R1(2), P1(1), K2(2) 
G1, T1, T2 
M3, J4, J1, 
M4 
 
30 
Strong 
agreement 
 RA2.  
Direction of 
institutionalization 
process 
TC1 2. 
Institutionalizati
on China style: 
Top-down 
directive 
SC2.1  
Greater international influence: China using 
M&A to extend its global power and 
influence 
M1(2), J2(3), A1(3), H2(3), J3(3), 
T2(3), N(3), M4(1), R1(3), P1(1), 
K2(3) 
V1, M2, J4, 
J1 
H(3), G(3), T(1), 
MO(1), L(3), K(3) 
15  
General 
agreement 
 SC2.2. 
Greater resource security for China:  
Conducting M&As for China’s resource 
security; indications of Chinese desires to 
be less reliant on others; more self-
sufficient 
M1(3), H1(3), V1(2), G1(3), J2(3), 
M2(3), H2(3), J3(3), TR(3), J1(3), 
L1(1), MI(2), R1(3), P1(3), K2(3) 
M3, T1, J4 A1(3), K1(1), 
N1(1) 
37  
Strong 
agreement 
Panel B. National level       
RA3. Formal 
institutionalization of 
the informal belief at 
the national level 
 
TC3.  
Government-led 
cross-border 
M&A 
SC3.1  
Selective M&A agenda based on the state 
mandate: Indication that M&As are 
becoming more selective and targeted based 
on the state mandate 
M1(3), H1(3), V1(3), G1(3), J2(3), 
A1(3), H2(3), J3(3), T2(3), J4(3), 
J1(3), K1(3), N1(3), L1(3), R1(3), 
P1(3), K2(3) 
M2, M4 M3(1), T1(1) 
49  
Resolute 
agreement 
  SC3.2  
Significant of state agencies: Involvement 
of state agencies in approving/disapproving 
M&A 
M1(3), H1(3), V1(3), G1(3), J2(3), 
A1(3), M2(3), 1T(3), H2(3), J3(3), 
T2(3), M3(3), J4(3), J1(3), K1(3), 
N1(3), L1(3), M4(3), R1(3), P1(3), 
K2(3) 
  
63 
Resolute 
agreement 
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Panel C. Organizational level         
Research  
Area 
Theoretical 
categories 
Subcategories Agree Neutral Disagree Total score 
RA4.  
Interaction between 
national level and 
organizational level  
TC4.   
The obligation 
to fulfill state 
plans with 
autonomy 
SC4.1.A  
Social responsibilities:  
SOEs must conduct deals with a social 
objective thus hindering profitability  
M1(3), H1(3), V1(3), G1(3), J2(3), 
T1(3), H2(3), J3(3), T2(3), J4(3), 
J1(3), K1(3), N1(3), L1(3), M4(1), 
R1(2), P1(3), K2(3) 
 A1(1), M2(3), 
M3(3) 
 
42 
Strong agreement 
  SC4.1.B  
Profit responsibilities:  
SOEs conduct profit driven deals when 
instructed by the state  
 
G1(3), H2(3), M3(3), J4(3), N1(3), 
L1(3), R1(1), K1(1), J1(2) 
V1, J3, T2, 
K2, P1, M1, 
J2 
M4(3), H1(1), 
A1(3), M2(3), 
T1(3), 
 
9  
General 
agreement 
  SC4.2:  
The SOE paradox: Undeniable influence 
yet a challenge to engage:  
SOEs are influential organizations but 
challenging to work with 
M1(3), H1(3), V1(3), G1(3), J2(3), 
A1(3), M2(3), 1T(3), H2(3), J3(3), 
T2(3), M3(3), J4(3), J1(3), K1(3), 
N1(3), L1(3), M4(3), R1(3), P1(3), 
K2(3) 
   
63 
Resolute 
agreement 
Panel D. Individual level       
RA5.  
Interaction between 
national level and 
individual level  
 
TC5.  
Strategically 
appointed 
managers by 
state 
SC5.1. 
Cross-border M&A for career leverage:  
Political aspirations by SOE leaders, 
therefore, using M&A as leverage to get 
politically promoted 
M1(3), H1(3), L1(1), V1(3), J2(3), 
A1(3), T1(3), H2(3), J4(1), J1(3), 
K1(3), N1(3) 
G1, M4, P1, 
K2, R1, J3, 
T2, 
M2(1), M3(2)  
29 
Strong agreement 
 
*Notes: Assessment for the total scoring system 
1. All responses given by the interview participants on the key categories presented by this research were categorized into views of Agree, Neutral or Disagree.  
2. Each participant’s response was then assigned a score from 1 to 3 depending on how strongly the participant agreed or disagreed with the category.  
3. In terms of Agree: a score of 1 indicates general agreement; 2 indicates strong agreement; 3 indicates resolute agreement  
4. In terms of Disagree: a score of 1 indicates general disagreement; 2 indicates strong disagreement; 3 indicates resolute disagreement 
5. For each research category, the scores assigned to each participant are then totaled. In scenarios where there are both responses within the Agree and Disagree categories, 
the minority score is deducted from the majority score. The highest collective score is taken as the predominant view  
6. The maximum possible collective score is 63.  Scores between: 1 - 21 will indicate general disagreement/agreement; 22 - 42 will indicate strong disagreement/agreement; 
43 - 63 will indicate resolute disagreement/agreement. 
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5.5 Conclusion  
 
The following findings were drawn from Table 5.1 can be summarized as follows: 
 
Regarding research areas 1 and 2, it was found that there is an informal shared belief 
in the concept of national rejuvenation at all levels of society. As a result, the state 
can institutionalize the belief of national rejuvenation and drive the formal pursuit of 
rejuvenation in a top-down fashion. As an indication of the top-down 
institutionalization of this belief, the desires for SOEs to extend its international 
influence, and the desires to increase resource security were found.  
 
In terms of research area 3 - the formal institutionalization of the belief at the 
national level; the state can ensure the achievement of this formal objective by 
regulating all cross-border M&As deals to be in accordance with national 
development plans. In doing so, it was found that cross-border M&As are becoming 
more selective while also serving specific state objectives. Furthermore, the state can 
regulate cross-border M&As through the use of state agencies, which are responsible 
for approving/disapproving M&A applications. This means that all cross-border 
M&As, undertaken by the national-level SOEs, fall under heavy state influence. This 
further highlights that the typical view of a bottom-up approach to institutional 
change is not applicable in the China context. 
 
Concerning research area 4 - the interaction between national level and 
organizational level, participants eluded to the point that SOEs are formally acting as 
agents to the state. Once the state mandate has been announced and targets have been 
assigned to SOEs, they have autonomy to proceed in participating in cross-border 
M&As. However, SOEs must ensure that all deals fall within the parameters of state 
mandates. Therefore, the objective of the M&A deal (whether social or profit-driven) 
is highly influenced by what is guided in these state plans. Simultaneously, as an 
outcome of the continuous state influence on the cross-border M&A process, SOEs 
are faced with a paradox. On the one hand, it is agreed that SOEs are globally 
respected organizations with considerable importance and influence; this is a direct 
result of their ability to undertake substantial M&As and, a direct benefit of state 
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support. However, on the other hand, the bureaucratic hurdles encountered 
throughout the M&A process, has meant SOEs are considered difficult to work with. 
 
In terms of research area 5 - the interaction between the national level and the 
individual level, it was found that SOE top-level managers and leaders are 
strategically appointed by the state.  Thus, at the individual level, managers are also 
considered as agents of the state and, are under considerable political pressure. It was 
also ascertained that SOE top-level managers are highly politically incentivized. 
Specifically, SOE managers incentivized to conduct successful cross-border M&As 
as leverage to attain a political career promotion. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion
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6.1 Introduction  
 
Following Chapter 5’s presentation of the findings of this research, this chapter will 
critically discuss the key findings of this thesis. A systematic analysis and objective 
interpretation of these findings will be supported by key policies, statements, and 
regulations made by the central government. Findings will be organized in line with 
the key interactions observed in the informal and formal institutions, and the 
corresponding dynamics between the national, organizational, and individual levels. 
The final section of this chapter will outline the proposed conceptual theoretical 
framework, designed to highlight the specifics of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) undertaken by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
 
6.2 Discussion on research question 1 
 
“What are the distinctive features of the institutionalization process in the China 
specific context?” 
6.2.1 Research area 1: Collective belief of national rejuvenation at all 
levels of society 
 
6.2.1.1 Theoretical category 1: The rejuvenation of China  
 
This research uncovered a number of themes that connect the informal institution to 
the collective Chinese desire for national rejuvenation. A prominent theme that 
emerged throughout discussions with participants was the significance of China’s 
century of humiliation. The main point being how this difficult period damaged 
Chinese pride and moreover, how this experience continues to influence the Chinese 
psyche. The reason for this sustained impact is connected to China’s past cultural 
and scientific prominence. The Chinese view themselves as highly capable, 
pioneering people, therefore making the acceptance of a lost century of progress or 
humiliation, difficult. Thus, the concept of national rejuvenation is widely shared 
because of the cultural poignancy that drives this ideology; namely, restoring 
China’s lost glory and reinstating the nation as a global leader both politically and 
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economically (Yan, 2001; Yu, 2017). To this end, it was found that the rejuvenation 
of China is something that is expected by most Chinese, at all societal levels. This 
narrative continues today, with a strong example evident in the speech delivered by 
Xi Jinping at The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017. 
Xi openly called upon the Chinese nation to realize the China Dream of national 
rejuvenation as follows.  
 
“We should keep on working with great determination to accomplish the three 
historic tasks of advancing modernization, realizing China's reunification, and 
preserving world peace and promoting common development; we should secure a 
decisive victory in finishing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all 
respects, strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a 
new era, realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, and see that our 
people realize their aspirations for a better life” 41 
 
Secondly, it is pointed out that large-scale government-led projects, such as the One 
Belt One Road initiative, i.e., revitalizing the historic Silk Road trade route provides 
a fitting narrative of how the central government is strategically working towards 
reinstating China's excellence. The benefits of the Chinese building infrastructure 
and enhancing trade channels that connect China to the West will be highly 
consequential and impactful. This initiative will allow China to obtain large volumes 
of resources, while at the same time boosting Chinese economic activity, and 
building political allies. The One Belt One Road initiative enjoys widespread 
domestic approval in China. Owing to the historical significance of the trade route, 
the project resonates with the underlying historical principles of the Chinese dream 
to reclaim lost glory. Supporting this, Nordin & Weissmann (2018) understand the 
Belt and Road as a redirection of China’s attempt to build a "community of shared 
destiny." This shared destiny includes shared beliefs, mutual respect, and trust, but 
also, a destiny that sees China in a central position (Callanhan, 2016). It is a result of 
the collective shared dream among the Chinese that allows the informal institution to 
drive formal institutional change. That is, the consistency within the informal 
institution allows the central government to direct national rejuvenation in a top-
down fashion. 
                                                 
41 CPC national congress. Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC national congress, 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/201711/04/content_34115212.htm>, 
2017. 
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6.2.2 Research area 2: The direction of the institutionalization process 
 
6.2.2.1 Theoretical category 2: Institutionalization Chinese style: Top-down 
directive  
 
This research argues, that the belief of national rejuvenation has been 
institutionalized from the informal institution into the formal institution at the 
national level. This is a result of the belief in rejuvenation being collectively shared 
at all levels of society. Subsequently, this belief is legitimized by society allowing it 
to be supported and popularized as a national sentiment. Resultantly, as this is a 
widely shared belief, has become institutionalized into a formal rule. Moreover, 
because the desire of national rejuvenation is a vision that is shared among all level 
of society, it subsequently allows the central government to direct formal commands 
in a top-down fashion to the subordinates below thus formally carrying out this 
national objective. 
 
Moreover, it is evident that the top-down style of command is unique and 
characteristic to the Chinese context. This form of institutionalization goes against 
the conventional style of institutionalization i.e., institutional change occurs from 
bottom up. In the conventional context, there is a specific focus on the individual 
level to envision new institutional meaning as the method for advancing formal 
change (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009). The individual can obtain 
legitimacy for these new actions by way of amassing users and adoption by groups 
of society (i.e., the organizational level). When there is enough societal support, this 
can drive formal institutional change at the national level, thus changing the rules of 
the game (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). What is seen in the China context is that new 
formal change is closely guided by the central government. That is top-down 
directives, from the state to SOEs and, finally to SOE leaders - i.e., at both the 
organizational and individual level. 
 
The formal institutional belief of national rejuvenation, communicated in a top-down 
fashion, is indicative of how the state views its central role in the task of national 
rejuvenation. At the 19th National Congress in 2017, the state emphasized the 
importance of societal alignment and following central leadership, in realizing the 
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goal of national rejuvenation. Additionally, during the National Party Construction 
Work Conference of State-Owned Enterprises in 2016, the critical role of SOEs in 
relation to national rejuvenation was highlighted. At this conference, the state 
defined SOEs as "important forces to implement the decision by the party." 42 
Subsequently, state formalized national initiatives, aimed at driving national 
rejuvenation, such as Made in 2025, were introduced. Made in China 2025, is 
focused on strengthening and enhancing China's position as a manufacturing power, 
and thus, links into and, further supports the concept of rejuvenation.  
 
“National rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people since 
modern times began…Realizing our great dream demands a great project. This 
project is the great new project of Party building…without the leadership national 
rejuvenation would be just wishful thinking…the Party exercises overall leadership, 
we must strengthen our consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, 
think in big-picture terms, follow the leadership core, and keep in alignment.” 43 
 
“We must firmly grasp this major historical opportunity, implement the strategy of 
manufacturing a strong country in accordance with the requirements of the strategic 
layout, strengthen overall planning and forward-looking deployment, and strive to 
achieve a hundred years of the founding of New China through three decades of 
efforts. To build China into a manufacturing power that leads the development of the 
world's manufacturing industry and lay a solid foundation for realizing the Chinese 
dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 44 
 
(1) Subcategory 2.1 Greater international influence 
 
In finding support for the formal institutionalization of China’s beliefs of national 
rejuvenation; it is argued that the objective of rejuvenating China can be observed 
through the state directed objectives of increasing greater international presence, and 
China's desire to further their global influence. Evident in the speech delivered at the 
13th National People Congress in 2018, the state announced a move towards greater 
international cooperation through the One Belt One Road initiative. 
                                                 
42
 Xinhua, Xi Stresses CCP leadership of state-owned enterprises, 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2016-10/11/c_135746608.htm>, 2016. 
43 CPC national congress. Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC national congress, 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/201711/04/content_34115212.htm>, 
2017. 
44 State Council. Notice of the State Council on "Made in China 2025,” 
<http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=826a5000ff214a60bdfb&lib=law>, 2015. 
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“China will continue to actively push forward the Belt and Road Initiative, and 
strengthen its exchanges and cooperation with countries around the world. China 
will continue to actively participate in the evolution and construction of the global 
governance system. China will contribute more Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions 
and Chinese strength to the world.” 45 
 
One strong example of China’s growing and formidable international influence is the 
ambitious One Belt One Road project; a massive, strategic initiative set on 
connecting China with over 60 countries and in excess of 4 billion people, through 
the use of a colossal network of railways, highways, ports, and pipelines (Summers, 
2015). It was argued that all Chinese firms – including SOEs – are under instruction 
to pursue and undertake cross-border M&As related to this initiative. That is, if they 
wish for their M&A applications to be approved by state-regulated bodies.  
 
This project will mark a new era of multilateral cooperation and globalization for 
China, and is arguably a concrete manifestation of the “Chinese dream” of 
rejuvenation. The One Belt One Road program is viewed as China’s ascendance onto 
the global stage, economically, politically and strategically (Yu, 2017). Ferdinand 
(2016) pointed out that underpinning the One Belt One Road initiative is China’s 
growing self-confidence as a result of its economic achievements. Supporting this is 
Nordin & Weissmann (2018) who argue that China’s growing international influence 
stems from the longevity of their economic growth. Resultantly, this draws others to 
China, seeking to understand their world-view and share in the gains of their 
continued economic success (Kaufman, 2010). 
 
China’s growing international prominence is further underscored by their increased 
activity in foreign policy. Yu (2017) asserts that China’s increase in national pride as 
a result of China’s emergence as a global power has led China’s stance on foreign 
policy to change substantially. It is argued that China has now become more 
proactive, assertive, and globally driven; therefore further aiding the 
internationalization initiatives of SOEs. For example, China has upgraded various 
regional cooperation mechanisms to facilitate greater economic integration. This 
                                                 
45 Xinhua, Speech delivered by Xi Jinping at the first session of the 13th NPC, 
<https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/184/187/127/1521628772832.html>, 2018. 
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includes the re-negotiation of the China-ASEAN (10+1) trade agreement in 2016 to 
support the One Belt One Road initiative.  
 
“…suggestions on the commercial cooperation between the two sides: 1) Deepen the 
connection of strategy on development, and build the “One Belt and One Road” 
hand in hand. The Chinese side will follow Xi Jinping’s principle of discussing 
together, building together and sharing together, not a solo by China, but a choir 
with other countries. The initiative of “One Belt One Road” should be docked with 
other ASEAN countries to promote the programs in other areas, enhance the mutual 
beneficial and win-win cooperation in depth.” 46 
 
Many nations have vocalized concerns that the Belt and Road initiative could likely 
tip the global balance of power in favor of the Chinese (Prasad, 2018). For example, 
upon the announcement of the One Belt One Road initiative, 27 out of 28 EU 
ambassadors signed a report criticizing the project, as contradictions with the EU's 
agenda of liberalizing free trade were identified (Prasad, 2018). However, both 
participants and scholars have argued that the rejuvenation of China – and related 
projects such as One Belt One Road – are more about regaining lost pride and not, 
about attaining new power or greater influence over other nations. That is, to the 
Chinese, national rejuvenation is about restoring the lost status quo and reinstating 
China’s rightful place in the world (Gries et al., 2011; Li, 2017). 
 
Consequently, China has been working hard to appear less like a revisionist power 
and more like a global leader. China has stated that the One Belt One Road program 
is less about the Chinese dominating international infrastructure and trading routes, 
and more about increasing global cooperation and economic integration (Swaine, 
2015).  In support of the One Belt and One Road program, China has established 
new innovative institutions – namely the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB). Headquartered in Beijing, the AIIB was designed to accelerate Asian 
infrastructure development, whilst simultaneously cultivating strong bilateral trade 
integration (Elek, 2014). To date, the AIIB has 57 regional members and is hailed as 
an important development for sustainable infrastructure in Asia (AIIB, 2018). At the 
same time, the AIIB also underscores China’s growing regional influence in Asia, 
and highlights China’s greater push for global power. 
                                                 
46 China FTA Network MOFCOM. China – ASEAN FTA, 
<http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/chinadmen/endmnews/201608/33077_1.html>, 2018. 
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(2) Subcategory 2.2 Greater resources security for China  
 
It is argued that China's quest for greater resource security and increased self-
sufficiency is also a further an indication of the state-driven formal desire for 
national rejuvenation. It is highlighted that the Chinese government is seeking to 
secure a position that would allow them to be less reliant on critical trade partners. 
China wants to avoid being in a position where another country can have leverage on 
them that they cannot mitigate, especially, in areas concerning the security of raw 
materials, energy, technology, and trade flow security through the use of M&As. It is 
indicative that these resources are important to China, as without these resources, 
China will struggle to become fully self-sustaining and independent. This vision of 
independence and increased domestic security remains a central goal for the Chinese 
government and fundamental to the Chinese dream (Nordin & Weissmann, 2018).   
 
Acquiring natural resources has been considered a priority and a critical agenda for 
China for a number of decades. China simply does not have enough resources to 
support the Chinese people. According to The World Bank (2018), since the 
initiation of market reforms in 1978, China has lifted 800 million people out of 
poverty. Fuelled with an accelerating urban population, the largest middle-income 
class in the world, it is therefore expected that domestic consumption will increase. 
Collectively, it furthers the necessity of securing enough resources to satisfy and 
sustain domestic demand (Larson, 2013). It is apparent that with China's more 
significant experience in the international M&A field, SOEs are now specifically 
pursuing M&A deals that will intrinsically benefit the Chinese population. This 
includes securing a range of natural resources of which China is not self-sufficient in. 
As seen in Chapter 2, acquisitions in natural resources by SOEs account for 27% of 
the total number of observed deals from 2002 – 2016. Such acquisitions include, oil 
(i.e. China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation’s acquisition of Russia’s Udmurtneft 
OAO for $3.5 billion in 2006), coal reserves (i.e. Yanzhou Coal Mining Co Ltd’s 
acquisition of Australia’s Felix Resources for $2.9 billion in 2009), and grains (i.e. 
ChemChina acquiring Syngenta for $43 billion in 2017). The significance of the 
2017 ChemChina-Syngenta deal was consistently pointed out throughout this 
research. As China’s largest M&A deal in history ($43 billion), it clearly highlights 
how food security continues to be a priority for China.  
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The state has also emphasized how there are only a finite amount of resources 
available in China. Addressed by the state council in 2014, a strategy was issued 
with an action plan for China’s energy development. The premise of the strategy was 
to lessen China’s dependence on other countries with regards to energy provision. 
 
“On the basis of domestic resources, the energy supply capacity building shall be 
strengthened… keep promoting the capacity of independent control over energy and 
lessen the over-reliance on foreign countries for oil.” 47 
 
Thus the Chinese have to look outwards and use cross-border M&A to realize the 
strategy for resource security. It is argued that the acquisitions are made to primarily 
acquire resources that will assist in security provisions for the Chinese population 
and assist the transition towards greater self-sufficiency. Collectively these 
acquisitions will help propel the Chinese towards achieving sustainability and self-
sufficiency. By acquiring and controlling more critical resources, eventually, China 
could direct enough of the global supply so as to attain a higher level of command 
over economic affairs (Nordin & Weissmann, 2018) 
 
Moreover, it is pointed out that, relying on other countries for technology-related 
resources is an area the Chinese government is actively striving to change. It has 
been argued that the underlying technology in two-thirds of China’s technology 
exports is in fact produced by foreign companies (Wübbeke et al., 2016). To add to 
this, China's most prominent single line import is not, in fact crude oil, but 
semiconductor chips - China’s semiconductor imports in 2017 were worth $200 
billion (Cadell, 2018). China’s dependence on foreign technology was critically 
exposed by the Chinese telecommunication giant ZTE. In 2018 the United States 
effectively banned ZTE from the US market for seven years and ordered them to pay 
a USD $1 billion fine for violating US trade laws (Klein, 2018). This ban illustrated 
the extent of China's dependence on foreign technology and also how quickly a 
seemingly powerful Chinese multinational could be shut down due to external forces 
beyond their control. Thus, it can also be argued that it is critical for M&A to be 
                                                 
47 State Council. Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the Program of Action 
for the Energy Development Strategy (2014-2020), 
<http://en.pkulaw.cn.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/display.aspx?id=5f8e90c006bb1fa8bdfb&lib=law>, 2014. 
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used to secure supplies through diversification and thereby making China less reliant 
on importing key resources from a single source.   
 
China’s aggressive technology catch up strategy for greater resources is illustrated in 
Chapter 2, the observed cross-border M&As by SOEs in the manufacturing industry 
accounted for 49.6% of the total number of deals. Of these manufacturing deals, it 
was noted that a significant portion of these acquisitions was of high-technological 
value. Such as, the manufacturing of special purpose equipment (i.e. Zhuzhu CSR 
Times’ acquisition of UK’s Specialist Machine Development for $178 million in 
2015); manufacturing of electric components (i.e. Weichai Power’s acquisition of 
Germany’s Linde Hydraulics for $358 million in 2012); and manufacturing of air 
and spacecraft related machinery (i.e. AVIC’s acquisition of US Hilite International 
for $2.8 billion in 2014). The announcement of the Made in China 2025 project 
which aims to usher in a technologically upgraded Chinese economy focused on 
implementing intelligent high-technology manufacturing; has driven significant 
efforts from the Chinese to work towards state plans (Wübbeke et al., 2016).   
 
6.3 Discussion of research question 2  
 
“How does the Chinese-style institutionalization process facilitate the unique 
characteristics of cross-border M&A activities by Chinese state owned enterprises 
(SOEs)?” 
 6.3.1 Research area 3: The formal institutionalization of the informal 
belief at the national level 
 
6.3.1.1 Theoretical category 3: Government led M&A 
 
This research found that the state is highly involved in the cross-border M&A 
process to ensure that cross-border deals are in-line with state plans. State plans 
themselves are reflections of China’s values and beliefs, formally written as specific 
objectives, guidelines, and agendas for national development. Therefore, it is evident 
from the state plans, that the informal institutional beliefs have been institutionalized 
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by the formal institution. By outlining clearly defined national goals specifically 
designed for China’s rejuvenation, this ensures that all organizations perform cross-
border M&As within the boundaries of the state mandate; and thus the objective of 
national rejuvenation is actively pursued. This furthers highlights a China-specific 
style of management that is indicative of a formal institutional change originating 
from the top and is directed down.  
 
Further supporting the above is the specific guided direction of cross-border M&As. 
As per Table 2.2 of Chapter 2, the state council releases a catalogue which acts as a 
guide on the type of foreign investments permitted. The catalogue is for the 
reference of all Chinese companies, both state-owned and private (Cicenia, 2017). 
Industries are divided into three categories: ‘encouraged,’ ‘restricted,’ and 
‘prohibited.’ 48  Encouraged industries will usually receive preferential treatment 
including subsidies and grants. Investments in restricted industries are subject to the 
review of the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM). The prohibited list is firmly off limits for foreign 
investment (State Council, 2017).  
 
This overseas investment catalogue came about following excessive spending by 
Chinese enterprises on deals that were deemed irrational, or not directly beneficial to 
China. The excessive spending created significant concern regarding the 
considerable corporate debt used to fund these acquisitions and the potential this had 
to destabilize the economy (Sui-Lee, 2017).  As a response, the state council issued a 
statement at the end of 2016 warning companies that they would be punished for 
violating foreign investment rules by acquiring irrational overseas assets. These 
investments are viewed as not in accordance with the macro-control policies. 
Therefore, the government introduced safeguards to protect China against the risks 
associated with such irrational purchases (State Council, 2017). The state council has 
explicitly instructed the big four banks to be vigilant with their credit lines, and to 
                                                 
48 State Council, Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Forwarding the Guiding 
Opinions of NDRC, MOFCOM, PBOC, and MFA on Further Guiding and Regulating the Direction 
of Outbound Investments, <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-08/18/content_5218665.htm>, 
2017. 
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scrutinize credit requests from SOEs. 49  Banks are instructed to closely examine 
enterprises, to mitigate any risks, and to reduce the leverage on China’s financial 
sector (Mitchell, 2017).  
 
The stringent vetting on all M&A deals as ordered by the central government is 
indicative of the shift in China's mentality of how SOEs should now pursue overseas 
M&As. Ultimately the Communist party guides the state council, whom in turn 
governs State-owned assets supervision and administration commission (SASAC). 
SASAC instructs SOEs to invest on behalf of the Chinese people. It is highlighted 
that, in using public money, Chinese SOEs are required to assess an investment on 
the basis of what it might bring to the development of China. This outlook is 
supported in how the state has viewed M&As for other purposes such as acquisitions 
in overseas trophy assets. These types of deals are now strictly forbidden and are 
treated as putting the financial institutions at unnecessary risk, and thus treated as a 
disservice to the Chinese people (State Council, 2017). 
 
(1) Subcategory 3.1 Selective M&A agenda based on the state mandate 
 
This research puts forward, that recent tone of state plans – particularly the emphasis 
on national rejuvenation – has had a direct impact on the direction of M&A 
investments made by Chinese SOEs. It can be observed that traditional SOE 
investments such as those seen in industrial companies have now instead been 
directed to more high-tech companies. This links in with preceding point 
highlighting recent Chinese governmental initiatives, such as Made in China 2025, 
and One Belt One Road – both of which assert priority on technology and 
infrastructure acquisitions. Technology and infrastructure are also featured heavily in 
the 13th five-year plan (FYP), in addition to being listed under the ‘encouraged’ 
category in the state catalogue for overseas investments. 
 
Categories Encouraged 50 
                                                 
49 China’s big four banks are: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China. 
50 State Council, Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Forwarding the Guiding 
Opinions of NDRC, MOFCOM, PBOC and MFA on Further Guiding and Regulating the Direction of 
 176 
(1) “Overseas infrastructure investment that is conducive to the construction of the  
‘Belt and Road’ and connections with neighbouring infrastructure” 
 
(2) “Investment and cooperation with high-tech and advanced manufacturing 
enterprises and to encourage R&D centers abroad”  
 
 
Pursuing acquisitions that align with state objectives, as noted above, directly results 
in increased likelihood of party approval. In addition, this also provides SOEs with 
favorable government financing, swifter approval, and increased support from 
related state agencies. The preceding points are indicative of China’s increased 
selectivity and caution with regards to M&A transaction approval. This trend is also 
the result of a number of past, poor performing M&A deals, further contributing to 
China’s more selective approach.  Supported by Capron & Mitchell (2012), it was 
pointed out that most of China’s early acquisitions did not work out, with this poor 
track record tainting China’s reputation and adding to growing skepticism from 
western counterparties. For example, SOE oil company China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) acquisition of Canada’s Nexen in 2013 for USD $15 
billion. It was speculated that CNOOC paid a 60% premium only to suffer a 
slump in oil prices, a pipeline spill, and mass layoffs including senior Nexen 
executives (Kynge & Mitchell, 2016). Indeed, following the strategy where SOEs 
primarily sought international exposure had seemingly exhausted a valuable supply 
of state money (Yao, 2009).  
  
As a result of past experiences, this research found that most recent acquisitions have 
a more of a long-term strategy. China has significantly developed their strategic 
thinking behind cross-border M&As and SOEs seem to be carefully selecting 
opportunities as per state mandates. The acquisition of Switzerland’s Syngenta by 
ChemChina for $43 billion in 2018 is evident of this. Syngenta is a world leader 
in crop protection products and is also a leader in the production of seeds. Thus, 
the Syngenta acquisition is indicative of China’s national strategy in securing a 
sustainable and safe food supply for China’s growing population (Tsang, 2017). 
It is clear that Chinese SOEs are now far more experienced and also, are critically 
                                                                                                                                          
Outbound Investments, <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-08/18/content_5218665.htm>, 
2017. 
 177 
analyzing deals before investing. Moreover, with the tightening of policies towards 
cross-border M&As and the stringent screening of M&A applications, the Chinese 
government’s cautious approach to foreign currency allocation also became clear 
(Baker McKenzie, 2017). This means that any approved M&A deals have not only 
been well thought out but also, have a particular purpose. It is argued that, as SOEs 
and M&A deals themselves are being intensely vetted to be in line with the state 
plans; it is therefore apparent, that if an SOE has been given clearance by the state, it 
is because the target is considered to be specifically beneficial and strategic to China.  
In every stage of the M&A process, every deal has to be scrutinized to determine 
whether its purpose and is in-line with the state's objectives (Alderman, 2018).  
 
However, simultaneously, SOEs are also subject to considerable scrutiny by their 
overseas counterparties, making the task of completing cross-border M&As more 
challenging for SOEs. For example, China General Nuclear’s (CGN) negotiations 
with EDF France were ultimately deemed to be in breach merger thresholds, by the 
European Commission. Therefore, this deal required further EU merger clearance 
and added an extra layer of complexity, further complicating the deal. Ultimately it 
was ruled that CGN was considered not to be independent from the SASAC 
(Timperley, 2018). Subsequently and as result of bureaucratic, long-winded 
processes, a number of overseas bodies have blocked Chinese deals (Chazan, 2018). 
 
(2) Subcategory 3.2 The significance of state agencies 
 
This research found that the central government can significantly influence cross-
border M&A activity because the state has the ultimate decision making power and 
control. Though the state council has decentralized its power and does not hold 
power directly, it has ultimately created various state agencies that have been 
allocated responsibility for SOEs including, responsibility for overseeing and 
approving outbound M&A deals (as per Chapter 3, Table 3.1 & 3.2).  This is also 
supported by Sauvant & Chen (2014) who documented the cumbersome and unclear 
government regulatory approval system. Sauvant & Chen (2014) also illustrated the 
strong and unavoidable administrative control that that must be dealt within in order 
to pursue overseas investments. Key administrative agencies mentioned throughout 
the interviews were, SASAC, MOFCOM, NDRC, and State Administration for 
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Foreign Exchange (SAFE). The importance of these agencies in governing and 
permitting overseas transactions was also highlighted in the research of Luo, Xue, & 
Han (2010); Sauvant & Chen (2014); Jones & Zou (2017).  
 
All SOEs need to receive approval from NDRC and MOFCOM before they can 
undertake an overseas M&A project (Luo et al., 2010). Moreover, SOEs who want to 
pursue a target under any state restricted categories will need to also obtain approval 
from SASAC (Sauvant & Chen, 2014). All investments going overseas that exceed 
$300 million require further approval by the NDRC and state council (Jones & Zou, 
2017). As all national SOEs are fundamentally owned and managed by SASAC; thus 
SASAC holds the ultimate control on what the SOE can or cannot do. This is also 
supported by Robins (2013) who pointed out that SASAC has the ability to exercise 
the final authority over strategy and investment decisions. For this reason, SASAC is 
keen to ensure that acquisitions are in line with China’s economic policies. 
Consequently, if SASAC permits the SOE to pursue a cross-border target, the other 
state agencies will also follow suit. Likewise, if SASAC does not approve the deal, 
there is no way the SOEs can carry out outbound deals. 
 
In January 2017 China’s central bank announced its foreign reserves slipped to USD 
$2.99 trillion from a high of nearly USD $4 trillion in 2014 (Bradsher, 2017). 
Consequently, this triggered the state to tighten control of foreign currency transfers 
out of China. SASAC ordered the state agencies to be extra vigilant and issued new 
SASAC guidelines on overseas investments. Examples of the new SASAC 
guidelines included: Further application processes so that the state can determine the 
economic benefits that will come out of the deal. Extra scrutiny and specific 
approval measures on all transactions over USD $1billion for transactions that fall 
outside of the buyer's core business area (Baker McKenzie, 2017). All acquisitions 
over USD $100 million will need to be examined and will require approval (Pan, 
2018). Transactions over $300 million will require a confirmation letter from NDRC 
before a binding offer can be made (Wildau, 2016). It is speculated that these new 
measures on outbound M&A are indicative that SASAC will now have a more 
significant say in the decision-making process of SOEs.  
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Critically one fundamental ways that the state controls cross-border M&As is via the 
SAFE agency. The state council ordered the SAFE agency to implement strict 
capital control restrictions at the end of 2016 (Choudhury, 2017).  
 
“The SAFE shall, in accordance with the "Regulations on the Administration of 
Foreign Exchanges of the People's Republic of China" and the "Regulations on 
Foreign Exchange Administration of Foreign Investors in Domestic Investors" and 
other relevant regulations, strengthen the guidance on the compliance of banks with 
foreign exchange enterprises for the settlement and use of capital of foreign-invested 
enterprises…includes requesting relevant business entities to provide written 
explanations and business materials, interviewing responsible persons, on-site 
inspection or copying of relevant information of business entities, and reporting 
violations.” 51 
 
As the renminbi (RMB) is not freely traded on the open market, all Chinese 
companies (unless they can access foreign currency offshore) will have to navigate 
the SAFE agency. The SAFE agency is responsible for governing China's foreign 
exchange activities and managing the state foreign exchange reserves (SAFE, 2008).  
This means that unless Chinese companies can get SAFE agency approval, M&A 
deals will simply not happen. Therefore, the state is also able to further influence 
cross-border M&A activity through the accessibility of foreign currency. 
 
6.3.2 Research area 4: Interaction between the national level and the 
organizational level in the formal institution 
 
6.3.2.1 Theoretical category 4: The obligation to fulfill state plans with 
autonomy 
 
This research argues that the state views the role of SOEs as instrumental to China’s 
rejuvenation. Supporting the importance of SOEs to the party, Li Rongrong the 
current chairman and party secretary of SASAC said in 2009: “no matter how the 
reform proceeds, the leading role of state-owned enterprise in the national economy 
will never change.” This research found that SOEs are viewed as tools of the 
Chinese state and are purposefully used to execute the state’s strategic plans. In other 
words, the central state will outline the blueprint for national rejuvenation through 
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 State Administration of Foreign Exchange. Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
on Reforming the Management Method of Foreign Exchange Capital Settlement of Foreign-invested 
Enterprises, <https://www.safe.gov.cn/safe/2015/0408/5549.html>. 2016. 
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state plans, and then in order to the fulfill the overarching long-term plan, targets are 
set for SOEs in a top-down fashion by the central state. As the major shareholder of 
the SOEs, the state requires that these targets fulfilled by the SOEs. Evidently. In the 
National Party Construction Work Conference of State-Owned Enterprises in 2016, 
the state addressed how it must be insisted that SOEs implement state’s strategies.  
 
“The party leadership and building the role of the party are the root and soul for 
state-owned enterprises…. The party’s leadership in state-owned enterprises is a 
major political principle, and that principle must be insisted on... state-owned 
enterprises should also become important forces to implement decisions of the CPC 
Central Committee, the new development concept, major strategies such as the 
"going out" strategies and the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as to enhance overall 
national power, economic and social development and people's wellbeing.” 52 
 
However, in saying this, it was pointed out by participants that SOEs are relatively 
autonomous. Once the directives from the Chinese government are received by the 
SOEs, the SOEs can act freely to pursue the targets in whatever manner they see as 
reasonable. The autonomy is extended as long as the SOE business activities are 
based within the parameters that are guided by the state plan. The unique 
relationship between state and SOE is also supported by Jones & Zou, (2017). It was 
pointed out that to attain economic growth whilst maintaining political stability, the 
Communist party follows a Chinese-style regulatory system. Robins (2013) and 
Jones & Zou (2017) states this regulatory system issues guidelines to steer public 
and private actors towards the state’s desired outcomes. However, these guidelines 
are often vague and at times open to interpretation, as the Chinese economy is still 
transitional and often uses an experimental approach to reform (Perkins, 2018). 
 
Concerning the effect of the state influence in M&A, this research found that the 
central government’s involvement extends mostly to setting the policies, regulations 
and, initiatives that guide Chinese organizations. This is to ensure that cross-border 
deals are safeguarded against risks, while also ensuring that transactions are in 
accordance with state mandates. This means projects and deliverables are limited to 
a range that the SOE can act within. Once these guidelines have been laid out, the 
boundaries in which the SOE can operate within are established. Thus it is argued 
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 Xinhua, Xi Stresses CCP leadership of state-owned enterprises, 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2016-10/11/c_135746608.htm>, 2016. 
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that when SOEs pursue international targets, it is not an attempt to colonize a given 
nation or impose Chinese values; rather the fulfillment of state mandates laid out in 
the regulatory framework (Jones & Zou, 2017). 
 
To build on the topic of SOE autonomy within the Chinese M&A environment, the 
following additional points can be made. Firstly, regarding M&A target selection, 
this will stem from the SOE itself. It was found that the central government does not 
actively seek M&A targets for the SOEs because they do not have the resources to 
screen nor allocate M&A targets for the SOE to pursue. Moreover, the choice to 
conduct a cross-border M&A is also down to the SOEs. Therefore, the SOEs have a 
significant degree of autonomy as long as they follow the guidelines set by the 
central state. However, it is critical that the central government remain informed as 
to what the SOEs plans are. Participants highlighted that the SOE has to construct a 
report at the beginning of the year that details all aspects of their operations to 
SASAC. Included within this report are any details of overseas investment plans – 
including cross-border M&As. Once SASAC has approved the plans as per the SOE 
report, the SOE will not need any subsequent approval or registration with SASAC. 
Participants also pointed out that by following the state’s guidelines, any SOE 
M&As will be approved with minimal hassle. SOEs are acutely aware to inform 
SASAC concerning the pursuit of assigned state targets. Supporting this is Leutert 
(2018) who argues this is why SOEs were paperwork heavy - because SOEs 
managers are keen to keep Beijing informed at all times. As long as the guidelines 
are adhered to, and SOEs consistently notify the state, then the central government 
will not be actively involved with SOE affairs.  
 
(1) Subcategory 4.1 Social vs. Profit-driven deals 
 
This research argued that as an outcome of SOEs being representatives of the 
government and an organizational agent to the state, SOEs consequently have a 
complicated dual responsibility to the nation. Firstly, it is claimed that fundamentally 
SOEs were created by the central government to be used as tools to provide a service, 
and to ensure the implementation of national policies (Brødsgaard et al., 2017).  
Supporting this, was one participant's view that "the central government promoted 
the Chinese economy and developed the country through SOEs." As SOEs are quasi-
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government corporations, they are responsible for executing plans that have been set 
by the central government (Li & Brødsgaard, 2013). Thus, essentially it is argued 
that depending on what the central government’s plans, it will subsequently 
influence SOE objectives, therefore affecting the rationale for cross-border M&As. 
This is further supported by the central state, where according to the 13th FYP, SOEs 
will be divided into two categories: 1) commercial profit entities where the main 
objectives of these SOEs are to increase state assets and boost the economy; and 2) 
public welfare entities which will provide public goods and services. 
 
“The main aims of commercial SOEs will be to vitalize the state-owned sector, 
improve the efficacy of state capital, and maintain or increase the value of state-
owned assets. To achieve these aims, they should engage in lawful and autonomous 
production and business operations under the principle of the survival of the fittest. 
The main aims of public-benefit SOEs will be to ensure people’s wellbeing, serve 
society, and provide public goods and services.” 53 
 
It is indicative that the state plan is influential in determining the type of acquisitions 
that SOEs should make – that is, whether acquisitions by SOEs should be socially 
driven or profit driven. For example, in the 11th FYP, SOEs were encouraged to be 
economically viable enough to sustain themselves so that their everyday operations 
were not on the bankroll of local governments or state banks (Wildau, 2016). As per 
the 11th FYP, other than the GDP quantifiable target of 7.5%, the plan did not name 
any specific high priority sectors to be developed. The plan did, however, focus on 
M&A as an essential mode of OFDI in order for China to gain more exposure to 
international markets (Worldbank, 2009). Resultantly, SOEs pursued cross-border 
M&A targets in various diverse sectors in a bid to fulfill the state’s GDP quota. 
Participants expressed how during this period, meeting SOE profitability targets was 
of especially high importance. SOE would be assigned aggressive profit-driven 
targets; wherein the only viable source to meet the assigned aggressive performance 
targets was to conduct a lucrative cross-border M&As i.e., acquiring an existing 
profitable cross-border target.  
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“… they (the state) would say I would like to see the SOE revenue grow 50% or I 
like to see the revenue double. Or they would say I would like to see 10 or 20% of 
your revenue come from international sources. So it’s really hard for a company to 
grow a business that fast so you’ve got to buy and acquire something…” 
                 (Participant J4, Shanghai, M&A brokerage) 
 
Having said this, currently in the 13th FYP, the social aspect of SOEs has now 
returned, to a greater degree than before. The tone and prerogative of SOEs are now 
viewed as playing the role of workshops collaborating as units to support the big 
national "factory" (Li & Brødsgaard, 2013). For example, encouraged acquisitions of 
coal mines that are essential to meet the growing energy demands of the Chinese 
population. As per Chapter 2, several large cross-border acquisitions of natural 
resource mines by SOEs were observed and reflected this aspect. For example, the 
acquisition of Australia’s Felix Resources for $2.9 billion in 2009 by Yanzhou Coal 
Mining Co Ltd; and Anglo American (Brazil) for $1.7 billion in 2016 by China 
Molybdenum.  
 
However, at the same time, the social obligations of SOEs greatly hinder their 
profitability, particularly in the case of natural resources. The acquisitions of these 
resources are a fundamental component of many other SOE industries. For example, 
the dependency on coal is needed for steel and chemical manufacturing. Thus the 
price of coal is influenced by the state and, kept artificially low as a subsidy to such 
SOEs. Resultantly, these coal-related SOEs are unable to sell coal domestically at 
market rates. 
 
"Of course for the government they want them to make a profit, if they can't make a 
profit it's a financial burden for the government and for all the people in China. But 
we can see the problem for the national SOEs, they also need to take responsibility 
like social responsibility and other things. I can give you an example of coal price, 
they are a state-owned company and buy many mines overseas, if they sell coal at 
the spot market price, then they will get a much higher price, but they are an SOE 
and the government does not let them to sell the coal at the market price because … 
if the coal price too high, then the factories will have too high price to produce steel 
or cement so they need to control the coal price, because this is the fundamental 
price for many products so they need to control many factors and then they will 
decide the price.  This is only one example, but you can apply this to all the SOEs 
companies in China." 
                       (Participant L1, Shanghai, M&A consultant) 
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Other participants have pointed out that due to social obligations to secure resources 
for the domestic market, China does not make the best overseas M&A deals. An 
example was given by a participant was how China’s initial lack of international 
M&A experience, resulted in the acquisition of a mine that remains un-operational 
several years on; this is not uncommon, with Robins (2013) pointing out that these 
acquisitions should not be viewed as “failures.” This is because SOEs do not work 
under typical timeframes. With the substantial backing of the central government, 
these acquisitions are treated as long-term strategic deals that need to be undertaken 
in the national interest (Zhang, Morse, & Kambhamptati, 2014). As China does not 
have sufficient raw materials to meet domestic demand, these acquisitions are less 
profit-driven; and more focused on self-sufficiency and decreasing dependency on 
trade partners. 
 
(2) Subcategory 4.2 The SOE paradox: Undeniable influence yet a challenge to 
engage 
 
This research found that SOEs are faced with a paradox when it comes to their 
global reputation. Firstly, they are greatly respected by their global peers and in the 
international cross-border M&A market. It is argued that they are respected for their 
size and the political power that these SOEs hold as a result of the state connections. 
National level SOEs are organizations that have a very strong presence both 
domestically and internationally. According to the Global 500 (2018) ranking of the 
top 500 organizations in the world that is compiled and published annually by 
Fortune, the following could be observed:  
 
- Three Chinese SOEs are within the top 5 world’s largest organizations in 
terms of revenue. They are: State Grid (ranked 2nd with revenue of $348,903 
million), Sinopec (ranked 3rd with revenue of $326,953 million), and China 
national petroleum corporation (CNPC) (ranked 4th with revenue of $326,008 
million)  
 
- Seven Chinese SOEs are within the top 20 world’s largest organizations in 
terms of employees. Including the big four state banks. SOEs include: CNPC 
(ranked 2nd with 1,470,193 employees), State Grid (ranked 3rd with 913, 546 
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employees), Sinopec (ranked 5th with 667,793 employees), Agricultural Bank 
of China (ranked 8th with 491,578 employees), ICBC (ranked 10th with 
453,048 employees), China Construction Bank (ranked 13th with 370,415 
employees), Bank of China (ranked 18th 311,133 employees).  
 
Participants argued that SOEs are viewed as essentially extremely large state-backed 
organizations to the point that when dealing with an SOE, it is effectively akin to 
dealing with a government representative and member of the Communist party. This 
is supported by Yu (2014) who highlighted that SOEs are not just treated as a pillar 
of the Chinese economy but also a critical component of the communist party. The 
party’s continuing influence on M&As also means SOEs have access to a 
considerable amount of resources. Particularly when it comes to bidding on M&A 
deals. Due to the availability of favorable financing, SOEs are able to adopt a more 
aggressive bidding strategy (Hope et al., 2011). It was found that Chinese SOEs have 
a reputation of overpaying for M&A targets, primarily because of their ability to 
attain substantial cheap financing. This has meant overseas targets in some cases 
specifically seek to be acquired Chinese SOEs due to their ‘reputation’ for 
overpaying. This is supported by Chatzkel & Ng (2013) who agrees that SOEs 
receive significant support from the central authorities and mainly financial support 
from the state banks. The same theme was echoed by Nolan (2010), an account was 
given of an M&A deal wherein a Chinese state bank was quoted asking the SOE 
“how much do you want? $10 billion, $20 billion?” When the Chinese SOE 
Chinalco acquired a 12% stake of Rio Tinto in 2009, Chinalco at the time was close 
to bankruptcy. Despite this, the big four Chinese state banks agreed to lend the SOE 
$21 billion - at a very low-interest rate (Robins, 2013).  This type of lending is only 
possible and unique to the Chinese context. Chinese state banks are SOEs and are 
treated as a division of the central government, and the lending is considered 
imperative for China to carry out its long-term development plans (Yao, 2009). Even 
the former president at the Bank of China Li Lihui explained that the party had an 
essential role in the bank’s business strategies because displaying loyalty to the state 
was very important (Li & Brødsgaard, 2013). 
 
As a result of the aggressive acquisition strategy, resulting from state support and 
backing of the central government, Chinese SOEs have been able to increase their 
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global footprint in many key industries. Particularly in the energy sector, SOEs such 
as Sinopec, State Grid, and CNPC have certainly obtained notable global influence. 
 
“Everyone wants the Chinese to be part of the conversation, they are taken 
incredibly seriously because they are massive and they are growing. They are just 
huge companies especially in the energy sector. CNOOC, CNCP, Sinopec, all these 
companies are huge conglomerates and they acquire a lot and spend a lot of money. 
For the other oil companies like ExxonMobil, it’s the SOEs are who they want to 
meet.”     
                              (Participant J2, Geneva, M&A consultant) 
 
Thus on the one hand, the state influence has allowed SOEs to obtain increased 
global importance and international respect. However, on the other hand, the top-
down bureaucratic guarantee on the M&A process has also resulted in SOEs being 
characterized as challenging and difficult to work with. In the case of the M&A 
process, participants highlighted the necessity of obtaining state approval at every 
stage of the M&A process. It was argued that the embedded nature of the state in the 
M&A process has made the process far too onerous and unnecessarily difficult 
(Sauvant & Chen, 2014). Moreover, the lack of transparency and bureaucratic 
hurdles involved often results in considerable uncertainty during the cross-border 
deals. The need to obtain approval from various state agencies considerably delays 
the M&A process to the extent that this can directly derail negotiations and breaks 
deals. The ongoing compulsory approval required by SOEs from state agencies 
illustrates the constrained autonomy that SOEs have, and moreover highlights the 
inefficient dynamics between the state and the SOEs during the cross-border M&A 
process. 
 
“So some Chinese companies they can begin the process of a M&A but in the 
middle of the process they disappear, they don't answer any calls or don't send a 
non-binding offer so people are a little skeptical of the acquisitions by Chinese 
companies” 
                       (Participant M2, Santiago, M&A advisory) 
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6.3.3 Research area 5: Interaction between the national level and the 
individual level in the formal institution: 
6.3.3.1 Theoretical category 5: Strategically appointed managers by state 
 
This research found that there are very close ties between SOEs and the state party. 
It was highlighted that senior SOE managers are strategically placed and allocated 
by SASAC whilst the chairman/SOE leader is assigned by the state party. As per the 
SASAC website, it is seen that the number of centrally control SOEs, i.e., the 
national SOEs that are under direct management by SASAC is a total of 96 (SASAC, 
2018). It was pointed out that, as the most significant shareholder of SOEs, SASAC 
has to select all senior managers/ key personnel of SOEs (at least those ranked at the 
department level). However, leaders/top-level executives and the chairman of an 
SOE are selected by the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China. 
This is a Central Committee that controls the staffing positions within the party and 
has the power to veto the appointees made by SASAC (Brødsgaard et al., 2017). 
From this, it is evident SOE senior managers and chairpersons of the national SOEs 
are under considerable political control. Thus, it is argued that even at the individual 
level, the behavior of SOEs leaders are highly influenced by the state and 
consequently SOEs leaders acting as agents of the state.  
 
“SASAC appoints and removes the top executives of the supervised enterprises, and 
evaluates their performances through legal procedures. It either grants rewards or 
inflicts penalties based on their performance, establishes a corporate executives 
selection system in accordance with the requirements of the socialist market 
economy system, and improve incentives and restraints systems for corporate 
management.” 54 
 
 Leutert (2018) stated that the party governs the top leaders of the largest and most 
strategic SOEs, i.e., the backbone SOEs. This research found that the state party is 
involved in this process because it is fundamental for the party to be able to ensure 
that their principles are implemented. Resultantly, this further ensures that all cross-
border M&As are in line and supportive of state plans. The implementation of the 
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state mandate can only be guaranteed if the party selects the best possible candidates 
to be placed in key positions within SOEs. Robins (2013) argues that by specifically 
appointing key people, the party can therefore monitor and supervise SOEs. This 
theme was also echoed by participants who explained that the appointment of SOE 
leadership positions ensures that the execution of national policies, development 
plans, and resultant cross-border M&As fall in-line with state wishes. From this, it is 
clear that SOEs in China differ from SOEs in other countries. In China, the role of 
the state is not just that of an owner, but the state is also responsible for ensuring that 
SOEs follow and carry out top-down commands.  
 
Jones & Zou (2017) highlighted that the reason for the Organization Department 
appointing the national level SOEs’ top management, is because these positions are 
treated as stepping-stones to higher political positions. Knowing this, SOE leaders 
are therefore incentivized to comply with the policies set out by the party leaders 
(Thomas & Price, 2016). Moreover, as the state council has handpicked and 
specifically placed the individual into the leadership position, it would reflect poorly 
on the state and the party if an SOE manager fails to perform. Therefore, there is a 
lot at stake to ensure the best candidate (i.e., an ally to the political faction best 
placed to comply with state mandates) is selected (Choi, 2012). This research also 
found that despite political appointments, the vast majority of C-level managers of 
SOEs are all competent individuals. It was also highlighted that despite the specific 
political appointment, the majority of SOE chairmen have built their entire careers 
working their way up through SOEs and are “state-owned industry careerists” 
(Leuter, 2018). Therefore, it is aruged that these SOE managers/ leaders are 
politically shrewd, and equally are very capable of conducting successful cross-
border M&As fully complicit with national strategies and party objectives. 
 
(1) Subcategory 5.1 Cross-border M&A for career leverage 
 
This research also expressed that SOE managers are incentivized to be ambitious due 
to the potential political rewards. They have an acute awareness that the elite party 
members will determine their career advancements, thus further highlighting the top-
down influence. The promotion of key personnel can be attributed to the fact that 
SOE managers are politically astute externally and business savvy internally (Li & 
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Brødsgaard, 2013). Therefore, SOE managers are keen to partake in cross-border 
M&A because it is an opportunity for the SOE manager to increase SOE profitability, 
and to exhibit their ability to the state party. This is supported by Yang, Wang, & 
Nie (2013) and Thomas & Price (2016) who illustrated that despite the specific 
political appointment, SOE top-level executives are motivated to encourage the best 
possible financial performance from their SOE; and improve economic performance, 
i.e., growth of operating revenue highly increases the chance of managerial 
promotion.  
 
It is argued by this research that once managers reach leadership level, they will 
become increasingly more ambitious. Using cross-border M&As is in most cases one 
of the most effective methods for SOE managers to have leverage to further their 
political careers. It was found that for a political promotion, it comes down to the 
level of ambition of the chairman/number one/party secretary of the SOE. If the 
individual has high political aspirations, then the individual will look to undertake 
cross-border M&As to both increase their SOE economic performance, and also, 
create a successful track record to enhance their political reputation. In this case, the 
motivation for undertaking an M&A and driving profitable performance is driven by 
personal gain, i.e. political ambition. An example of this is former Sinopec chairman 
Su Shulin. Su was Sinopec’s chairman from 2007 – 2011; under Su's leadership, 
Sinopec undertook several overseas acquisitions including the high profile 
acquisitions of Swiss-based Addax Petroleum in 2009 for $ 7.24 billion (Hagett, 
2009). At that time, it was the largest ever cross-border oil related acquisition by 
China. The rationale for the acquisition was to secure land in West Africa which was 
licensed for oil exploration and extraction (Sinopec, 2011). Shortly after this 
acquisition, Su Shilin was promoted to governor of the Fujian province (Potkin, 
2018).  
 
SOE managers are trusted with the great responsibility of acting on behalf of the 
Chinese people. Deals must be viewed by the central party as beneficial to China and 
within the parameters of China’s national development plans. Repercussion for bad 
M&A decisions includes disciplinary action by the party’s Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection (Brødsgaard et al., 2017). Jones & Zou (2017) stated that the 
SOE leaders are bound to a three-year performance contract linked to individual 
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performance by SASAC. Performance standards are related to financial indicators of 
the SOE. This includes growth in revenue and profitability (Brødsgaard et al., 2017). 
Additionally, losses incurred by the SOE are a matter of whether a manager gets 
promoted or not (Thomas & Price, 2016). Therefore, given that their political career 
could be at risk, M&A targets are now far better thought out than previous M&A 
cross-border experiences. An interesting example given by participants to illustrate 
the power of the state party is the recent ChemChina – Syngenta deal in 2017. It 
seemingly appeared that ChemChina chairman Ren Jianxin was acting to secure a 
safe food supply for China. However, it was pointed out by a participant that it was 
not Ren’s intention to make this China's largest outbound M&A in history (a $44 
billion acquisition). It was highlighted that the deal “got out of hand” and ended up 
becoming too big to fail because Ren promised Syngenta a USD$3 billion breakup 
fee without consulting SASAC first. SASAC were displeased with what they 
perceived as ChemChina risking USD $3 billion worth of public money and forcing 
the state into this position. Resultantly, because of not consulting and gaining 
approval from SASAC, once the deal was finalized, the central party forced the 
ChemChina CEO into retirement. 
 
6.4 Theoretical development  
 
In applying the dynamics of the institution to the Chinese context, this research 
argues that the beliefs that underpin the objective and concept of China’s 
rejuvenation present within the informal institution can profoundly influence the 
formal institution at the national level. This can be observed in the state plans 
wherein the central government has openly declared the dreams of a new and 
excellent China. Subsequently, these formal plans are directed to China's SOEs who 
are essentially an extension of the central state itself. The close relationship between 
the state and the SOEs is further highlighted by the specific appointment of SOEs 
top-level leaders, which is both led and decided by the state council. The direct ties 
between the party and the SOEs ensure that the central government can enforce 
formal state mandates at each level, therefore ensuring that the fundamental 
objective of restoring China to its former glory is carried out.  
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In assisting to reach this conclusion, the following section will firstly discuss the 
conventional institutional view at the national, organizational, and individual levels 
(section 6.4.1). The formal/informal interactions of China’s institutional context and 
the Chinese M&A context will then be presented in section 6.4.2 - 6.4.3 as a 
comparison to the conventional institutional perspective. Lastly, a summary of the 
proposed theoretical framework as obtained through the results of this research will 
be presented in the conclusion section 6.5.  
 
6.4.1 The interaction between formal and informal institutions at 
national, organizational and individual level: Conventional 
institutional theory view 
 
From Figure 6.1, it can be seen that in response to external environmental changes, 
the informal institution can influence societal change through what the cognitive 
mindset perceives as the norm. This new behavioral change is then institutionalized 
by the formal institution and is subsequently legitimized by the societal jurisdiction 
through new rules, policies, and guidelines (Webb et al., 2009).   
 
Institutional change in the conventional sense can originate at an individual level 
within the informal institution. An individual who envisions a new institution as a 
means to advance their interest (i.e., an institutional entrepreneur) can exploit new 
opportunities to that are outside of the formal institution (Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006). This is commonly seen in emerging economies where the formal institution is 
weak and enjoy less trust, therefore allowing institutional entrepreneurs to legitimize 
their actions more easily (Thai & Turkina, 2014). At the organizational level within 
the informal institution, when the informal behaviour and activities are adopted by a 
group of members (informal organizations) within society, this creates an informal 
economy (Webb et al., 2013). If enough members of society perceive the use of the 
informal economy as legitimate, this can ultimately provide enough support and 
popularity to instigate formal institutional change (Lee & Hung, 2014). Thus, in 
driving institutional changes, informal organizations have to achieve legitimacy and 
legitimize the meaning of their informal activity (Pejovich, 1999). At the national 
level, as the formal institution acts to constrict what is formally perceived as 
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acceptable behaviour, the actions and behaviour of the informal institution are 
technically deemed outside legal boundaries (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, 
the informal institution at the national level can encourage the government to re-
address new societal beliefs by creating new rules and new institutional norms 
(North, 1994). Thereby formally institutionalizing the actions of the informal 
institution. 
 
6.4.2 The interaction between formal and informal institutions at 
national, organizational and individual level: Chinese SOE context 
 
From Figure 6.2, the relationship between the formal and informal institution can be 
observed at three levels – the national level (central government), the organizational 
level (the SOEs), and the individual level (the SOEs top-level manager). It can also 
be seen that the beliefs and values of China's informal institution, i.e., the collective 
dream of rejuvenating a strong China is institutionalized into China's formal 
institution at the national level. The core values and beliefs are formally 
institutionalized through policies, regulations, and principles. The formal institution 
restricts and sets the boundaries of how SOEs should behave and limits how they can 
act.  Moreover, as the central government is the ultimate manager of SOEs, it is also 
argued that the informal institutional values at the national level are also infused into 
those of the SOEs. In this case, the SOEs are extensions of the central government 
and therefore are considered as strategic instruments to fulfill formal state plans 
(Nordin & Weissmann, 2018). The importance of SOEs to the party can be observed 
in the Chinese pillar industries. These industries are considered to be of strategic 
significance to state plans and thus are heavily influenced by the agenda of the 
central state (Brødsgaard et al., 2017). Consequently, the organizations within these 
industries are predominately only SOEs, and remain under the watchful eye of the 
state.  At the individual level, SOE top-level leader positions are directly appointed 
by the state council, and SOE senior managers are specifically appointed by SASAC 
(Brødsgaard et al., 2017). These top-level SOE positions such as that of a chairman 
correspond to the minster level rankings within the Communist party (Leutert, 2018). 
Thus it is argued that SOE managers are inherently political figures themselves, and 
will therefore share the same informal beliefs as the central state party. 
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The formal institution is directed in a top-down fashion by the central government. 
Throughout this process, the central government ensures that at every level, the 
informal institution is kept consistent (Zhao, 2005). At the individual level, 
organizational level, and national level, everybody shares the same national pride 
while also having the vision of China's rejuvenation in common. Without ensuring 
the consistent shared belief at every level, the central government would not be able 
to direct the formal institution firmly nor would it be able to guarantee that the state 
mandate of restoring China’s excellence is achieved. From this, whilst the 
institutional change in the conventional theory originates from the individual level, 
however, institutional change occurs in the reverse direction in the China context. 
That is, change is directed from the national level to the organizational and 
individual level respectively in a top-down fashion. 
 
6.4.3 The interaction between formal and informal institutions at 
national, organizational and individual level: Chinese SOEs’ cross-
border M&A context   
 
Shown in Figure 6.3 is the application of the formal and informal institution to the 
SOE cross-border M&A context. The formal institution can respond to the external 
changes such as the deepening of economic reforms as long as the central party is 
considered legitimized. The state, therefore, needs to justify any formal changes by 
ensuring the informal institution is constant, i.e., reinforcing the ultimate goal of 
national rejuvenation. For as long as Chinese society shares the same cognitive 
beliefs and has faith in the state, any formal institutional changes that the central 
government undertakes will not cause political or social instability in the country 
(Gries et al., 2011). 
 
Based on state plans, targets are assigned to SOEs. Given that the state oversees all 
SOE activities, the state can, therefore, ensure that the national goal of rejuvenation 
is carried out. Moreover, the state can directly ensure state plans are fulfilled by 
regulating what cross-border M&As are approved. State agencies are also tasked 
with vetting the M&A deals to ensure that only those deals within the parameters of 
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the state plans are approved. Should an SOE want to pursue a cross-border target, the 
M&A process requires the SOE to receive approval from the state agencies SASAC, 
NDRC, and MOFCOM (Jones & Zou, 2017). Without approval, the SOE cannot 
perform the M&A. Furthermore, as the RMB is not a freely convertible currency, the 
SOE will need to obtain foreign currency through the SAFE agency which will not 
be permitted unless the necessary approval is in place. As a result of these 
administrative requirements, SOEs need to specifically ensure that all deals are 
within the parameters of state plans. Current state-backed projects actively pursued 
by SOEs include Made in China 2025 and One Belt One Road.    
 
As mentioned in section 6.4.2 the close association of SOEs to the state is evident in 
how the party specifically appoints the chairman of the SOEs and how SASAC 
purposefully select the SOE senior managers. This approach to leadership 
appointment further illustrates how the formal institution is directed in a top-down 
fashion even at the individual level and further goes to highlight the influence of the 
state on all levels of the SOE. Upon successful management of their SOE, these SOE 
managers are usually rewarded with a political promotion (Leutert, 2018). This 
tendency or unwritten rule is a key motivator for SOE management to pursue 
lucrative cross-border M&As in an effort to increase SOEs assets. A successful 
M&A deal within the boundaries of the state plans will act as sufficient leverage for 
a political promotion. As a result, there will be a lack of incentives for the SOE 
managers to deviate from what is outlined by the formal institution. Consequently, 
this ensures that appointed SOE managers are the best candidates to fulfill the state 
mandate. From the above, it can be seen that the informal belief is consistent 
throughout all three levels of the Chinese economy, by ensuring this; it acts to 
guarantee that the formal institutional objective of the national rejuvenation of China 
can be achieved.  
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Figure 6.1.  Conceptual framework illustrating the direction of institutional change between the informal and formal institution at the national, organizational, 
and individual level: A conventional perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
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Figure 6.2.  A China-specific conceptual framework illustrating the top-down formal institutional directive between central government (national level), SOEs 
(organizational level), and SOE managers (individual level). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
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Figure 6.3. A China-specific conceptual framework illustrating the complete dynamic of the 
informal and formal institutional on the central government (national level), SOEs 
(organizational level), and SOE managers (individual level) - with the resultant outcome of 
cross-border M&As.  
Source: Constructed by the author 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
Figure 6.4 illustrates a proposed China-specific conceptual framework which 
highlights the relationship between informal and formal institutions across national 
(State), organizational (SOEs) and individual (SOE leaders) levels during a SOEs' 
cross-border M&A process.  As per Figure 6.4, the findings of this thesis underscore 
a ubiquitous informal belief in the concept of rejuvenating China. Collective belief 
in rejuvenation stems from the informal institution and is rooted in Chinese values; 
subsequently playing a part in motivating SOEs to undertake cross-border M&As.  
This shared hope for rejuvenation, directly facilitates the state’s top-down delivery 
of related objectives to the SOEs and subsequently, SOE leaders.  
 
The formal institutionalization of this belief can be observed through China's desire 
for greater international influence and the need for greater resource security/self-
sufficiency. Subsequently, the belief of national rejuvenation is actively pursued 
through many government-led cross-border M&As. This includes formal policies 
and initiatives as mapped out by state national development plans. Example policies 
include; 1) the promotion of the One Belt One Road initiative to facilitate China's 
global trade position and 2) the upgrading of China's manufacturing sector, in-line 
with the Made in China 2025 initiative. All cross-border M&A activity by the SOEs 
is directed at accomplishing state targets and complying with the state policies. 
Therefore, it is argued that all M&A activity is highly selective based on what is led 
by formal state mandate. This is further supported by the fact that all cross-border 
deals are now under greater scrutiny by state agencies and only those deals that fall 
within the boundaries of the state plans will gain approval.  
 
In order to further ensure that the objectives of national rejuvenation are fulfilled at 
the organizational level, state targets set by the state council are formally directed to 
SOEs. Due to the proximity of SOEs to the party, it is argued that the behaviour of 
SOEs is highly influenced by the state, and thus essentially, SOEs are organizational 
agents to the state. However, once targets are allocated to an SOE, and the state 
council has laid out national development plans, the SOE has relative autonomy in 
how it may choose to approach achieving these targets. However, all intentions and 
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proposed strategies must be documented to SASAC at the start of the year including 
details of planned cross-border M&As. Therefore, it is argued that the SOE does 
have autonomy, albeit constrained by boundaries set out in state plans.  
 
Finally, the state ensures mandates are carried out at the individual level by having 
authority over the appointment of key SOE personnel and management. This 
underscores the top-down influence – at an individual level – of the state, as it 
directly facilitates state influence and control over SOE leadership. For example, the 
chairman of an SOE is specifically chosen by the Organization Department of the 
Communist Party of China, whilst SOE top-level managers are selected by SASAC. 
Therefore, SOE key personnel selection is a strategic and political decision, 
implemented to ensure that state plans are carried out (by the best possible candidate 
to closely follow the state directives). SOE managers are also politically driven 
individuals with career aspirations that extend beyond their respective SOE. SOE 
leaders are also politically astute and well aware of how the party can influence their 
future aspirations. To this end, SOE leaders will proactively seek to undertake high-
quality M&A deals well aligned with the state plans. As this will not just increase 
their SOEs revenue and profits, it will also gain them the positive state recognition 
required for later political advancement. Therefore, it is argued that cross-border 
M&As can also be motivated by personal political gain in addition to being driven 
by more clear objectives such as direct economic benefits and, fulfillment of state 
mandates.  
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Figure 6.4. A proposed China-specific relationship between informal and formal institutions across the national (State), organizational (SOEs), and individual 
(SOE leaders) levels during the cross-border M&As process by SOEs.' 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
 
 
 
 
 201 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
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7.1 Introduction  
 
As a result of illustrating the dynamics of the informal and formal institution in the 
context of China, this research was able to explore the underlying motivations 
driving cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) undertaken by Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). These motivations were assessed at the national, 
organizational, and individual level. In this closing chapter, the key findings of this 
thesis will be summarized, and a conclusion will be put forth.  
In addition to the conclusive findings of this thesis, this chapter also includes a 
discussion outlining how this research has contributed to the field of cross-border 
M&A in terms of the literature and methodological implications. Moving on, the 
direct institutional policy implications of this research will be examined, and 
suggestions will be made as to how new policies could be implemented at a national 
and organizational level. In the last section of this chapter, the possible limitations of 
this research will be considered, and finally, the future directions that can be 
explored as a result of this research will be examined. 
 
7.2 Main findings  
 
 
This research started with two research questions and, two corresponding research 
objectives, which this research set out to answer.  
1) To answer the first research question of this thesis; “What are the distinctive 
features of the institutionalization process in the China specific context?” it required 
an assessment of the significance of China’s informal institution, and the motivations 
that drive the national rejuvenation initiative. It was illustrated that the institutional 
change in China was directed in a top-down fashion, contrary to the conventional 
bottom-up approach frequently observed in much of the literature. To thoroughly 
highlight these findings, a China-specific framework outlining the dynamics between 
the formal and informal institutions was developed. 
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Upon developing a China-specific conceptual framework, it was found that the 
informal belief of national rejuvenation is deeply ingrained in China’s social values. 
To this end, this belief has been institutionalized into China’s formal institution at a 
national level. As a result of the consistency of this informal belief across society, 
the state can smoothly direct cross-border M&As in a top-down fashion. That is, the 
state is able to command formal institutional change by directing the objectives of 
national rejuvenation to the SOEs and SOE managers respectively. Evidently, the 
formal institutionalization of the informal value of national rejuvenation can be 
reflected through China’s formal objectives; namely, China is striving to attain 
greater international influence, and greater natural resource security/self-sufficiency. 
 
2) The second research question of this thesis; “How does the Chinese-style 
institutionalization process facilitate the unique characteristics of cross-border 
M&A activities by Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs)?” required a strategy that 
leveraged the grounded theory approach. On following this qualitative research 
methodology using of semi-structured interviews with various China M&A industry 
elites; the impact of the informal institution in driving the formal institution to 
pursue cross-border M&A activity at the national, organizational, and individual 
level was established. 
 
Key findings at the national level include establishing that cross-border M&A 
undertaken by SOEs are governed by state-directed formal policies. Of which are 
then directed at the SOEs to fulfill. Resultantly, cross-border M&As are highly 
influenced by what is guided by the state plans. Supported by Chapter 2, secondary 
data was collected from the Zephyr M&A database, and analyzed over a 15-year 
period (2002 – 2016). This chapter illustrated how the formal institution, through 
state policies, regulations, guidelines, and targets facilitated the outcome of cross-
border M&As conducted by SOEs. Transactions were analyzed according to their 
region (continent and country level) and industry distribution, in addition to being 
sorted according to the total number of deals and transaction value. Notable findings 
from the descriptive data aligned with the state mandate set out in the Made in China 
2025 strategy, One Belt One Road, natural resources, and an increased focus on 
technology M&A targets. Thus, it is indicative that M&A deals are now 
considerably more selected and conducted to serve a specific purpose. This is further 
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evident in that all cross-border deals now fall under increased scrutiny and instructed 
to be vetted based on the guidelines of the state directive. Subsequently, those deals 
in-line with the state plans such as One Belt One Road or Made in China 2025 
related will receive preferential approval by the state agencies (State-owned assets 
supervision and administration commission – SASAC; National development and 
reform commission – NDRC; Ministry of commerce – MOFCOM; and State 
administration of foreign exchange - SAFE).  
Findings at the organizational level included, a better understanding of how SOEs 
are acting as agents of the state; in serving the state in this way, SOEs can ensure 
that formal party mandates, such as that of national rejuvenation, are properly carried 
out. This point underscores the influence that state has over SOEs, particularly in the 
context of Chinese cross-border M&A. That said, it was also established as a result 
of this research, that SOEs do have some autonomy with respect to determining how 
they set out to achieve specific objectives. However, this autonomy is conditional on 
the SOE working within the clearly defined boundaries of state plans. Because of the 
influence the state has on SOEs activity, their international reputation is often 
conflicting. That is, on the one hand, SOE's can't be ignored due to their undeniable 
global influence and importance; while on the other hand, and in the context of 
M&A, SOEs are documented as being difficult to work and engage. This is directly 
because of the states' involvement in the cross-border M&A process, noted to 
contribute to a perceived lack of transparency, cumbersome bureaucratic hurdles and, 
delays. 
Concerning the findings at the individual level, it was discovered that the state can 
further ensure the fulfillment of national rejuvenation related objectives, by taking 
charge of the recruitment of top-level SOE managers. It was noted that the chairman 
of an SOE is specifically chosen by the Organization Department of the Communist 
Party of China, while other top-level SOE managers are selected by SASAC. The 
state is involved in the appointment of key personnel as a means to ensure that the 
best candidates are selected and, more importantly, to support the smooth 
implementation of state mandates directly from inside the SOE. It was concluded 
that the actions of SOE leaders are politically influenced. Specifically, it was also 
noted that these leaders are incentivized by the prospect of political career 
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advancement. Indeed, successful deals would serve to highlight the managerial and 
political merit of a manager to the party and thus, often result in the advancement of 
their political career. 
 
7.3 Major contributions  
7.3.1 Contributions to literature  
 
This research has contributed to the body of literature on cross-border M&As in the 
China-specific context through 3 areas.  
 
Firstly, there is limited literature that purposefully applies the institutional theory in 
the China context, and less focused on Chinese cross-border M&A specifically. For 
example, the highlighted institutional and political economy effects were based on 
OFDI in a general sense (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Buckley et al., 2007; Luo, Xue, 
& Han, 2010), with no specific mention of the mode of OFDI or effects on cross-
border M&A in China. Therefore previous literature has been limited in explanatory 
power in terms of purely explaining the institutional motivations of cross-border 
M&A in China. This research therefore contributes to the literature by demonstrating 
the use of a China-specific institutional framework, exclusively applicable to the 
institutional theory in the context of cross-border M&A. 
 
Secondly, existing cross-border M&A literature has been more focused on 
explaining the cross-border M&A phenomena from the perspective of Chinese firms, 
with limited research documenting the exclusive perspective of SOEs. Specifically, a 
great deal of the prevailing M&A literature involves studies underpinned by data 
comprised of both state and, non-state enterprises (Du & Boateng, 2015; Schweizer, 
Walker, & Zhang, 2017; Zhang & Mauck, 2018). By having a dataset that is 
comprised of both state and non-state enterprises, researchers have therefore 
previously classified the M&A motivations of SOEs the same as conventional 
organizations, i.e., with autonomy to dictate their own M&A activity. This is not the 
case in the China context.  
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This research found that Chinese SOEs are organizational agents of the state, 
directed by state mandates with a strong responsibility to complete government 
objectives. Thus it is argued that the motivation to conduct cross-border M&As, is 
not simply only from the organizational level (as conventional M&A literature has 
assumed) - rather the motivation is also deeply embedded with the state. Moreover, 
the state also appoints SOE managers, thereby further influencing the behaviour of 
top SOE personnel, thus illustrating state influence at even the individual level. This 
research has therefore contributed to the existing institutional cross-border M&A 
literature, by undertaking an institutional analysis and highlighting the embedded 
nature of the state on cross-border M&A activity at the national, organizational, and 
individual level.  
 
Lastly, there is a limited body of literature that is able to explain how the 
significance of China’s past historical achievements, national pride and identity, 
drives the collective desire to achieve national rejuvenation. Previous literature such 
as that of Hope, Thomas, & Vyas (2011) and Chatzkel & Ng, (2013), illustrated the 
significance of pride in the valuation and bidding process of cross-border M&As 
undertaken by Chinese firms. This stream of research asserted that pride could result 
in premium bids, and therefore observed pride from the perspective of ‘ego' or ‘face.' 
This is contrary to the findings of this thesis, which established that pride is a tacit 
quality inherent to the Chinese identity. This research argues that it is these inherent 
tacit qualities that motivate SOEs to pursue cross-border M&As deals that will serve 
the overarching goal of national rejuvenation. It is therefore contended that the 
existing literature overlooks the significance of the informal institution in 
influencing the formal institution to motivate cross-border M&As. The informal 
institution is greatly influential in shaping the outlook of the state, SOEs, and key 
SOE personnel. This research has contributed to M&A literature by including the 
effects of China’s intrinsic and intangible properties that are influential to the 
informal institution. Subsequently, these properties drive the formal outlook of the 
state, SOEs and, SOE managerial behavior, therefore directly influencing the 
outcome of cross-border M&A activity.  
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7.3.2 Methodological contributions 
 
This thesis adopted a qualitative approach to research and, it is argued that in doing 
so has contributed to the prevailing field of cross-border M&A research. So far, 
cross-border M&A research has predominately taken a quantitative approach to 
collect data, with qualitative studies – particularly those leveraging semi-structured 
interviews – being limited in comparison. This thesis argues that this is because of 
the following challenges; 1) finding SOE personnel willing to discuss the topic of 
cross-border M&As and; 2) relevant SOE personnel being granted permission to 
discuss these topics openly. Indeed, in the event of securing an interview with an 
SOE manager, the close state ties highlighted in this research, make the task of 
obtaining reliable, high-quality information difficult. In addition, due to the sensitive 
and often confidential nature of cross-border M&A targets in China, a degree of 
personal risk is involved. Therefore, SOE personnel are cautious in disclosing 
information and, are typically reluctant to participate in interviews.   
 
Through broadening the scope of interview participants, this research managed to 
obtain 32 in-depth interviews covering 26 different national level SOEs. Elite 
interviews were conducted with China experts with extensive knowledge of Chinese 
SOEs and, direct experience with SOE led cross-border M&A deals. 55  Undertaking 
elite interviews provided the opportunity to attain a unique insight into the SOE 
cross-border M&A phenomenon using an external perspective. Specifically, it 
provided a distinctive viewpoint, which directly contributed to the originality of this 
research. Should an elite interview approach not been conducted (with interviews 
with SOE personnel as the alternative), the outcome of this research would have 
been vastly different. This is because SOEs themselves are notoriously private, and 
the high-quality interviews with industry elites used by this research was only made 
possible as a result of several years of meticulous relationship cultivation and trust 
building. It is argued that because this thesis is underpinned by data collected from 
independent and unbiased individuals, the resulting collected insights are both rich 
                                                 
55 Industry experts included China-focused M&A consultants, M&A analysts, M&A advisories, and 
M&A brokers, who hold senior positions within well-established multinational organizations. All the 
participants have extensive knowledge of the Chinese business environment, SOE operations, and the 
cross-border M&A process. 
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and authentic. This assertion is supported, when the degree of trust between the 
researcher and interview participants, is considered. That is, because of this mutual 
trust participants were willing to speak openly, candidly and, in-depth on the nature 
of the Chinese institution, the behaviour of SOEs and, their motivations for 
undertaking cross-border M&As. 
 
Concerning the focus of this research – the dynamics of the informal and formal 
institution in the Chinese context, it critical to undertake a qualitative approach using 
in-depth interviews. This research involved many tacit and intangible elements, 
which are unique to the Chinese context. This includes the concept of national 
identity, the belief in rejuvenation, and a China-specific top-down approach to 
institutionalization. Should a quantitative approach have been adopted to undertake 
this study, these tacit, China-specific elements could not have been easily 
documented; consequently, an important component of Chinese motivation to 
conduct M&A would remain poorly understood. Therefore, it is argued that using in-
depth interviews with the rich, first-hand experience of interview participants, the 
effects of the Chinese institution on cross-border M&A can be captured in full. 
 
7.3.3 Policy implications 
 
There are four policy implications that this research has uncovered. The first and 
second implications are for the central government and SOEs/SOE managers 
respectively. The third and fourth implications are for the cross-border targets, from 
the perspective of the target country and, the target organization.  
 
(1) Firstly, this research has adopted an institutional approach to conclude that all 
levels of society share the same underlying belief in the concept of national 
rejuvenation. This is a result of the informal objective of national rejuvenation 
having been institutionalized, and then subsequently, through formal policies and 
regulations the state ensures that the objective of national rejuvenation is collectively 
shared among the state, SOEs, and SOE managers (Chapter 5 and 6). In knowing 
this, the first research implication is that the central government will not need to 
implement such tightly regulated systems on the cross-border M&A process. Upon 
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recognizing that the objective of national rejuvenation is collectively shared by 
SOEs and SOE leaders, which guarantees that all cross-border M&As are aligned 
with this belief; the state will therefore not need to implement such close regulation 
on the cross-border process. The Chinese government can, therefore, streamline the 
M&A process to reduce the level of authoritarian management during the cross-
border M&A processes to increase efficiency. One example includes the granting of 
more flexibility to the approval process of M&As by the state. Thus, directly leading 
to a less bureaucratic and more streamlined application process. This loosening of 
grip by the state, has two outcomes that merit note: 1) More cross-border M&As 
activity will be pursued by all Chinese firms and as a result, drive increased cross-
border M&A activity, therefore diversifying overseas investment portfolios and 
increasing the global footprint of Chinese firms. 2) The discussed streamlined 
approval process should directly increase the percentage of successfully completed 
deals. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, many of the cross-border M&A deals 
undertaken by SOEs, fail due to a lack of transparency on the Chinese side. This 
greatly frustrates the counterparties, and the state involvement is generally viewed as 
unnecessary. Currently M&A deals undertaken by SOEs are often plagued with 
extensive delays and often fail due lack of transparency on the Chinese side.  Thus 
by implementing a more streamlined M&A approval process, this would result in 
less bureaucratic hurdles as well as reducing the number of delays, and hence an 
increase in the deal success rate.  
 
(2) Secondly, regarding the implications for SOEs, in sharing the same underlying 
vision of national rejuvenation as the state, and upon formally institutionalizing this 
core objective; SOEs and SOE managers can therefore lobby for more autonomy and 
greater control over the cross-border M&A deals. Firstly, by increasing the amount 
of autonomy, an SOE would improve its efficiency, working operations and as s 
result, also improve its reputation. 56  Moreover, greater autonomy will better 
incentivize SOEs and SOEs managers to demonstrate initiative and perform more 
entrepreneurial driven M&A deals, as opposed to deals that are directed by the state 
and constrained within the boundaries of the state plans. As detailed in Chapter 6, 
SOEs are primarily respected as a result of the political power behind the 
                                                 
56 As detailed in point 1, the state-imposed guarantee on all aspects of the M&A process has resulted 
in SOEs being categorized by the counterparty as challenging to work with.  
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organizations. By undertaking cross-border M&As in-line with the objectives of 
national rejuvenation on their own account, it will therefore allow SOEs to 
demonstrate their own capabilities to conduct lucrative M&A deals with minimal 
state involvement. Thus ultimately would provide SOEs with increased credibility 
from their global peers. Secondly, as a result of increased autonomy, SOEs should 
have better chances to acquire more strategically lucrative M&A targets. This is 
because the enhanced distance between the SOE and the state would allow the SOEs 
to appear more independent, thus increasing the chances of deals undertaken by 
SOEs (particularly regarding technology targets) to pass the foreign approval 
boards.57 Finally, by increasing SOE autonomy, SOE managers can have greater 
control over when the cross-border M&A deals should be undertaken. That is, rather 
than immediately adapting the existing SOE strategy to meet evolving state targets 
and guidelines; SOEs instead, should be entrusted to conduct cross-border M&As 
deals that are in the best interest of the organization. Specifically, SOE should lead 
M&A deals when the time is right. That is, based on what is in-line with the SOE’s 
existing strategy and in the best interest of the organization, as opposed to being 
incentivized to meet state targets.  
 
(3) Concerning the implications for the cross-border target country, the theme of 
national rejuvenation and, its role as a motivator for Chinese SOEs to undertake 
cross-border M&As, has been highlighted by this research. Resultantly, target 
countries will now have a holistic institutional level understanding (both formal and 
informal), of some of the core motivations driving cross-border M&As. This should 
in turn, will facilitate a more informed understanding of the state-level dynamics 
underpinning the acquisitions. Understanding this should help target organizations 
better prepare themselves for the process and moreover, encourage them to carry out 
more thorough screening and vetting of proposals put forward by Chinese SOEs. To 
this end, national policies focused on the safeguarding of organizations in strategic 
industries can be developed, and thus, shield nations from an undesirably high 
number of acquisitions by Chinese SOEs. In sum, from the perspective of the target 
country, by having a complete institutional level understanding, the target country 
can better safeguard its own enterprises from foreign acquisitions, as well as be more 
                                                 
57 As discussed in Chapter 6, technology deals conducted by SOEs often do not pass the foreign 
approval boards on national security grounds, as SOEs are viewed as not independent from the state.   
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be informed to justify vetoing acquisitions within sensitive economic industries and 
the export of key foreign technology. 
 
(4) From the perspective of the firms targeted for acquisition by Chinese SOEs, these 
organizations may be able to gain additional confidence when dealing with SOEs, as 
a result of firstly, having a better understanding of the degree state involvement in 
the cross-border M&A process; and secondly, knowledge of the underlying 
motivations driving cross-border acquisitions. That is, given the stringent approval 
process on M&A deals, a target firm would now be equipped to better understand the 
reasons for a deal undergoing a long-winded vetting and approval process – this 
typically being the case for transactions deemed to be of strategic benefit to China. 
In understanding the effects of both the informal and formal institution on SOE 
behaviour, and moreover, how this often affects M&A outcomes, a target 
organization could leverage this in negotiations, securing a better outcome for their 
stakeholders. This is because acquisitions will usually have specific strategic 
relevance to China’s broader national objectives. In sum, a better understanding of 
the magnitude of political dynamics at play within SOEs and how these dynamics 
influence M&A, will afford target organizations with increased strength during 
negotiations.  
 
7.4 Limitations: Sample size   
 
This research completed a total of 32 interviews with 21 different interview 
participants, covering a total of 26 different SOEs. This could be considered as a 
relatively small sample size and thus, be singled out as a possible limitation. 
However, researchers in the past have argued there is no concrete definition of what 
is an acceptable sample size in qualitative research. For example, Creswell (1998) 
recommended a sample size of twenty to thirty interviews as sufficient for grounded 
theory studies. Guest et al. (2006) found that after twelve interviews, the data 
collected was sufficient to reach a saturation point and achieve the desired research 
objective. Bernard (2006) further supported this view, stating that there is no such 
minimum requirement in terms of total conducted interviews and moreover, that the 
pool of candidates and amount of data very much depends on the nature of the study. 
Furthermore, Mason (2010) and Morse (2000) emphasized that the quality of the 
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sample used should be determined by the individuals selected and the calibre of the 
interviews captured.  
In further support of the preceding statement, the following points serve to justify the 
sample size of this thesis further. Firstly, given that SOEs are all managed by the 
state and influenced by party objectives, it can be argued that SOEs are homogenous 
in nature thus limiting the need to attain a large and varied sample size. Secondly, as 
this research does not involve hypothesis testing, it does not require a large data 
sample, which is typically needed to refute, or support hypothesis testing (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). Lastly, following Mason (2010) and Morse (2000) notion of quality 
over quantity, as addressed in Chapter 4, high calibre interviews were acquired 
firstly by undertaking pilot studies to screen and pre-test all prepared questions. This 
allowed questions to be revised in terms of answerability, understanding, and 
sensitivity. Furthermore, and most critically, the obtained interviews of this research 
were with high-level industry experts, given based on trust and as a result of long-
established relationships built over several years. Because of this, participants were 
comfortable to speak candidly, allowing for the collection of rich and varied 
information. Therefore, in consideration of the preceding points, and moreover 
because of the rich nature of the sample acquired, it is countered that in the context 
of this thesis, the data obtained is fully sufficient to satisfy the objectives of this 
research. 
7.5 Suggested future directions of research  
 
This research has drawn attention to the significance of the informal and formal 
institution in the context of Chinese cross-border M&As by SOEs. That is, this 
research has illustrated an understanding of how cross-border M&As can be both 
culturally and politically motivated. This has shed light on the following new 
streams of research that merit further consideration.  
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Extension of this research in other economies  
 
Foremost, it is hoped that through a holistic understanding of both realms of the 
institutional effects, scholars and industry practitioners will recognize the 
significance that the institution can have in driving cross-border M&A. Thus 
inspiring the extension and development of this research. For example, determining 
whether institutional effects are also significant in driving cross-border M&As in 
other economies (both developed and developing). This research exposed the 
significance of the informal belief of national rejuvenation. However, despite China 
having a unique cultural identity, the overarching implications of national 
rejuvenation and national pride could also be key drivers to other nations seeking to 
regain past economic prominence or political influence. Given that the Chinese 
economy has consistently continued to experience substantial economic growth, a 
closer analysis into the economic significance of a state-driven top-down approach 
towards SOE management can be made. Therefore, scholars could extend this 
research to determine whether a transition from a decentralized democratic style of 
management, to a more centralized style – as seen in Chinese SOEs – would create 
economic gains for other nations and their state-owned organizations. 
 
Post-acquisition synergy analysis   
 
Finally, one of the key findings of this research was the illustration of the 
significance of national rejuvenation on motivating cross-border M&As by Chinese 
SOEs. Therefore, in order for the state to achieve this, it is critical to ensure that 
upon acquiring the target organizations, Chinese SOEs are equipped to generate 
positive post-acquisition synergy. Thus, this research can be extended by analyzing 
the post-M&A performance of the acquisitions.  
 
When cross-border M&A deals occur, it is understood that the most challenging task 
a firm is faced with, is for the firm to integrate operations to best maximize the new 
resources. This is because of the complexity associated with differences in values, 
norms, and culture. When an M&A deal involves the merging of two cultures, it is 
critical for the success of the transaction that the organizations integrate culturally. 
However, post M&A cultural integration between two parties from with varying 
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cultures often struggle to generate synergy, because the firms are viewed as separate 
entities as opposed to interdependent.  
 
This research has shown that the majority of M&A deals led by Chinese SOEs are 
undertaken in Europe (as per Chapter 2). Because of the cultural differences between 
European acquisition targets and SOEs – whether linguistic, organizational, or 
managerial – efforts must be applied in order to create synergy and secure longevity. 
Therefore, future research could set out to determine the post-acquisition factors, that 
are critical to achieving organizational synergy and post-acquisition longevity. This 
is most important due to the significance that these acquisitions have in relation to 
China's strategic objectives. That is, assuring post-acquisition success and 
subsequent value creation of cross-border M&A deals, should have a direct and, 
positive impact on China's ultimate objective of achieving national rejuvenation. 
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Appendix 1.1  
 
Table 1. Cumulative total of cross-border deals undertaken by Chinese SOEs’ by industry 
(2002 – 2016) 
 
Industry 
 
 
Total by number of deals (%) 
 
Total by value of deals (%) 
 
Manufacturing 49.6 44.3 
Natural resources 27.0 23.1 
Finance 12.2 23.9 
Retail 5.2 2.2 
Technology 2.6 6.3 
Others 3.5 0.2 
Total  100 100 
Data source: Zephyr M&A database. Constructed by the author 
 
*Notes: 
Total number of deals: 115  
Total value of deals: $983.9 (100 mill USD) 
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Table 2. Industry distribution of Chinese SOEs’ cross-border M&A targets regionally by number of deals 
Panel A. Europe 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry  No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % 
1 Natural resources 3 60 1 Manufacturing  4 80 1 Manufacturing  31 66.7 
2 Manufacturing  2 40 2 Others 1 20 2 Natural resources 7 14.6 
 Finance  - -  Finance - - 3 Retail 4 8.3 
 Retail - -  Natural resources - - 4 Technology 2 4.2 
 Technology - -  Retail - - 4 Others 2 4.2 
 Others - -  Technology - - 6 Finance  1 2.1 
 Total 5 100  Total 5 100  Total 47 100 
Panel B. Asia 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % 
1 Manufacturing  3 60 1 Natural resources 3 50 1 Natural resources 3 33.3 
2 Natural resources 2 40 2 Manufacturing  2 33.3 2 Manufacturing 2 22.2 
 Finance  - - 3 Finance  1 16.7 2 Finance 2 22.2 
 Retail - -  Retail - - 4 Technology 1 11.1 
 Technology - -  Technology - - 4 Others 1 11.1 
 Other - -  Other - -  Retail - - 
 Total 5 100  Total 6 100  Total 9 100 
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Panel C. North America 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry  No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % 
1 Manufacturing 3 75 1 Manufacturing 2 50 1 Manufacturing 5 62.5 
2 Finance 1 25 2 Finance 1 25 2 Finance 2 25 
 Natural resources - - 2 Retail 1 25 3 Natural resources 1 12.5 
 Retail - -  Natural resources - -  Retail - - 
 Technology - -  Technology - -  Technology - - 
 Others - -  Others - -  Others - - 
 Total 4 100  Total 4 100  Total 8 100 
Panel D. South America 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % 
1 Natural resources 1 100 1 Natural resources 2 100 1 Natural resources 5 45.5 
 Finance - -  Finance - - 2 Finance 4 36.4 
 Manufacturing - -  Manufacturing - - 3 Manufacturing 1 9.1 
 Retail - -  Retail - - 3 Retail 1 9.1 
 Technology - -  Technology - -  Technology - - 
 Others - -  Others - -  Others - - 
 Total 1 100  Total 2 100  Total 11 100 
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Panel E. Oceania 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry  No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % 
1 Natural resources 1 100 1 Natural resources 1 50 1 Natural resources 2 66.7 
 Finance - - 1 Finance 1 50 2 Manufacturing 1 33.3 
 Manufacturing - -  Manufacturing - -  Finance - - 
 Retail - -  Retail - -  Retail - - 
 Technology - -  Technology - -  Technology - - 
 Others - -  Others - -  Others - - 
 Total 1 100  Total 2 100  Total 3 100 
Panel F. Africa 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % Rank Industry No. of deals % 
 Finance - - 1 Finance 1 100 1 Manufacturing 1 100 
 Manufacturing - -  Manufacturing - -  Finance - - 
 Natural resources - -  Natural resources - -  Natural resources - - 
 Retail - -  Retail - -  Retail - - 
 Technology - -  Technology - -  Technology - - 
 Other - -  Other - -  Others - - 
 Total    Total 1 100  Total 1 100 
Data source: Zephyr M&A database. Constructed by author 
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Table 3. Industry distribution of Chinese SOEs’ cross-border M&A targets regionally by value of deal (100 mil USD) 
Panel A. Europe 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry  Value % Rank Industry Value % Rank Industry Value % 
1 Natural resources 1.9 60.3 1 Manufacturing 3.8 81.9 1 Manufacturing 162.9 51.4 
2 Manufacturing 1.3 39.7 2 Others 0.8 22.1 2 Natural resources 64.6 20.4 
 Finance - -  Finance - - 3 Retail 60.4 19.0 
 Technology - -  Natural resources - - 4 Finance 21.7 6.9 
 Retail - -  Retail - - 5 Technology 6.9 2.2 
 Others - -  Technology - - 6 Others 0.7 0.2 
 Total 3.2 100  Total 4.6 100  Total 317.2 100 
Panel B. Asia 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry Value % Rank Industry Value % Rank Industry Value % 
1 Manufacturing  3.9 53.4 1 Manufacturing 0.2 50 1 Manufacturing 59.0 33.3 
2 Natural resources 3.4 46.6 2 Natural resources 51.7 33.3 2 Natural resources 8.0 22.2 
 Finance  - - 3 Finance 2.8 16.7 2 Finance 84.9 22.2 
 Retail - -  Retail - - 4 Technology 1.7 11.1 
 Technology - -  Technology - - 4 Others 0.1 11.1 
 Other - -  Others - -  Retail - - 
 Total 7.3 100  Total 54.7 100  Total 153.7 100 
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Panel C. North America 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry  Value % Rank Industry Value % Rank Industry Value % 
1 Manufacturing 1.6 98.2 1 Finance 0.8 74.5 1 Manufacturing 191.1 81.4 
2 Finance 0.03 1.8 2 Manufacturing 0.2 21.8 2 Finance 43.7 18.6 
 Natural resources - - 3 Retail 0.04 3.7 3 Natural resources 0.1 0.04 
 Retail - -  Natural resources - -  Retail - - 
 Technology - -  Technology - -  Technology - - 
 Others - -  Others - -  Others - - 
 Total 1.63 100  Total 1.01 100  Total 234.9 100 
Panel D. South America 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry Value % Rank Industry Value % Rank Industry Value % 
1 Natural resources 1 100 1 Natural resources 0.1 100 1 Finance 93.7 60.9 
 Finance - -  Finance - - 2 Natural resources 48.3 31.3 
 Manufacturing - -  Manufacturing - - 3 Manufacturing 12 7.8 
 Retail - -  Retail - - 4 Retail 0.004 0.003 
 Technology - -  Technology - -  Technology - - 
 Others - -  Others - -  Others - - 
 Total 1 100  Total 0.1 100  Total 154.0 100 
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Panel E. Oceania 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry  Value % Rank Industry Value % Rank Industry Value % 
1 Natural resources 0.2 100 1 Natural resources 29.1 93.6 1 Natural resources 19.0 98.8 
 Finance - - 2 Finance 2.0 6.4 2 Manufacturing 0.03 0.2 
 Manufacturing - -  Manufacturing - -  Finance - - 
 Retail - -  Retail - -  Retail - - 
 Technology - -  Technology - -  Technology - - 
 Others - -  Others - -  Others - - 
 Total 0.2 100  Total 31.1 100  Total 19.03 100 
Panel F. Africa 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Industry Value % Rank Industry Value % Rank Industry Value % 
 Finance - - 1 Finance 0.2 100 1 Manufacturing 0.02 100 
 Manufacturing - -  Manufacturing - -  Finance - - 
 Natural resources - -  Natural resources - -  Natural resources - - 
 Retail - -  Retail - -  Retail - - 
 Technology - -  Technology - -  Technology - - 
 Other - -  Other - -  Others - - 
 Total    Total 0.2 100  Total 0.02 100 
Data source: Zephyr M&A database. Constructed by author 
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Table 4. Top 3 largest single cross-border M&A deals by Chinese SOEs’ from each period  
 
Panel A. 10th FYP 2002-2005 
 
    
 
 
Rank Acquirer Target Target Country Target Industry 
Deal value  
100 mil USD 
Year 
1 Beijing Oriental Electronic Technology Group Hynix semiconductor Inc. South Korea Manufacturing 3.8 2003 
2 Petrochina Co. Ltd Devon energy Corporation Indonesia Natural resources 2.6 2002 
3 Weifang Yaxing Chemical Co. Ltd Bayer Chemicals (Texas) United states Natural resources 1.2 2005 
3 Weifang Yaxing Chemical Co. Ltd Bayer Porofor (Leverkusen) Germany Natural resources  1.2 2005 
 
Panel B. 11th FYP 2006-2010 
 
    
 
 
Rank Acquirer Target Target Country Target Industry 
Deal value  
100 mil USD 
Region 
1 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Udmurtneft OAO Russia Natural resources 35.0 2006 
2 Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. Ltd Felix Resources Ltd Australia Natural resources 29.1 2009 
3 Huaneng Power International Inc. Sinosing Power PTE Ltd Singapore  Natural resources 16.1 2008 
 
Panel C. 12th FYP / 13th FYP 2011-2016 
 
    
 
 
Rank Acquirer Target Target Country Target Industry 
Deal value  
100 mil USD 
Year 
1 Bank of Communications Co Ltd Banco BBM SA Brazil Finance  83.7 2016 
2 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd Tekstil Bankasi SA Turkey Finance 82.3 2015 
3 
Nangtong Jiangshan  
Agrochemical & Chemicals Co Ltd. 
Ladda Group Holdings  
Co Ltd.  
Thailand Manufacturing 59.0 2013 
Data source: Zephyr M&A database. Constructed by author 
 224 
Table 5. Industry distribution of cross-border M&A targets by Chinese SOEs’ and Non-state enterprises (number of deals) (1 of 3)  
Panel A. Manufacturing  
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % 
1 SOEs  8 88.9 1 SOEs  8 44.4 1 SOEs  44 40.0 
2 Non-state enterprise 1 11.1 2 Non-state enterprise 10 55.6 2 Non-state enterprise 66 60.0 
 Total 9 100  Total 18 100  Total 110 100 
Panel B. Natural Resources  
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % 
1 SOEs  7 100 1 SOEs  6 100 1 SOEs  18 64.3 
2 Non-state enterprise 0 0.0 2 Non-state enterprise 0 0.0 2 Non-state enterprise 10 35.7 
 Total 7 100  Total 6 100  Total    28 100 
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Table 5 continued (2 of 3) 
Panel C. Finance  
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % 
1 SOEs  1 100 1 SOEs  4 80 1 SOEs  10 71.4 
2 Non-state enterprise 0 0.0 2 Non-state enterprise 1 20 2 Non-state enterprise 4 28.6 
 Total 1 100  Total 5 100  Total 14 100 
Panel D. Technology  
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % 
1 SOEs  1 100 1 SOEs  0 0.0 1 SOEs  3 25 
2 Non-state enterprise 0 0.0 2 Non-state enterprise 0 0.0 2 Non-state enterprise 9 75 
 Total 1 100  Total 0 0.0  Total   12 100 
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Table 5 continued (3 of 3) 
Panel E. Retail 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % 
1 SOEs  0 0.0 1 SOEs  2 66.7 1 SOEs  5 29.4 
2 Non-state enterprise 0 0.0 2 Non-state enterprise 1 33.3 2 Non-state enterprise 12 70.6 
 Total 0 0.0  Total 3 100  Total 17 100 
Panel F. Others 
10th FYP  
2002-2005 
11th FYP 
2006-2010 
12th FYP / 13th FYP 
2011-2016 
Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % Rank Firm No. of deals % 
1 SOEs  0 0.0 1 SOEs  1 100 1 SOEs  3 23.1 
2 Non-state enterprise 0 0.0 2 Non-state enterprise 0 0.0 2 Non-state enterprise 10 76.9 
 Total 0 0.0  Total 1 100  Total    13 100 
Data source: Zephyr M&A database. Constructed by the author 
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Appendix 2.1  
 
Invitation for Interview 
 
 
PhD candidate: Ms. Kim Bui 
Tel: +44 79177 65639 
kb11@soas.ac.uk 
  
 
Motivations for cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A)  
by Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs). 
 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research that aims to determine the 
motivations for cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) by Chinese state 
owned enterprises (SOEs). In partaking in this research, it would involve either a 
face-to-face interview or a telephone interview with the researcher to discuss your 
thoughts on this subject matter.  
 
Enclosed is a Participant Information Pack which provides you with further 
information regarding this research. This includes a research synopsis, answers to 
questions you may have, and a participant consent form.  
 
Should you have any questions regarding taking part in this research please do 
contact me on the details found at the top of this letter. 
 
Thank you for taking the taking time to read this invitation. 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Kim Bui  
 
 
Kim Bui  
PhD candidate  
School of Finance and Management  
SOAS, University of London
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Appendix 2.2  
 
Participant Information Pack 
 
Motivations for cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A)  
by Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs). 
 
 
Synopsis of Research 
 
This research would like to explore the impact of China’s past historical 
achievements on influencing the informal and formal institution and subsequent 
effect on motivating cross-border M&As. This research proposes that the behaviour 
of Chinese SOEs and subsequent cross-border M&A transactions are a result of the 
effects of both the formal and informal institutions. It has been well documented that 
formal policies, targets, and guidelines set by the central government can encourage 
the internationalization in the form of cross-border M&As. However, there has been 
little research conducted on how the significance of informal beliefs such as national 
rejuvenation and pride can also influence the formal institution to encourage cross-
border transactions. This research will therefore take an inductive grounded theory 
approach to determine the dynamic interactions of the formal and informal 
institution on motivating cross boarder M&A transactions by Chinese SOEs.  
 
Given the interconnectedness of SOEs and the central government, this research will 
therefore explore the motivations at the national, organizational, and individual 
levels, and across four industries: natural resources, finance, manufacturing, and 
technology  
 
 
Why have I been selected to take part? 
You have been selected to take part in this research because it is believed that your 
expert knowledge and experiences on the Chinese economy, SOEs, and in the field 
of M&As will provide invaluable insight into determining the motivations for cross-
border M&As by SOEs.  
 
What is required of me? 
The researcher will arrange a time that is most convenient for you to be interviewed. 
The interview can be done in person or over the phone. The researcher will ask you 
some questions such as about your experiences on the Chinese economy, working 
with SOEs, and your opinions on the Chinese institution. It is expected that the 
interview will be approximately one hour, and with your permission the interview 
will be audio-recorded.  
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Do I have to participate in this research? 
The interview is entirely voluntary. Should you not want to take part, you can 
decline without reason to be interviewed. Even if you do take part, you are free to 
withdraw at any stage of the interview process.  
 
Will my participation be kept confidential? 
This research will follow the Chatham House Rule, this means the researcher is free 
to use the information received, however, the identity and affiliation of the interview 
participant cannot be revealed. Any information given will be used solely for the 
purpose of this research. At no stage during the research process will the participant 
identification be disclosed.  Excerpts from the interview may be included in the final 
thesis however your name or any identifying characters will remain anonymous and 
confidential. 
 
What will my information be used for? 
It is hoped that with your participation and the data collected using your interview 
will assist in generating a new theory explaining the cross-border M&A 
phenomenon. This research would like to illustrate the institutional dynamics for 
motivating outbound M&As. From your answers this research can also determine the 
drivers for cross-border M&As from the national, organisational and individual level 
by Chinese SOEs. 
 
What if there is a problem?  
If you have any concerns regarding any aspect of this research, you can speak to the 
researcher directly (contact details below) so that the researcher can do their best to 
address your concerns. If you remain concerned or unhappy you can formally 
contact the researchers’ supervisor Dr. Eunsuk Hong on +44 (0)20 7898 4564 or 
eh19@soas.ac.uk. 
 
I want to take part, what shall I do?  
If you would like to take part, then please contact the researcher Ms. Kim Bui or  
+44 79177 65639 or by email on kb11@soas.ac.uk.  
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Appendix 2.3  
 
Participant Consent Form 
 
Motivations for cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A)  
by Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs). 
 
 
 
          Please tick 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information pack 
provided for this research.  I have had the opportunity to ask 
questions and have had these questions answered.   
 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to 
withdraw from the interview at any time.   
I understand that the interview will be audio-recorded and give 
permission for the researcher to listen to the recording of my 
interview. 
 
 
I agree the researcher is free to use the information received; 
however, my identity and any identities affiliated with me must 
not be revealed. 
 
 
I agree to take part in this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________                 ______________                   __________________ 
Name of Participant                              Date                                         Signature  
 
 
Name of Researcher: Ms. Kim Bui (PhD Candidate) 
School of Finance and Management  
SOAS, University of London 
Tel: +44 79177 65639 
kb11@soas.ac.uk 
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Appendix 2.4 
A Sample of the interview transcripts 
 
 
Motivations for cross-border M&As by Chinese SOEs  
 
Semi-structured interview for China M&A experts 
 
Interview session: 1  
Date: 06/12/2017 
Start time: 16:06 (China standard time) 
Finish time: 17:20 (China standard time) 
Location: Participant in Beijing (interview over the telephone) 
 
Personal background of interviewee:  
Sex: Male  
Position: M&A advisory for MNE 
Years experience: 8 
Involved SOEs: ChemChina, COFCO, Sinopec, CNPC. StateGrid 
 
(I = interviewer) and (G = interviewee) 
 
I: Why do you think is the rationale for SOEs to conduct overseas M&A? 
G: Hm…to explain a little bit… SOEs are not government but they are owned 
by government and they operate the decision making level very much like 
the government but those are officially appointed… When you’re not 
incentivized like a commercial organization like a private company, then 
you have the reason to believe that the behavior is more quasi government 
than economically profit driven... It’s like you won’t be able to imagine the 
head of Sinopec and CNPC the two largest oil companies in China, you 
know the head of them can swop just by the government! If BP and Shell 
CEO will swop tomorrow you will be shocked! Like… it’s never going to 
happen!  So in this sense, they are quasi-government so each of them 
actually have a region they can operate in. Um…for example, you are the 
StateGrid company, you have a parameter in which you can operate in, if 
you are the electric company for Shanghai then you authorization to operate 
within the Shanghai region. Now by time when you have grown large 
enough and you have dominated every part of your own region, the 
problem being where next can you go, because going out of your 
authorization region which if you are a private company is the natural 
incentive, for them it is impossible which means you are trespassing 
someone else’s territory and that's political suicide! You have no incentive 
to do that! hm…so in that respect…going abroad and acquiring something 
overseas is one of the ways they can grow, because that's very safe. It 
means I’m creating something as per governments incentive policy of going 
out and I have the parameters to grow. All these big companies measure 
their success to an extent by their size, and with their ability to attain cheap 
guarantee financing from the Chinese banks. Sometimes this is one of the 
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most effective way forward for them to build up their political resume per 
say... So yes you can say this is some sort of pride for them because by 
doing that they have sort of created something when there is nowhere else 
to go because if they have dominated 95% of the market then there’s not 
really any more room to move forward so that's one of the incentive we 
actually see quite often is because there is nowhere else to go…they have 
lots of guarantee of cheap financing available at hand so they can do it and 
if they want to grow then going overseas is the inevitable option for some 
of them. Whether that makes economic sense is actually another matter... 
um for them as long as… um well… if you think about economic decision, 
fundamentally speaking your return is hurdled by your rate of financing, 
like if you can borrow money at 0% then anything will have a positive 
impact, so you will go and pursue it because you earn money. So if you are 
an SOE and you have access to cheap financing then for them the hurdle 
rate is actually quite low, it’s getting less and less now, but several years 
ago you would see people pursing at crazy prices which shocked 
infrastructures funds and then everybody was saying “that's a bit you 
know… in our calculations that doesn't work.” And you know also SOEs 
don't sell. They have something in their pocket and they need it to be there 
and to be a size indicator so they have no intention to sell... But we do see 
companies that are forced to, like COFCO is obviously having problems at 
the moment because previous acquisitions turned out to not be as they 
imagined it to be. Like Syngenta and ChemChina where they discovered 
the deal was getting out of hand.  
G But uh ChemChina specifically… so their incentive is actually back-driven.  
So as ChemChina, they are having a lot of tasks from the nation, so like 
some of the provincial government have some near bankruptcy local level 
SOEs, so actually they will have ChemChina absorbed them! And then, you 
will see… they are one of the larger SOEs so they have the capability to 
solve employment issues, they have the money and power and human 
resource to turn things around - and even if they can turn the entire 
operation around. So…this is also one of the ways the government operates 
in China. ChemChina, what they are trying to do… well, they are trying to 
acquire state of the art company in the industry and they introduce those 
markets and the sort of international operating standard back into China… 
so they actually which is quite rare really! They are actually trying to make 
themselves profitable in the sense where they acquire something that is 
really profitable. For example, they have 100 billion in assets, they have 1 
billion in net profit so that's about 1% and they now acquire something 
that's 50 billion in total assets but 20 billion in net profits…You can do the 
math’s, that is something that will really incentivize them…because they 
can say look we have improved our profitability by doing this! Because 
literally, it's a math’s game. I’m introducing something that is much more 
high quality and profitability… in comparison to myself, the grand 
conglomerate is going to be a better company! This model is not universal, 
it’s less common and actually its much risker because the head of 
ChemChina is in deep trouble. Because the Syngenta move is getting out of 
his hand. He has promised a 3 billion breakup fee without telling SASAC, 
when SASAC found out they were shocked, because ChemChina are not 
authorized to use taxpayers money to that extent. You are risking 3 billion 
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USD worth of public money, to him it’s like common commercial terms for 
doing a 45 billion deal and 3 billion breakup fee sounds reasonable but to 
the government, they are like… I don't care what you have been doing but 
that 3 billion USD sounds a bit unusual…Uh I think he is in a lot of trouble 
because the state is being forced into this position because of him. It's a 
little bit like too big to fall.  
I: So what will happen to the ChemChina CEO? 
G: He is being lifted in the air the Chinese way… So his decision is still there, 
his name is still on the website but everything has been taken out of his 
hands. So he is literally now, just a puppet sitting at the chairman seat. I 
mean you could place that on anyone, he loses his actual power. No one is 
going to speak to him because they don't want to look like they are in his 
inner circle, so it's a bit pathetic.  
I: Was ChemChina specifically chosen by SASAC to pursue Syngenta or 
was it a deal they found on their own? 
G: Uh, I think its a little bit weird… to an extent it was mutual. I think in this 
case, his initiative was probably the major force behind it but if you’re 
going to pursue something that size without a covert indication from 
SASAC…well look, how the SOE operates in overseas investment, they 
will have a report at the beginning of the year that lays out every aspect of 
their operations to the shareholder i.e. the SASAC, and within it they will 
detail. So like, if they have any plans they will say it, and that's usually the 
way SOEs operate because if you say that and that has been approved then 
when you are actually pursuing them in the middle of the year, you don't 
need any subsequent approval or registration with SASAC or more because 
they acknowledge your plans. Now for Syngenta, given the fact that this is 
very optimistic coming on the market. No one would have predicted it 
would be on the market, then I would say, it’s probably not included in 
their M&A plans. But before when they acquired Pirelli, I think the State is 
actually quite happy because Pirelli is a very good asset… although they 
paid a considerable price, but they have successfully merged the two of 
them to create a conglomerate that works for Pirelli and themselves. Before 
Syngenta they were… sort of a hero, and now after they have become a 
little bit… hard to define really. Not a happy ending.  
I: Given socialist responsibility of SOEs, how do you think that affects the 
performance of SOEs? 
G: If you’re looking at the SOEs before 2016, none of them were profitable, 
well most of them were struggling on the break-even point! You can check 
the net profit level of them, at the moment I think most of them are doing 
better because of the state efforts to trying to eliminate the private sector in 
the upstream level i.e. the raw materials like the steel company, chemical 
industry… they basically control most natural resources of the country. At 
the moment they are doing good. In terms of the social responsibility point, 
they are the pioneers of developing this country, so at the very beginning 
the communist party laid down their strengths, in doing so they promoted 
the entire economy by their firm grips on the entire country through the 
SOEs! Because they are quasi-government and they are doing things not 
entirely economic but with plans laid out for the country… so I don't really 
think profitability has been their goal from the very beginning. They try not 
to make a loss yes. 
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I: How involved is the state in the SOE process?  
G: The state is not very involved to be honest. What the government is doing is 
that, hm they have sort of grant initiatives, for example the belt and road 
initiative. So they won’t directly be involved in a transaction of course 
except Syngenta which is in a bit of trouble and is racing a bit too high, but 
generally they won’t. Their involvement is firstly laid out in policies, 
initiatives, mm… the initiative are actually, well if you’re doing something 
towards it then you can easily get credit. It’s much more easier and you 
have sovereign funds, you have the banks, when you say you’re doing 
something within the belt initiative, the bank will say OK… So that the 
promoting area so we will treat you differently. Secondly, when you’re 
doing the deal, the state has the veto right. The veto right is subtle, when 
you are doing a deal you need to report to them, in theory they can veto it, 
in reality it doesn't happen. The SASAC level is more of an informed basis. 
Hmm for example, you are a utility company and you are acquiring utility 
related that is fine but if you are going to acquire Apple tomorrow then 
you’re probably going to get called out…what is that and how is that 
related to your major business? It's still a bit related to the first story I 
told… they have their authorized area and they can operate…they can go 
overseas but you still have to operate within your own arena and not go out 
into something else. And of course now… the real estate properties are 
being literally banned by the central government.  So if you’re doing it as 
an SOE, that would be very unwise. As a decision maker, worst case 
scenario they will remove you from your seat. They will not choose to do 
that because if they do that it shows they have previously made a mistake 
by putting you there and you don't really want that. In terms of emergency 
or something like that they have the authority.  
I: So the target is selected by the SOE and not allocated by the central 
government? 
G: No, the central government won’t have that kind of resources to do it.  
I: So it sounds like SOEs actually have quite of lot of autonomy 
G: Yes of course! As long as they follow the initiatives set by the state. They 
have much better access to credit than private companies, it’s not even 
comparable.  
I: So are SOEs able to perform profitably? 
G: The SOEs entire purpose of existence is not profit driven. Mm… from the 
very beginning they have their purpose and that purpose just happened to 
be not very economically driven and that's it. For them, it all comes down 
to the chairman, number 1, or party secretary of that SOE. If he has high 
political ambition, then he will try to do something to promote himself. If 
he is less ambition type then he will obviously live a good life but at the 
same time try not make mistakes. 
I: The C-level managers of SOEs, who appoints them there? 
G: Hmm…that's actually a tricky question, so usually the decision makers i.e. 
board level will consist who been in the SOE for a very long time and 
people who are from whatever sources. So, for example, the head of 
SASAC was the previous head of CNPC. So… you will have intermingle 
selection and then sometimes you will have few political players like 
provincial heads who’s been defeated in his political career and has been 
put into an SOE as a deputy executive chairman or something…Its difficult 
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to say but usually a mix of these so people being appointed by the top and 
you've had people who have been there for their lifetime. 
I: So the appointment is not just politically appointed, they have expertise 
in their field? 
G: There will be political intermingle for sure but in the decision making 
level… I think the spirit is… so you will see people who have been 
transferred regularly between the SOE just to avoid them having too much 
influence in one of the SOE. If you think about it, if you are the head of 
Sinopec, in some of the local provinces your company employs significant 
amount of the GDP, so you are looking at one of the only sort of power that 
has authority across the entire nation. Its acting a very dangerous thing to 
have, and if you think about China Tobacco company who has I believe 
cash reserves of 1 trillion USD in cash, you will see if they really want 
spend their money into a very against government way, they have a huge 
leverage of doing that, they can acquire Apple plus Microsoft tomorrow. 
SOEs are powerful organizations.  
I: So does the political aspirations really drive SOE managers? 
G: To some extent, to some of them yes…and to some of them it’s difficult to 
say. To me I would say to some of them, to be a head of an SOE it will be 
the end of their career anyway. So to them, hmm… but I think for lots of 
them that will be their end of game so what they will try to do is to stay put, 
smile and act steadily and to just retire. And they will have a lifelong 
guarantee pension, medical care for life and for their family. 
I: Do you have any final remarks? 
G: The fact is, China is a huge entity, thinking about it, China is the size of 
Europe, we have a huge population and so it’s very very difficult a few 
people to govern this place. Think about it…just look at how the EU is 
falling apart every week. You will have very similar situation where 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong share the same the culture, language or way of 
doing things. I come from Guangzhou and I live in Beijing and I realize 
how different the people are, that's just normal. You go to London and you 
expect to see people very differently from Paris and Paris to London is only 
2 hours in flight and I am flying from Beijing to Guangzhou and it takes me 
4 hours! So it’s actually, how to manage the country and how to govern the 
country in China is actually quite something much more difficult than you 
can think of. The only sort of democracy country in the world that has a 
large span of population is the US and they existed since 1876 that's 200+ 
plus years. Beijing has 30 million living in the city and Australia as a 
continent has 25 million so the entire way as to how to govern the country 
is much more difficult and different than the Western way of thinking it 
will be. And… if you’re thinking how diversify the country is, if you use 
democracy to do it, it won’t work, I’m pretty sure. The relationship between 
the state and M&A activities, it’s not like I’m telling you what to do and 
you go and do it. It’s more like, I’m promoting this, and if you do it you 
will get preferential treatment even this way or that way, because I am the 
government and I hold absolute power and authority to grant you whatever 
I think is appropriate. It is within my power, you will have my gratitude and 
you will have more influence. Probably not in the way you desire but the 
country does have a way to send its gratitude. The state can send its 
direction and move things in a way but it does not micro manage. It’s more 
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of a macro way of looking at things. At the moment if you make your case 
to the state council, you will have the state backing and you will have bank 
financing, if you can let us see your plans, if you get approval of the plan 
then you will have state backing. That's how the relationship goes, you can 
take a look at September 2016, we have sort of a note from the government 
saying we have foreign no go areas, don't do it. For SOEs they will not do it 
because its political suicide. For private sector if you dare to do that, even if 
you manage to do it you will know the consequences of it. So if you do… 
then don't let anyone know or move overseas resources to do it. Don't 
bother the state at all. They will also have areas of promotion as well, they 
will encourage you to do that and if you fall in that general direction then 
you really have preferential financial backing; you will have easier approval 
process within the state departments. 
I: OK, thank you so much for taking the time to participant in this 
research, the information you have provided has been really insightful. 
 
END. 
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Appendix 2.5 
 
Table 6. The list of potential interview questions adopted by this research 
Research questions Potential interview questions 
1. Warm up question WQ1. Have you witnessed any recent developments in the 
Chinese M&A field? 
WQ2. What do you think the motivations are for Chinese cross-
border M&A? 
 
 
2.  
What are the distinctive 
features of the 
institutionalization 
process in the China 
specific context? 
 
RQ2-(1)  
National level 
Q1 How significant is the century of 
humiliation to the Chinese people? 
Q2 Does China feel a responsibility to 
revive its nation? 
RQ2-(2) 
Organizational level 
Q1 Do you think SOEs have a degree of 
pride in carrying out overseas 
investments? 
Q2 Are SOEs nationalistic 
organizations? 
Q3 Are SOEs driven to carry out state 
orders? 
RQ2-(3) 
Individual level 
Q1 What motivate SOEs leaders to 
fulfill state plans? 
Q2 Are SOE leaders members of the 
Communist party? 
3.  
How does the Chinese-
style institutionalization 
process facilitate the 
unique characteristics 
of cross-border M&A 
activities by Chinese 
state owned enterprises 
(SOEs)? 
RQ3-(1)  
National level 
Q1 How involved are the Chinese 
government in cross-border acquisition? 
Q2 Can you explain the M&A process? 
Q3 The idea to conduct an M&A – 
where does it come from? 
RQ3-(2) 
Organizational level 
Q2 To what extent must the SOEs deals 
be profit driven vs. socially driven? 
Q2 How much freedom do SOEs have?  
Q3 What is the global reputation of 
Chinese SOEs? 
RQ3-(3) 
Individual level 
Q1 Who chooses the SOE managers? 
Q2 Post successful M&A, what will 
happen to the SOE manager? 
Q3 How capable are Chinese managers? 
4. Concluding questions CQ1. Is there anything you consider important that you would 
like to add? 
 
Notes: Questions were subject to change on the day of the interviews and were asked in no 
particular order. 
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